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My dissertation participates in a developing body of Romantic criticism that 
seeks to trace the crucial, yet uncertain, relationship between Romanticism 
and the Gothic. Recent studies argue persuasively for the influence of gothic 
aesthetics on the major poets of the Romantic era, yet surprisingly little 
attention has been given to Percy Bysshe Shelley, for whom, more than any 
other Romantic, the gothic sensibility arguably provided the most powerful 
and lasting influence during the course of his career. Shelley’s earliest 
publications, including his two gothic novels—Zastrozzi, a Romance and St. 
Irvyne; or, The Rosicrucian—have received scant critical attention and 
demand an analysis that approaches these early works with the same 
theoretical rigor that his mature poetry receives. I employ the insights of 
Lacanian psychoanalytic theory to interrogate my distinction between the 
Shelleyan subject of Romanticism and the Shelleyesque subject of Gothicism. 
Where the Shelleyan gaze finds synthesis, desire, pleasure, sublimity, 
benevolence, and being; the Shelleyesque gaze finds antagonism, drive, 
  
 
jouissance, monstrosity, perversion, and lack. Rather than an undisciplined 
juvenile phase of Shelley’s development, the Shelleyesque continues to 
operate throughout his mature poetry in unsettling and provocative ways, 
particularly in works such as Prometheus Unbound—generally considered to 
be Shelley’s most idealistic attempt to transcend the political, sexual, and 
psychological antagonisms associated with the gothic tradition—further 
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My dissertation participates in a developing body of Romantic criticism that 
seeks to trace the crucial, yet uncertain, relationship between Romanticism 
and the Gothic. Michael Gamer, in Romanticism and the Gothic, points out 
that “at the end of the eighteenth and beginning of the nineteenth century . . . 
neither ‘gothic’ nor ‘romantic’ had yet taken their modern meanings” and that 
the Gothic is rather “a discursive site crossing the genres” (2-3). Recent 
studies such as Gamer’s, Anne Williams’s Art of Darkness: A Poetics of 
Gothic, Thomas Pfau’s Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and 
Melancholy, Robert Miles’s Gothic Writing, David Richter’s The Progress of 
Romance, Stephen Bruhm’s Gothic Bodies, and Ellen Brinks’s Gothic 
Masculinity, argue persuasively for the influence of Gothic aesthetics on the 
major poets of the Romantic era. Miles and Williams, in particular, inform my 
approach to the Gothic. For Miles, the Gothic is not a set of conventions, but a 
“a ‘carnivalesque’ mode for representations of the fragmented subject. Both 
the generic multiplicity of the Gothic, and what one might call its discursive 
primacy, effectively detach the Gothic from the tidy simplicity of thinking of it 
as so many predictable, fictional conventions” (4). Similarly, for Anne 
Williams the Gothic “outlines a large, irregularly shaped figure, an irregularity 
that implies the limitations of language—appropriate for the category 
containing [the] unspeakable ‘other’” (23). Ultimately, for Williams, the 
Gothic “is a discourse that shows the cracks in the system that constitutes 
consciousness, ‘reality’” (66). Williams, as does Jerrold Hogle, models her 
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approach on Julia Kristeva’s theory of the “abject,” or the “throwing off” of 
fundamental inconsistencies of our being. According to Kristeva, the “abject 
has only one quality of the object—that of being opposed to I” (1) and that 
there is “nothing like the abjection of self to show that all abjection is in fact 
recognition of the want on which any being, meaning, language, or desire is 
founded” (5). In terms of the Gothic, Hogle argues that characters in Gothic 
fiction “deal with the tangled contradictions fundamental to their existence by 
throwing them off onto ghostly or monstrous counterparts that then seem 
‘uncanny’ in their unfamiliar familiarity . . .” (5).  
 As impressive and important as these recent studies are, surprisingly 
little attention is given to Percy Bysshe Shelley, for whom, more than any 
other Romantic, the Gothic arguably provided the most powerful and lasting 
influence during the course of his career. Although Shelley claimed, in an oft-
quoted letter to Godwin, that by 1812 he was no longer a “votary of Romance,” 
his reading habits and poetic interests suggest instead that what he had given 
up was not an interest in the Gothic itself but the well-worn conventions of 
the “Old Gothic” of Walpole and Radcliffe that had since become the object of 
satire and ridicule. We know from Mary Shelley’s Journal1—the best source 
for tracking Shelley’s reading habits—that both Mary and Percy continued to 
read (and read outloud to friends) a number of Gothic texts, which included, 
among many others, William Beckford’s Vathek; Charles Brockden Brown’s 
Weiland, Ormond, Edgar Huntley, and Arthur Merwyn; Charlotte Dacre’s 
Zafloya; Godwin’s Caleb Williams and St. Leon; Caroline Lamb’s Glenarvon; 
Charles Maturin’s Fatal Revenge; or the Family of Montorio (1807) and J. 
 3 
 
Bertram (1816); Thomas Love Peacock’s Nightmare Abbey (in which Shelley 
is playfully satirized in the character of Scythrop); John Polidori’s The 
Vampyre; along with all of Matthew Lewis’s and Ann Radcliffe’s works. 
Shelley also enjoyed the Gothic productions of Germany, which included 
Goethe’s Faust; Frederick Schiller’s The Robbers and The Ghost Seer; and the 
aptly titled Phantasmagoriana, a French translation of a collection of ghost 
stories (translated into English in 1812 as Tales of the Dead). In fact, Thomas 
Love Peacock remarked that “Brown's four novels, Schiller's Robbers, and 
Goethe's Faust were, of all the works with which he was familiar, those which 
took the deepest root in his mind, and had the strongest influence on his 
character . . . . He devotedly admired Wordsworth and Coleridge, and in a 
minor degree Southey . . . but admiration is one thing and assimilation is 
another; and nothing so blended itself with the structure of his interior mind 
as the creations of Brown.”2  
  Shelley’s earliest publications, including his two gothic novels—
Zastrozzi, a Romance and St. Irvyne; or, The Rosicrucian—have received 
scant critical attention and demand an analysis that approaches these works 
with the same theoretical rigor that his mature poetry receives. My study of 
the importance of Shelley’s early gothic works attempts to fill a gap in Shelley 
scholarship by establishing a more detailed reading of Shelley’s early works 
and to argue that Shelley’s gothic sensibility is fundamental to fully 
appreciating the psychological complexities and antagonisms in his mature 
poetry, using as my test case his great lyrical drama Prometheus Unbound. 
 Throughout my study, I employ the insights of Lacanian psychoanalytic 
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theory to interrogate the distinction between the Shelleyan subject of 
Romanticism and the Shelleyesque subject of Gothicism. I resist the 
temptation to literalize this split or to apply a rigid definition to either his 
Gothic or Romantic works, terms I use provisionally. Where the Shelleyan 
gaze finds synthesis, desire, pleasure, sublimity, benevolence, and being; the 
Shelleyesque gaze finds antagonism, drive, jouissance, monstrosity, 
perversion, and lack. What will become clear in my reading, is that these two 
designations operate antagonistically across the body of his writing and 
characterize the aesthetic tension in Shelley that has traditionally been 
defined in terms of skepticism and idealism. Rather than an undisciplined 
juvenile phase of Shelley’s development (as many critics have traditionally 
argued), I claim that the Shelleyesque continues to operate in unsettling and 
provocative ways throughout his mature poetry, particularly in Prometheus 
Unbound, generally considered to be Shelley’s most idealistic attempt to 
transcend the political, sexual, and psychological antagonisms associated with 
the gothic tradition. I argue that the Gothic, for Shelley, provides the aesthetic 
ground through which his most idealistic moments are mediated. It functions 
as the “Real” that always returns to its place as a site of failure when the 
imagination fails or when the aspirations of the Romantic ego are confronted 
with the void of subjective destitution. Major poems such as Alastor, “Mont 
Blanc,” Julian and Maddalo, Epipsychidion, Adonais, and The Triumph of 
Life, all enact a version of this failure and exemplify Shelley’s appreciation for 
the complexities of psychological trauma.  
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 Theoretically, my study is informed by concepts drawn from Lacan’s 
schematic representation of the Imaginary, Symbolic, and Real orders that 
appears in Seminar XX: On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and 




At the risk of introducing more confusion than necessary into my analysis, my 
operative definition of the Gothic is that it is an aesthetic of the Lacanian Real. 
The Gothic aesthetic provides a representational site where irruptions of the 
Real disturb the subject’s experience of reality and interactions with others. 
On a structural level, the Symbolic, Imaginary, and Real refer to, respectively, 
the signifier, signified, and the bar that separates the two and that resists any 
totalizing identity between word and image, or between self and other. In 
terms of the subject’s experience of reality, the Symbolic refers to the register 
of language and ideology; the Imaginary to nature, the body, and to the 
images with which the subject identifies; and the Real to the impossible, the 
antagonism that resists symbolization. The three objects on the side of the 
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triangle—the object-cause of desire (a), the phallus, or phallic function (Φ), 
and the signifier of the barred Other (S [/A])—refer to the objects that are 
produced as the Real undergoes symbolization and jouissance (the “J” in the 
middle) is evacuated. In other words, the three objects indicate a mediation of 
the Real after the subject enters language and undergoes symbolic castration. 
Although an oversimplification, the triad of Real, Imaginary, and Symbolic 
can usefully be applied to Gothic, Romantic, and Enlightenment. Where the 
Enlightenment critical procedure is to bring the imaginary under the 
determinations of the symbolic, the Romantic procedure is to free the 
imaginary from the reification of the symbolic. The Gothic, in turn, represents 
the antagonism that resists the movement from one to the other. 
 One of the key Lacanian terms I deploy throughout my study is 
“fantasy,” which Lacan defines as the split subject’s relation to his/her object-
cause of desire.3 The object-cause is not the object itself but is the difference 
between an articulated demand for the object and the satisfaction it provides. 
The remainder when one is subtracted from the other is the object-cause, and 
the lack of satisfaction sets in motion the metonymic movement of desire 
from one object to the next. Thus “fantasy” is the frame in which the subject 
structures his/her desire and provides the coordinates for a consistent sense 
of “reality.” So when I say that the Gothic is an aesthetic of the Real, I do not 
mean that it is a representation of the Real, which resists symbolization. I 
mean that the Gothic represents the traumas, fears, and proliferation of 
images associated with the breakdown of reality as it is structured through 
fantasy. I hope to make these distinctions more clear as I use them 
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throughout my study to exemplify those moments in Shelley’s texts where the 
subject’s fantasy frame is placed under pressure by traumatic encounters with 
the alterity of the Other or an aleatory event that ruptures a given socio-
ideological context.  
 The first three chapters of the dissertation are devoted to establishing 
new readings of Shelley’s earliest and most important gothic works: the novels 
Zastrozzi and St. Irvyne, and Shelley’s first book-length poem, The 
Wandering Jew. Shelley scholars have neglected these early works largely on 
aesthetic grounds. Kenneth Neill Cameron encapsulates what was once the 
predominant critical attitude towards Shelley’s interest in the Gothic, writing 
that Shelley, during his “votary of Romance“ period “was genuinely interested 
in the mysterious and the occult . . . and in his novels he was, from time to 
time, carried away by his subject . . . but he wrote largely with his tongue in 
his own cheek—delighting, at times, in parodying his own style—aware, as he 
was writing the novels, of their inherent ridiculousness, but interested in a 
quick, schoolboy fame” (28). One of the wagers I make in my study is that if 
we examine these works with the same seriousness and theoretical rigor that 
Shelley’s mature poetry receives, what we find is that the Gothic is, for 
Shelley, at first an experimental aesthetic through which he develops an 
increasingly sophisticated psychology of trauma. It is a critical commonplace 
that the Romantics internalize gothic form and establish a psychological 
depth that is often lacking in their literary precursors. The ruined castle, the 
tempestuous elements, the mysterious strangers, and so forth, thus become a 
model for the mind. In an important new work, Romantic Psychoanalysis, 
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Joel Faflak claims that psychoanalysis (a term, Faflak points out, that was 
coined by Coleridge) emerges in Romanticism itself as a “body of writing 
struggling to find its own identity” (8). In Shelley’s gothic works we find a 
poet struggling to find his own artistic identity and to establish an aesthetic 
capable of representing both ideological and psychological complexity.  
 In chapter one, I begin with an overview of critical responses to 
Shelley’s early gothic works to establish the space for my own readings. I take 
particular issue with readings that fail to take these works seriously simply 
because they participate in a “vulgar” genre that Shelley would later abandon. 
I also take issue with criticism that seeks to interpret Shelley’s early work 
through the lens of his later poetry and metaphysical positions, arguing that 
precisely the opposite critical stance should be taken. Shelley’s Gothic 
provides a baseline account, so to speak, of his earliest philosophical, political, 
and psychological interests, and articulates a mode of subjectivity that 
recognizes rather than sublimates the antagonisms produced within the social 
field where the combinatory dynamics between subject, self, object, and other 
are expressed. In his first gothic romance Zastrozzi, I argue that Shelley 
appropriates the conventions of the gothic novel to reveal the ideological 
mechanisms of anti-Jacobin paranoiac fantasy. It is important to remember 
that by the time Shelley began writing his early gothic works the popularity of 
the genre was in decline, as were Republican revolutionary aspirations that 
had seemingly been defeated by reactionary forces. Shelley, thus, attempts to 
remobilize the Gothic by satirizing the reactionary paranoiac fantasy of the 
Jacobin monster and to interrogate the desires and fears that produces it. I 
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also show how Shelley then subjectivizes these paranoiac images by giving 
them a voice and an identity that exceeds the paranoiac image and articulates 
a model of subjectivity and desire that is presciently modern, one that 
destabilizes not only the self-transparency of the Enlightenment ego, but also 
the more idealistic strains of Romantic consciousness.  
 While more ambitious than Zastrozzi, Shelley’s second gothic novel, St. 
Irvyne, is a fascinating mess, beset with apparent contradictions and 
structural gaffes. The novel is a transitional work for the young Shelley as he 
sought to find a more effective register through which to represent in 
materialist terms his increasingly abstract sensibility. St. Irvyne is a text 
where Shelley is clearly moving towards that direction, and, tellingly, it is the 
last work of prose fiction he would publish.4 In contrast to critics who ascribe 
the novel’s structural inconsistencies to immaturity or sloppiness, I 
demonstrate how St. Irvyne exemplifies the Lacanian notion of “fantasy” and 
its function in sustaining a “subject of desire” as a defense against the “real” of 
the drive. The “desire of the Other” always functions as a third term that 
disrupts or negates the complementary relation between the masculine and 
the feminine. Shelley stages this impasse by constructing two parallel 
narratives that never converge: the Eloise / Fitzeustace / Nempere plot and 
the Wolfstein / Megalena / Ginotti plot. If we accept Shelley’s insistence on 
the speculative identities between Ginotti and Nempere, and between Ginotti 
and Wolfstein, then we must conclude that a speculative identity exists 
between Wolfstein and Nempere. Such a relation suggests that the “event too 
dreadful for narration” (which led to Wolfstein’s unexplained exile) is actually 
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Wolfstein’s incestuous desire for his sister, a forbidden transgression that 
resulted in Eloise’s pregnancy. The incestuous “event” is thus mediated in two 
different aesthetic modes—the gothic and the sentimental. Wolfstein and 
Eloise exist in radically different ideological universes, and Shelley sharpens 
this distinction by placing Wolfstein in the German lineage of gothic 
barbarism and by placing Eloise in the French lineage of gentrified 
sentimentalism. The revelation that Wolfstein and Eloise are brother and 
sister is revealed only in the perfunctory final paragraph, which I interpret as 
the “real” of incestuous drive that resists symbolization and narrative 
resolution. Shelley’s early figurations of the “painted veil” of fantasy can be 
located at the level of intra- and interpersonal psychological dynamics—
among the combinatory relations of subject, self, and Other. When the 
subject’s symbolic universe collapses and the veil of fantasy is lifted, the 
subject encounters the impenetrable and traumatic alterity of the Other. 
Desire gives way to drive, pleasure to jouissance, and reality to the Real. 
Throughout my analysis of St. Irvyne, I exemplify these inter-subjective 
dynamics by reading figurations of desire and drive against Shelley’s budding 
adherence to Godwinian rationalism. St. Irvyne implicitly critiques the self-
transparency—the conjunction of will and desire—that Godwin’s philosophy 
demands, while simultaneously presenting Godwin’s philosophical positions 
as a solution to the impasses that negate those very positions.  
 Because of The Wandering Jew’s vexed textual history, no sustained 
critical reading of the poem has yet been offered. I read Shelley’s The 
Wandering Jew as a poem that reveals, even as it participates in, the 
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psychology and cultural transmission of superstition. Like Zastrozzi and St. 
Irvyne, The Wandering Jew raises the unsettling possibility that “eternal 
Love” itself—which for Shelley will become the primary metaphysical force for 
revolutionary action—mirrors the structural properties of superstitious 
thought. In the doomed relationship between Paulo (the Wandering Jew) and 
his love interest Rosa, I show how the desire of the other is misrecognized as 
one’s own, and how they exist for each other only as objects in each other’s 
fantasy frames. If love is idealized (even fetishized) in the aesthetic of 
sensibility, it is pathologized in the aesthetic of the Gothic. The character of 
Paulo is one of the earliest analogues of Shelley’s Prometheus. Shelley often 
takes an established literary form, empties it of its ideological content, and 
establishes a fresh context in which the traces of that former content 
introduce a productive tension between residual and emergent forms of 
consciousness. In each iteration of the legend of the Wandering Jew in 
Shelley’s poetry (Queen Mab, Alastor, Hellas), the significance of the 
character shifts in accordance with the ideological work Shelley has him 
perform. These different registers are important in understanding how 
Shelley manipulates the supernatural and superstitious elements in his works 
within the context of transference and desire. The tension between 
superstition as a reified form of error and superstition as an index of an 
underlying imaginative productivity that is itself susceptible to further 
reification, provides an illuminating context from which to consider Shelley’s 
treatment of the Wandering Jew. Shelley is less interested in debunking the 
supernatural, choosing instead to represent the insidious ways in which the 
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supernatural enters one’s experience of reality and provides the coordinates 
for one’s desire. I focus on those moments in the poem where metaphorical 
descriptions of reality materialize into the diegetic reality itself as characters 
internalize those figurations into sense impressions, how supernatural 
elements become reified into superstitious formations. Paulo exists in the 
imaginative space between demystification, imagination, and reification. His 
status as both subject and superstition, both undead and immortal, remains 
ambivalent throughout the poem. Paulo sustains multiple registers of 
significance depending upon the frame of reference from which we interpret 
his story and his actions. The Wandering Jew offers an illuminating account 
of the complex interactions among metaphor, desire, fantasy, and identity 
that I interrogate further in my final chapter on Prometheus Unbound. 
 Critical responses to Prometheus Unbound have largely focused upon 
its plausibility, particularly whether or not Prometheus’s psychological 
purification—whereby he substitutes his hatred for Jupiter with his love for 
Asia—constitutes an adequate enough cause to enable the emergence of a 
utopian republic of freely-desiring subjects. I read Prometheus Unbound, 
Shelley’s most optimistic work, through the lens of gothic paranoia, psychosis, 
and perversion, showing how the utopian aspirations of the drama are 
destabilized throughout by not only the gothic antagonisms articulated in his 
early work but also by poems such as Mont Blanc, Epipsychidion, Julian and 
Maddalo, The Cenci, The Sensitive Plant, and Adonais. Looking back to the 
conflict between gothic (masculine) and sentimental (feminine) aesthetics in 
St. Irvyne, I also argue that Prometheus Unbound represents a similar, 
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though far more ambitious, attempt to resolve the antagonism of sexual 
difference. Shelley’s utopia conceives of a mode of being without 
antagonism—no class struggle, no identity politics, no pain nor guilt, and no 
reified gender determinations. In short, Shelley strives to represent a post-
Oedipal society of undifferentiated libidinal flux, a movement from the 
castrating determinations of the phallic Symbolic to the affective jouissance of 
the maternal Semiotic. I show, however, that Prometheus’s supposed 
psychological transformation is not so well-defined as we, or Prometheus 
himself, may believe. I argue that the philosophical categories of Shelley’s 
“skeptical idealism” can be read productively in terms of the Lacanian 
formulation of perversion. By interpreting Prometheus as a perverse subject 
who disavows castration (his enchainment by Jupiter), rather than repressing 
or foreclosing it (as in neurosis or psychosis), and who positions himself as 
the object-instrument of the other’s desire, we can better understand how he 
is able to simultaneously express pity and hatred. I conclude that the 
emergent subject of modernity and psychoanalysis—the materiality of 
consciousness itself—conditions the utopian aims of the drama and 
introduces a series of obstacles to Romantic subjectivity. Shelley’s success as a 
poet is, paradoxically, a testament to the failure of imagination to “create from 
its own wreck the thing it contemplates,” unable to transcend the “terror” that 
“survives the ravin it has gorged.” For the poet of Adonais, the Romantic ego 
strives to imagine the “white radiance of Eternity” of an undifferentiated 
“One.” And yet, as I conclude in “Percy Bysshe Shelley and the Gothic,” the 
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Romantic ego is haunted throughout Shelley’s work by the Gothic subject 
























                                                                                                                                      
1 Of course, the time period covered in Mary’s journal, which begins in 1814, 
does not include Shelley’s earliest reading before and during the period of 
Zastrozzi’s composition, which was written well before he met Mary while he 
was still enamored with the mercurial Harriet Grove. Mary herself read 
Zastrozzi on 12 October 1814 (at the same time, incidentally, she and Shelley 
were reading Godwin’s Political Justice).   
2 See Pamela Clemitt’s The Godwinian Novel: The Rational Fictions of 
Godwin, Brockden Brown, Mary Shelley for an excellent analysis of the 
influence of Godwin on Brown, and by extension, Shelley.  
3 My understanding of Lacanian fantasy is drawn in large part from Zizek’s 
The Plague of Fantasies (pp. 3-44). His discussion of the “seven veils of 
fantasy” is instrumental for my analysis of the figure of the veil in Shelley’s 
work, which I interpret in terms of interpersonal dynamics in his early Gothic 
novels. The veil acquires a metaphysical significance in his poetry, but is still a 
function of the perceiving subject and, thus, a part of his or her fantasy frame. 
Shelley’s skeptical idealism is a self-generating ontological veil, for example. 
4 Shelley may have completed another novel entitled Hubert Cauvin, the 
manuscript of which is lost. We know only that the novel concerned the 
causes that led to the failure of the French Revolution. 
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CHAPTER ONE 
Zastrozzi, A Romance: 
 Paranoiac Fantasy and the Semblance of Subversion 
 
 Zastrozzi, composed between March and late-August of 1809 and 
subsequently published in the spring of 1810 by J. Wilkie and G. Robinson of 
London,1 was Shelley’s first significant publication and reflects his early and 
abiding enthusiasm for the gothic and sensationalist literature of the period. A 
cursory reading of the novel reveals many obligatory gothic trappings—an 
ominous castle, a gloomy cave, a demon-like seductress with transgressive 
desires, a maudlin hero-victim entrapped by circumstances beyond his 
control, a spectral villain bent on revenge, and shadowy figures of established 
authority—all saturated with the requisite dose of brooding atmospherics and 
sublime scenery that often reflect the characters’ “distempered” emotional 
states. Both in theme and style, Zastrozzi is clearly indebted to several of 
Shelley’s favorite gothic novels—particularly Ann Radcliffe's The Italian 
(1797), Matthew G. Lewis's The Monk (1796), and Charlotte Dacre's Zofloya 
(1806). Although Zastrozzi lacks the historical scope, descriptive depth, and 
narrative polish of Shelley’s models, the novel follows an elaborate pursuit-
escape narrative trajectory that is tightly structured and that unfolds at an 
energetic pace, incorporating aspects of gothic romance, sentimentalist 
fiction, and the philosophical novel.    
 Because Shelley’s earliest works are not well known, I will begin by 
briefly summarizing the sequence of events in Zastrozzi. As the novel opens 
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we find the “wretched” Verezzi, the ostensible protagonist, “[t]orn from the 
society of all he held dear on earth, the victim of secret enemies, and exiled 
from happiness . . .” (61). Verezzi has been abducted in his sleep and then 
brought to a cave and chained to a rock by the “sublime” and “malevolent” 
Zastrozzi, for reasons we are as yet unaware. When a “scintillating flame” of 
lightning destroys the cavern, Verezzi is able to escape, but is further pursued 
by Zastrozzi and his co-conspirator Matilda, whose sexual passion for Verezzi 
threatens to separate him from his fiancé Julia, whom we meet in the flesh 
only much later in the novel. In collaboration with the “wily” Matilda, 
Zastrozzi sets out to murder Julia and recapture Verezzi so that Matilda can 
continue her seduction and win his heart (although, unknown to Matilda, 
Zastrozzi’s murderous intent extends ultimately to Verezzi).  
 When Zastrozzi fails to kill Julia, Matilda falsely informs Verezzi that 
Julia is dead and continues, though unsuccessfully, to seduce Verezzi and 
erase the memory of Julia from his distempered mind. To that end, Zastrozzi 
devises a plan in which he feigns an attempt to murder Verezzi, at which point 
Matilda rushes in and shields him, sustaining only minor injuries. Believing 
Julia to be dead and Matilda to have been his saviour, Verezzi, in a “Lethean 
torpor” at last professes his love to Matilda and consents to marriage. Soon 
after, Zastrozzi arranges a meeting in which Julia confronts Verezzi and 
Matilda. Dumbfounded at the sight of Julia and overcome with guilt, Verezzi 
commits suicide by stabbing himself in the chest. Matilda then plucks the 
blood-stained dagger from Verezzi's corpse, and in a frenzy of rage stabs the 
innocent Julia “with exulting pleasure, again and again,” burying “the dagger 
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to the hilt in her body, even after all remains of life were annihilated” (143).  
 The guilty parties are eventually discovered and brought before the 
authorities, where Zastrozzi confesses that he is actually Verezzi’s illegitimate 
half-brother and has sought vengeance against Verezzi on behalf of his 
disgraced mother (possibly a prostitute) who was abandoned by their father, 
whom he had murdered before the events of the novel take place. At the 
conclusion of the novel, Zastrozzi and Matilda are sentenced to execution by 
the Council of Ten for their murderous conspiracy. Although Matilda finally 
repents and reconciles herself with the Catholic Church, Zastrozzi 
unrepentantly and defiantly continues to express his “atheism” and disdain 
for institutional morality, even at the expense of his own life: “Even whilst 
writhing under the agony of almost insupportable torture his nerves were 
stretched, Zastrozzi’s firmness failed him not; but, upon his soul-illumined 
countenance, played a smile of most disdainful scorn; and, with a wild, 
convulsive laugh of exulting revenge—he died” (156). Vengeance and 
transgressive sexual desires are punished, illegitimate threats to class 
structure and established authority are eliminated, and the equilibrium of the 
status quo is restored. 
 Although Zastrozzi successfully evokes the Italianate gothic tradition 
and offers an explicit moral resolution that would placate a genteel 
readership, the few contemporary reviews of Zastrozzi were unflattering, if 
not vitriolic, and no doubt contributed to Shelley’s lifelong acrimony towards 
critical responses in the press to his work. And yet, given the provocative 
subtexts of the novel, Shelley likely expected, and perhaps even delighted, in 
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such frenzied responses from conservative periodicals. The critical 
atmosphere of the early nineteenth century towards the glut of sensationalist 
fiction of the period is well exemplified in this passage from the following 
“Prospectus” that was submitted in support of the New London Review; or 
Monthly Report of Authors and Books (1799):  
 Though no arrogance will be indulged in this publication, whatever 
disturbs the public harmony, insults legal authority, outrages the best 
regards of the heart, invalidates the radical obligations of morality, 
attacks the vital springs of established functions of piety, or in any 
respect clashes with the sacred forms of decency, however witty, 
elegant, and well written, can be noticed only in terms of severe and 
unequivocal reprehension.2  
 
 In the spirit of such regulative moral criticism, the Critical Review, for 
example, offered these carefully considered observations on Shelley’s 
“shameless and disgusting volume”: “Zastrozzi is one of the most savage and 
improbable demons that ever issued from a diseased brain” . . . “a more 
discordant, disgusting, and despicable performance has not, we are 
persuaded, issued from the press for some time.” The review concludes that 
“We know not when we have felt so much indignation as in the perusal of this 
execrable production. The author of it cannot be too severely reprobated. Not 
all his ‘scintillated eyes,’ his ‘battling emotions,’ his ‘frigorific torpidity of 
despair,’ nor his ‘Lethean torpor,’ with the rest of his nonsensical and stupid 
jargon, ought to save him from infamy, and his volume from the flames” (329-
31). The Gentleman’s Magazine was less dismissive in this pithy, though 
naive, account: “A short, but well-told tale of horror, and, if we do not 
mistake, not from an ordinary pen. The story is so artfully conducted that the 
reader cannot easily anticipate the denouement, which is conducted on the 
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principles of moral justice; and, by placing the scene on the Continent, the 
Author has availed himself of characters and vices which, however useful in 
narratives of this description, thank God, are not to be found in this country” 
(258).  Mary Shelley herself, along with Shelley’s early biographers,3 
encapsulates a critical perspective that would dominate Shelley studies for the 
next two centuries:  
 He was a lover of the wonderful and wild in literature, but had not 
fostered these tastes at their genuine sources—the romances and 
chivalry of the middle ages—but in the perusal of such German works 
as were current in those days. Under the influence of these he, at the 
age of fifteen, wrote two short prose romances of slender merit. The 
sentiments and language were exaggerated, the composition imitative 
and poor.4 
 
 Although less vitriolic than the Critical Review, most Shelley scholars 
begin discussing Shelley’s gothic novels (if they are discussed at all) by 
offering what amounts to an apology. Shelley’s gothic sensibility is thought to 
be an embarrassment at worst or a transitional phase at best. Recent critical 
approaches can be summarized in terms of the following interpretive 
strategies: 1) to dismiss outright Shelley’s gothic works as youthful effusions 
of unprincipled affectivity which, although of historical interest, are 
thoroughly conventional imitations of an established literary form; 2) to treat 
the novels as psycho-biographical case-studies that reveal Shelley’s own 
neuroses and sexual ambivalence; 3) to draw attention to Shelleyan irony and 
his subversive deployment of established conventions to transmit radical 
ideas; 4) to acknowledge fully Shelley’s early investment in the Gothic but 
then rely upon his later essays, poetry, and intellectual development as a key 
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to interpreting retroactively the early work within a larger narrative of 
Shelley’s poetic development, in which his gothic sensibility is sublimated into 
more mature philosophical positions. 
 For Kenneth Neill Cameron, Shelley, during his “votary of Romance“ 
period, “was genuinely interested in the mysterious and the occult ... and in 
his novels he was, from time to time, carried away by his subject ... but he 
wrote largely with his tongue in his own cheek—delighting, at times, in 
parodying his own style—aware, as he was writing the novels, of their inherent 
ridiculousness, but interested in a quick, schoolboy fame” (28). And “if 
Shelley’s gothic novels are bad, his horror poetry written in the same period is 
worse” (33). For Cameron, of course, it is not until Shelley reads Godwin (“his 
master”) and assumes his “social duties” that his work rises to the level of 
serious critical attention. A. J. Hartley (following Frederick Jones), argues 
that Shelley’s “’taste for romances’ definitely ended in November, 1810, when 
he ordered a copy of [Godwin’s Political Justice] from Stockdale” (v). “That 
Shelley should have begun his literary life by conveying his ideas in the highly 
imaginative and popular medium of the Gothic ‘thriller’ indicates his 
propinquity with this aspect of romanticism which, though momentarily 
abandoned by him, he subdued and incorporated in his best poetry” (vi). For 
David Seed, Zastrozzi is a “crude and largely unconscious exploration of 
sexual fear.” “Zastrozzi as a figure of revenge is banal and a stereotype” (5); 
“Matilda is quite simply a personification of sexual passion;” and Julia 
“supplies an image of idealized, non-sexual love” (7). Eustace Chesser, in his 
Freudian reading of Zastrozzi as Shelleyan psychomachy (and perhaps 
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channeling Peacock), claims that Shelley “was not a rebel without a cause—he 
had too many causes. He was an introvert with no strong sense of reality. . . . 
His all too short life was a continuous refusal to accept responsibility. He 
never completely grew up. His vision was centred upon the world as he would 
like it to be, not on the world as it is” (12). Chesser confidently concludes that 
“Shelley was an introspective schizoid type with arrested sexual development 
at an undifferentiated stage, showing itself in elements of narcissism, 
homosexuality and immature heterosexuality. The bisexuality is clear from 
the manner in which he projects himself in Zastrozzi as equally divided 
between two male and two female characters. Were it not that his dreams 
were inspired by genius, Shelley could be dismissed as a futile visionary” (31-
32). More forgiving is Frederick Frank, who reads Zastrozzi as “a dark fable of 
identity” (ix) that “combine[s] an expert knowledge of the elaborate 
technology of the Gothic romance and its mandatory apparatus with the 
future poet’s desire to arrive at a Gothic aesthetic through which beauty and 
horror could be expressed simultaneously (ix). Although Frank concludes that 
Shelley’s Gothic is “basically a solipsistic excursion,” it does create “a 
nightmarish dialectic between opposite and incompatible selves in order to 
see these forces nullify one another within the general framework of the 
Todestraum or dream of death” (x).   
 Jerrold Hogle, who offers one of the more thorough analyses of 
Shelley’s gothic novels, nevertheless questions Zastrozzi’s literary merit: 
“Shelley’s plotting ranges from the static to the nonsensical” and that if “there 
is a linear cohesion in Shelley’s fiction, it is often impossible to find” (79). But 
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Hogle does, however, find significance in the way Zastrozzi anticipates 
Shelley’s mature poetry and metaphysical writings, noting that Zastrozzi is a 
work “about the higher unity of the self prohibiting its arrival with antitheses 
of its own making. Every sequence circles back on the mind’s dark chamber 
where the soul chooses to diffuse and battle itself and thus envelop the 
chamber in gloom. The principal events are states of being, each ‘a 
personification of the struggle which we experience within ourselves,’ as 
Shelley would later put it” (85). 
 These interpretive approaches tend to minimize in two ways the 
importance of Shelley’s gothic novels. The first approach takes the form of a 
fetishist denial—“I know very well, but all the same . . .”—in which Shelley’s 
gothic sensibility, although fully recognized, is minimized by choosing to 
believe as if it were simply an undisciplined experimentation with a tarnished 
genre that bears little relevance to his mature work and reputation. The 
second approach takes the form of an obsessional response, in which the 
Gothic is seen as a foreign element that disturbs Shelley’s natural poetic 
development and must be theorized away to maintain a sublimated image of 
Shelley as avatar of high Romanticism. Each of these defenses against the 
“Real” of Shelley’s Gothic drain it of its concrete particularity and mask the 
antagonistic voids around which his early work circulates.5 The young 
Shelley’s construction of a post-Enlightenment gothic subject produces an 
impasse that is not easily recuperated within the context of his later works, 
which may, I argue, be read as reaction-formations against the consequences 
that such a gothic subject precipitates.  
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 Throughout my study, I interrogate this distinction between the 
Shelleyan subject of Romanticism and the Shelleyesque subject of Gothicism. 
Where the Shelleyan gaze finds synthesis, desire, pleasure, sublimity, 
benevolence, and being; the Shelleyesque gaze finds antagonism, drive, 
jouissance, monstrosity, perversion, and lack. In fact, I will argue that the 
Shelleyesque continues to operate in unsettling and provocative ways 
throughout his mature poetry, particularly in works such as Prometheus 
Unbound, generally considered to be Shelley’s most idealistic attempt to 
transcend the political, sexual, and psychological antagonisms associated with 
the gothic tradition.     
 The most recent studies of Shelley’s gothic novels, though still few, 
have been informed by the growing interest in the complex relations between 
the Gothic and Romanticism, and by the emergence of Gothic studies as a 
legitimate discipline of scholarly inquiry.6 As Stephen Behrendt has argued, 
Shelley often exploits conventional forms to transmit radical ideas,7 so it is 
not surprising that Shelley would choose the Gothic as a vehicle through 
which to surreptitiously express his interests. Indeed, one is tempted to read 
Zastrozzi’s various philosophical exhortations (which Hannah More would 
have characterized as “speculative infidelity”) in the context of Shelley’s own 
iconoclastic positions at the time. For example, in series of letters to Hogg 
between 1810 and 1811 Shelley writes, in language that could have been 
spoken by Zastrozzi himself:  
 Oh! I burn with impatience for the moment of Xtianity's dissolution, it 
has injured me; I swear on the altar of perjured love to revenge myself 
on the hated cause of the effect which even now I can scarcely help 
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deploring. . . . Let us hope that the wound which we inflict tho' the 
dagger be conceald, will rankle in the heart of our adversary. (27-28) 
  
 Yet here I swear, and as I break my oath may Infinity Eternity blast me, 
here I swear that never will I forgive Christianity! it is the only point on 
which I allow myself to encourage revenge; every moment shall be 
devoted to my object which I can spare, & let me hope that it will not be 
a blow which spends itself & leaves the wretch at rest but lasting long 
revenge! I am convinced too that it is of great disservice to society that 
it encourages prejudice which strikes at the root of the dearest the 
tenderest of its ties. Oh how I wish I were the Antichrist, that it were 
mine to crush the Demon, to hurl him to his native Hell never to rise 
again—I expect to gratify some of this insatiable feeling in Poetry. (35) 
 
In an extended philosophical discussion with Matilda, Zastrozzi expresses the 
same antipathy to religious orthodoxy: 
 “Am I not convinced of the non-existence of a Deity? am I not 
convinced that death will but render this soul more free, more 
unfettered? Why need I then shudder at death? why need any one, 
whose mind has risen above the shackles of prejudice, the errors of a 
false and injurious superstition.” (153) 
 
Throughout the course of the novel, Zastrozzi argues in favor of a number of 
often contradictory Enlightenment philosophical motifs, from the utilitarian 
calculus of pleasures and pains to Godwinian perfectibility to mechanistic 
determinism and, ultimately, back to pagan fatalism: “whatever procures 
pleasure is right”; man “was created for no other purpose but obtain 
happiness”; “. . . rather than suppose that by its own innate and energetical 
exertions, this soul must endure for ever, that no fortuitous occurrences, no 
incidental events, can affect its happiness; but by daring boldly, by striving to 
verge from the beaten path, whilst yet trammeled in the chains of mortality, it 
will gain superior advantages in a future state”;  “fate wills us to die: and I 
intend to meet death, to encounter annihilation with tranquility.” Yet despite 
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his avowed atheism, Zastrozzi’s elaborate scheme for revenge against Verezzi 
is actually informed by, and dependent upon, the reality of a Christian heaven 
and hell as well as in the immortality of the soul (an irony that functions 
prominently in Lewis’s The Monk). Regarding the murder of his father, 
Zastrozzi laments: “But I destroyed his body alone . . . time has taught me 
better: his son’s soul is hell-doomed to all eternity: he destroyed himself; but 
my machinations, though unseen, effected his destruction” (155).      
 John Whatley argues that Zastrozzi is “a well-spoken and committed 
Atheist” (203) and that Shelley’s “representatives of atheism and revolution 
are yet ‘villains’ who through conspiracy, deceit, and violence forward social 
disruption, but they are equally fascinating in their power to satirize and 
undercut Church morality and to allow the fulfillment of desire” (209). 
Although Zastrozzi is an equal-opportunity sophist, more Hobbesian or 
Machiavellian than Godwinian, who appropriates into a bricolage of 
contradictory positions whatever discourse suits his purposes, he may be 
“well-spoken,” but is hardly “committed” to any particular cause other than 
revenge. And neither he nor Matilda successfully “undercut Church morality.” 
Matilda ultimately reconciles herself to the Church and Verezzi is executed by 
the Inquisition, whose absolute authority is never in doubt and remains fully 
intact at the conclusion of the novel. On the one hand we can point to the 
hypocritical self-interest of Matilda’s religious awakening and Zastrozzi’s 
Satanic-like resistance against absolute authority, but on the other hand we 
have to ask if such supposed insights are really all that subversive? From a 
progressivist standpoint, is Shelley asking us to identify with murderers who 
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are, despite their transgressive and liberating ambitions, consumed by self-
gratification? Is Shelley championing a Bataillean “expenditure” beyond the 
pleasure principle that ultimately seeks to sustain prohibitions for the 
purpose of producing the desire to transgress them? We should perhaps be 
inclined to take Shelley at his word when he admonishes one reader of the 
novel against confusing his own radicalism with that of his characters: “If he 
takes me for any one whose character I have drawn in Zastrozzi he is 
mistaken quite” (Letters, 11). 
 Such is the interpretive crux of Zastrozzi, caught in the balance 
between the gothic aesthetic’s reactionary and revolutionary impulses. 
Revolutionary desire is always in danger of falling into a “logic of specular 
doubling” or “structural repetition” that mirrors the oppressive mechanisms 
of power it seeks to displace.8 As Peter Starr notes, “If one undertakes direct, 
political action . . . then the logics of specular doubling and structural 
repetition apply. But if one refuses such action, then one’s revolt will at best 
be hopelessly marginal, at worst a reinforcement of institutionalized power” 
(8). For Shelley, the most vivid example of such a scenario would have been, 
of course, the degeneration of republicanism into terror in the French 
Revolution, where, according to Starr, revolutionaries became “trapped in a 
dualistic, paranoid world where rivalry springs from the narcissistic illusion of 
one’s own subjective unity” (9). And in the figure of Zastrozzi, Shelley 
demonstrates his budding appreciation for the complexities and dangers of 




 But if Shelley’s aim is simply to diagnose the failings of Enlightenment 
revolutionary discourse by drawing attention to the destructive desires that 
underwrite its universalizing drive (to distinguish between the “subject of the 
statement” and the “subject of the enunciation”), then we might expect 
Shelley to adopt a narrative strategy similar to that employed by Charlotte 
Dacre in Zofloya. The narrator of Zofloya informs us early on that to 
understand the transgressive desires of Victoria we must elucidate, in the 
spirit of Enlightenment curiosity and utilitarian ethics, the “causes” of her 
destructive behavior:  
 The historian who would wish his lessons to sink deep into the heart, 
thereby essaying to render mankind virtuous and more happy, must 
not content himself with simply detailing a series of events—he must 
ascertain causes, and follow progressively their effects; he must draw 
deductions from incidents as they arise, and ever revert to the 
actuating principle (3). 
 
Throughout the course of the novel, however, the narrator’s attempts to 
account for Victoria’s increasingly complex desires and motivations seem 
inadequate, almost to the point of comic absurdity. The failure to reduce 
Victoria’s subjectivity to a network of causal determinations (for example, 
negligent parenting), suggests that Dacre’s narration works ironically as a 
critique of Enlightenment itself, particularly the more dogmatic strains of 
French mechanistic materialism (La Mettrie’s L’Homme Machine and 
Holbach’s Systême de la Nature, for example) that reduce human 
relationships to a scientific model of strict necessity.   
 Shelley’s investment in materialism, however, was beginning to 
strengthen during the period of Zastrozzi’s composition, so he was, perhaps, 
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disinclined to adopt Dacre’s ironic stance toward Enlightenment critical 
gestures.9 Shelley’s narrator too adds a layer of ironic subtext, but from a 
different ideological perspective. The narrator often pauses to comment upon 
characters and events from a position of the “Church morality” that Whatley 
identifies, which signals the narrator’s complicity with conservative ideology 
and, by extension, with Verezzi. Zastrozzi is admonished for his “sophistry,” 
and his inability to “contemplate the wonderful operations, the mysterious 
ways of Providence” (102); and when Matilda prays for God’s forgiveness, the 
narrator happily reports that “mercy, by the All-benevolent of heaven, is never 
refused to those humbly, yet trusting in his goodness, ask it” (150). But again, 
this does not necessarily undercut church morality because, given the 
exaggerated evil and narcissism of Matilda and Zastrozzi, the disapprobation 
towards them would seem to be justifiable.      
 I argue that Shelley deftly subverts conventional ideology while at the 
same time satisfying its moral prescriptions by splitting the diegetic reality 
from its subversive subtext, revealing a radically intersubjective dynamic that 
complicates any reading of the novel that either reduces the characters to 
static gothic stereotypes or that resolves the tensions within a determinate 
nexus of cause and effect. Because the narrative is doubly refracted through a 
conservative lens, we must resist the impulse to valorize the characters of 
Verezzi and Julia at the expense of Matilda and Zastrozzi, who are actually the 
far more interesting and complicated characters in the novel (and like 
Milton’s Satan, more “ethical” in a sense).  
 30 
 
 But the temptation to identify with Verezzi and Julia persists 
nonetheless, particularly when we consider the similarity between the 
situation in which Verezzi finds himself at the beginning of the novel and that 
of Prometheus in Prometheus Unbound: “Verezzi was chained to a piece of 
rock which remained immovable. The violence of the storm was past, but the 
hail descended rapidly, each stone of which wounded his naked limbs. Every 
flash of lighting, although now distant, dazzled his eyes, unaccustomed as they 
had been to the least ray of light” (64). Several critics have commented upon 
the similarity here between Verezzi and Prometheus,10 but the resemblance is 
a lure that will prove to be superficial and misleading over the course of the 
novel and distorts any interpretation of Shelley’s early work through the 
retroactive gaze of his later treatment of similar themes. Envisioning Verezzi 
as a precursor to the “champion of mankind” strains credulity. As much as we 
might empathize with his suffering, Verezzi turns out to be a passive “hero” 
who represents unreflecting, reactionary aristocratic privilege, one of the 
primary targets of Shelley’s subversive critique. Furthermore, Verezzi 
occupies a space that is traditionally populated by female protagonists in 
gothic novels: in Zastrozzi, it is the male who is pursued, confined, and 
tormented by a sublime figure of phallic power—two if we count Matilda and 
her predatory sexuality—rather than a young, virtuous female. Throughout 
the course of the novel, Verezzi is coded as feminine, and the only feature 
which signifies his masculinity is his choice of love objects. The attitude 
towards gender and power expressed in the novel is ambiguous, subject to 
continual destabilization as Matilda and Verezzi negotiate their gendered 
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positions in relation to one another, finally reaching a provisional equilibrium 
within a common fantasy frame. Tilottama Rajan has drawn attention to the 
overdeterminations in Shelley’s novels, clearly evident in the shifting 
positions of gender and power.11        
    I argue, however, that Zastrozzi’s explicit representations of 
subversion are a semblance designed to alert us to a far more subversive 
strategy at work in the novel, one that is more historically informed than has 
been previously recognized and that interrogates the intellectual context in 
which it was written. By the time Shelley published Zastrozzi in 1810, the 
popularity of the gothic genre was in decline and its conventions had already 
become a target of satire and parody in the wake of the anti-Jacobin backlash 
against the revolutionary zeal expressed in the “Pamphlet Wars” of 1790-91.12  
As M. O. Grenby argues in The Anti-Jacobin Novel, “The ‘Revolution debate,’ 
the ‘war of ideas,’ withered away, not because every champion of radical 
doctrine had been utterly converted by the logic of the conservatives, but 
because few of them . . . could be found who wished to defy a near unanimous 
and highly militant anti-Jacobinism to put forward what had suddenly 
become dangerously unorthodox opinions” (5). Understandably, England’s 
guarded interest in the French Revolution—notably, calls for universal human 
rights and progressive social reform derived from the enlightened exercise of 
reason—would be drastically tempered by the subsequent regicide and Reign 
of Terror in France. And when Great Britain declared war on France in 1803, 
those who continued to advocate republicanism and the founding principles 
of the Revolution were largely swept away in a tide of nationalistic fervor, 
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portrayed as anarchists and threats to the providentially sanctioned social 
hierarchy secured in the British Constitution.  
 The ambiguous status of the Gothic regarding its transgressive 
revolutionary potential, on the one hand, and its reactionary, ameliorative 
impulse, on the other, participates in a larger aesthetic context in which the 
master signifiers of the Revolutionary era were points of bitter contention 
between those, like Edmund Burke, who framed the established authority of 
the ancien regime in sublime terms and the republicanism of Revolution as 
monstrous; and those, like Paine, Wollstonecraft, Godwin, and other 
Enlightenment progressives, who framed the Revolution in sublime terms and 
the ancien regime as monstrous. Burke's A Philosophical Enquiry into the 
Origin of Our Ideas of the Sublime and Beautiful (1757) was one of the most 
influential books on aesthetics in the eighteenth-century and established 
much of the theoretical grounding for gothic aesthetics. Burke defines the 
sublime as the "strongest emotion which the mind is capable of feeling" (59) 
and has as its source objects that "excite the ideas of pain or danger" (58). But 
"when danger or pain press too nearly, they are incapable of giving any 
delight, and are simply terrible; but at certain distances, and with certain 
modifications, they may be, and they are delightful, as we everyday 
experience" (60). A "terrible" object can become a source of the sublime if the 
individual can overcome or master the danger by elevating the mind in 
aesthetic contemplation (Furniss 27). The original terror felt for the object is 
transformed into awe and respect. The beautiful, on the other hand, is 
opposed to the sublime. Because the beautiful originates in pleasure rather 
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than pain, it is a passive aesthetic experience that does not require the mental 
exertion demanded of the sublime. Burke applies his aesthetic categories to 
political and social relationships so that beautiful qualities, such as tenderness 
and affection between men and women, assume a subordinate position to 
sublime qualities, such as the awe and respect shown by subjects to their 
rulers and state.     
 Burke considers pain to be a more powerful emotion than pleasure, so 
qualities associated with the sublime are privileged over those of the beautiful. 
In terms of gender, the Burkean aesthetic reflects the predominant 
eighteenth-century hierarchy: sublime qualities of nobility, reason, and awe 
are associated with men; and beautiful qualities such as passion, friendship, 
and elegance are associated with women. Burke applies his aesthetic 
categories to government as well. The feudal political structure of the ancien 
régime, both in England and France, represents a sublime political structure 
that inspires awe, admiration, and respect for a powerful patriarchal authority 
founded on centuries of political, ecclesiastical, and social tradition. The 
following passage from Burke’s Reflections on the Revolution in France is 
typical: 
  We fear God; we look up with awe to kings, with affection to 
parliaments, with duty to magistrates, with reverence to priests, and 
with respect to nobility. Why?  Because when such ideas are brought 
before our minds, it is natural to be so affected; because all other 
feelings are false and spurious, and tend to corrupt our minds, to 





 Burke found the French Revolution to be sublime as long as it 
remained a safe distance removed from English society, viewed as sublime 
spectacle; however, as English spectators became active participants and 
began to pose a threat to the English political structure, then the Revolution 
became a perversion of the sublime, or a sublime theater of the monstrous 
(Furniss 128). Burke writes that one should “approach the faults of the state 
as to the wounds of a father, with pious awe and trembling solitude” (84). He 
continues: 
 By this wise prejudice we are taught to look with horror on those 
children of their country who are prompt rashly to hack that aged 
parent in pieces and put him into the kettle of magicians, in hopes that 
by their poisonous weeds and wild incantations they may regenerate 
the paternal constitution and renovate their father's life.  (84) 
 
The hegemonic struggle between Jacobin and anti-Jacobin factions to define 
and control the meaning of master signifiers such as “freedom,” “nature,” 
“progress,” “necessity,” “good,” “evil,” “masculine,” “feminine,” etc., finds its 
aesthetic counterpart in the gothic literature (“sickening trash,” as one 
Quarterly Review critic put it) produced during the apex of its popularity in 
the 1790s and early 1800s13.  
 Anti-Jacobin anxieties concerning revolutionary and progressive aims 
was organized primarily around three concerns: the levelling of a preordained 
social hierarchy, the disruptive effects of social mobility, and the corruption of 
the ruling élite itself.14 The anti-Jacobin fiction of the period emphasizes the 
dangers to British social stability when challenged by the “new philosophy” of 
Enlightenment progressives. Clara Reeve writes, for instance, in her preface to 
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Memoirs of Sir Roger de Clarendon (1793): “The new philosophy of the 
present day avows a levelling principle, and declares that a state of anarchy is 
more beautiful than that of order and regularity. There is nothing more likely 
to convince mankind of the errors of these men, than to set before them 
examples of good government, and warnings of the mischievous consequences 
of their own principles.”15 Anne Thomas, in Adolphus de Biron (1795?) writes: 
“I must, however, acknowledge that we have some restless Spirits amongst us, 
who by their seditious Writings have contributed no a little to the Work of 
Destruction . . . I thank Heaven the number of such Miscreants is but small, 
when compared to the Spirit of the whole Nation.”16 And Robert Dallas writes, 
in Percival, or Nature Vindicated. A Novel (1801): “Men who born to fortune 
are appointed by Providence to the administration of a certain portion of the 
interests of the world: they are the helmsmen of happiness; and if they desert 
the wheel, is there any wonder that the even course should be lost?”17  
 Two poems in particular from The Anti-Jacobin Review (1799) 
effectively condense the perceived threats and vaguely generalized fear of 
revolutionary change into a coherent image of monstrosity against which the 
anti-Jacobin imaginary could organize its desire. “Ode to Jacobinism,”18 
ostensibly written by “An English Jacobin,” opens with an invocation to the  
 Daughter of Hell, insatiate power,  
     Destroyer of the human race,  
 Whose iron scourge and madd’ning hour  
     Exalt the bad, the good debase; (1-4)  
 
Under the guidance of this “Daughter of Hell,” the Jacobin sympathizer seeks 
to satisfy “Revenge” (25) and usher forth, from behind a “sophist veil” (41), 
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“Fire, rapine, sword, and chains, and ghastly Poverty” (40) and to “taint the 
mind, corrupt the heart” (44). The Jacobin’s ultimate motive is, therefore, to 
 Teach us to hate and revile;  
 Our glorious Charter’s faults to scan,  
 Time-sanction’d Truths despise, and preach Thy Rights of Man. (48)  
 
And in “Ode to a Jacobin,”19 a more satirical piece, the “Unchristian Jacobin” 
(1) is represented as an atheist who rationalizes the violence of the Terror, 
forgoing “Mercy” (18), “Pity” (19), and “humanity” (28) to profess a “love of 
executions” (41) that makes one “fit for Revolutions” (42). The poem 
concludes by admonishing the Jacobin for thinking “All Constitutions bad, 
but those bran new” (48).  
 Anti-Jacobin fiction and criticism was so successful that after only 
thirty-six issues the Anti-Jacobin Review closed-up shop in 1798, declaring 
that “the SPELL of Jacobin invulnerability is now broken.”20 Conservative 
discourse had successfully linked progressive philosophies with violence, 
establishing the image of a necessary connection in place of a complex 
constellation of contingent historical determinations. It had also appropriated 
the rhetoric of Enlightenment to “naturalize” the socio-economic hierarchy 
and its attendant privileges. The meaning of an abstract universal term such 
as “Nature” was articulated through the negotiation of its concrete 
particularity; thus if “whatever is, is right” then social hierarchies are not 
perversions of nature, à la Rousseau, but the true expression of nature itself. 
  So Shelley was entering an ideological battle that had apparently 
already been won by reactionary forces. Conservative paranoia, however, 
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provided a target-rich environment for a transgressive aesthetic that played 
upon fears of persecution, conspiracy, and libertinism,21 and Shelley exploits 
this opportunity by positioning Zastrozzi not as a satire of the Gothic itself, 
but as a diagnostic study of anti-Jacobin paranoiac fantasy, expressed through 
one of their favorite targets of derision—the gothic novel. From the 
perspective of the anti-Jacobin imaginary, nothing could be seen as more 
threatening to the normative hetero-patriarchal circuit of regulated desire—as 
exemplified by Verezzi and Julia—than the sexually aggressive Matilda and 
the violently atheistic Zastrozzi, two exceptions against which the stability of 
traditional British social hierarchy were grounded. If Matilda and Verezzi’s 
father signify the moral corruption of the élite, then Zastrozzi, in the form of 
an obscene surplus, signifies the illegitimate product of such corruption. And 
Verezzi, although unknowingly, contributes to that corruption himself when 
he finally submits to Matilda’s seduction and forsakes his love for Julia.  
 When we consider Zastrozzi’s bricolage of contradictory Enlightenment 
rhetoric, his murderous desire for revenge, and his illegitimacy (which 
signifies a generalized threat to primogeniture and social hierarchy), from 
Verezzi’s perspective Zastrozzi embodies the paranoiac image of the Jacobin 
monster. And Matilda, whose excessive sexual degeneracy reads like a case 
study from Bienville’s Nymphomania (1775), embodies the paranoiac image 
of a fully pathological subject whose actions are determined solely by 
contingent self-interest. Matilda, like her namesake in Lewis’ The Monk and 
like Victoria in Dacre’s Zofloya, is described by the narrator (whose 
complicity with the anti-Jacobin imaginary should not be overlooked) in 
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similarly demonic terms—“wily,” “perfidious,” “syren,” “ferocious,” “frantic,” 
“delirious,” “horror-tranced,” and “wretched.” And, as Alenka Zupancic 
observes, “what is a demon if not a fully pathological subject?”22 Because 
Matilda and Zastrozzi are images drawn from reactionary paranoiac fantasy, 
interpretations that identify Shelley’s own radicalism with either character 
would actually legitimate the anti-Jacobin linkage of violence to sexual 
liberation and progressive philosophy. This is why, from a progressive 
standpoint, the explicit acts of transgression in the novel constitute only a 
semblance of subversion.  
 A more subversive strategy is at work in Zastrozzi, one that reveals how 
paranoiac images of the Other are generated by antagonisms inherent to the 
dominant ideology itself. Ideology, as Renata Salecl explains, is "the way 
society deals with the fundamental impossibility of it being a closed, 
harmonious totality. . . . Behind every ideology lies a kernel of enjoyment 
(jouissance) that resists being fully integrated into the ideological universe" 
(6). The ideological fantasy works to conceal this “kernel” by constructing a 
scenario that disguises inconsistencies, excesses, and antagonisms in the 
social order. Matilda and Zastrozzi, therefore, appear to Verezzi as the 
“jouissance of the Other,” a traumatic “kernel” of the Real that the normative 
hetero-patriarchal circuit of desire must conceal through fantasy. In other 
words, desire itself, as it is structured in fantasy, serves as a defense against 
the traumatic encounter with jouissance that threatens the consistency of the 
subject’s imaginary and symbolic identifications (ideal ego, ego-ideal).  In 
Zastrozzi, the jouissance of the feminine Other is figured as a nymphomaniac, 
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and the jouissance of the masculine Other is figured as a bloodthirsty 
revolutionary. The paranoiac image of the Other, therefore, condenses a 
constellation of indistinct fears, threats, and desires, and functions as a 
defense against the breakdown of phallic structures of power that depend 
upon the stability of binary oppositions and upon the regulation of the 
metonymic movement of desire along the chain of signifiers.  
 Although Shelley represents Matilda and Zastrozzi as images drawn 
from anti-Jacobin paranoiac fantasy, those images do not remain static 
throughout the course of the novel, nor are they simply caricatures of 
conventional gothic villains. The only static characters are Verezzi and Julia. 
Verezzi is a MacKenzian man of feeling who finds himself thrust from the 
pleasures of sentimentality into a gothic nightmare of violent sensibility and 
conspiratorial danger. He remains transfixed by Zastrozzi’s impenetrable 
gaze, paralyzed by fear: “. . . Verezzi stood bewildered, and unable to arrange 
the confusion of ideas which floated in his brain, and assailed his terror-
struck imagination. He knew not what to believe—what phantom it could be 
that, in the shape of Zastrozzi, blasted his straining eye-balls— . . .” (90). 
Although we, as readers, eventually learn Zastrozzi’s identity and his reasons 
for pursuing Verezzi, Verezzi himself never does. Thus there is no meaningful 
interaction between the two; they exist for each other only as image-objects. 
So if we claim that Zastrozzi poses a thought experiment in which the subject 
of aristocratic privilege encounters in reality the monsters he has created in 
paranoiac fantasy, might we not also argue that Zastrozzi sees Verezzi only as 
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an image of the aristocratic oppression that has denied him entrance into the 
socio-symbolic order?  
 The conservative ideology of the narrator makes it difficult to sustain 
such a reversal, but the implication is there and points to how revolutionary 
and reactionary discourses engage each other only through the conflict 
between fantasmatic materializations of their own lack. In Lacanian terms, we 
could say that Verezzi misrecognizes Zastrozzi, mistaking him as a phallic 
signifier rather than as a signifier of the barred Other. The phallus is an object 
that materializes the lack in the symbolic order, gives it a fascinating, 
powerful presence; whereas the signifier of the barred Other is an object that 
signifies this lack itself. Thus Lacan can claim that the phallic object is a 
signifier without a signified. Zastrozzi, as a fantasmatic condensation of anti-
Jacobin fear, doesn’t exist. He is a signifier of the lack in the ancien régime 
social hierarchy itself, the reminder (and remainder) that society does not 
exist as a harmonious totality. As Zizek explains, the phallus is at once a sign 
of power, but also signifies and masks a fundamental impotence: "The phallic 
signifier is, so to speak, an index of its own impossibility . . . the phallus is the 
signifier of castration . . . This logic of the phallic inversion sets in when the 
demonstration of power starts to function as a confirmation of a fundamental 
impotence" (Sublime 157). Only at the conclusion of the novel, after Verezzi 
has already committed suicide, do we learn that what lies behind the display 
of phallic power is Verezzi’s illegitimate half-brother, an impotent figure in 
the context of the predominant social hierarchy.   
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 Interestingly, Zastrozzi is able to sustain his phallic presence, even 
after being brought before, and sentenced to death by, the Inquisition: “He 
looked around him. His manner awed the tumultuous multitude; and, in 
uninterrupted silence, the spectators gazed upon the unappalled Zastrozzi, 
who, towering as a demi-god, stood in the midst” (154). Why, after learning of 
his identity, of his illegitimate birth, and of his past murders, do the 
spectators and council still confer upon Zastrozzi the image of sublime phallic 
authority? Part of the answer lies, no doubt, in the mesmerizing theatricality 
of Zastrozzi’s performance. He both fascinates and frightens. Furthermore, 
when considered as a paranoiac image of the Jacobin monster, we see how 
such images are not only cultural productions, but must necessarily maintain 
their sublime status in the anti-Jacobin imaginary; for to demystify the 
paranoiac image would be to lose the very object against which an ideology 
recognizes itself. The spectators, therefore, are invested in their “willing 
suspension of disbelief” (to appropriate Coleridge’s phrase) and are not 
inclined to give up their investment in the image of the Other. In his excellent 
book Romantic Moods: Paranoia, Trauma, and Melancholy, Thomas Pfau 
isolates this curious relation between paranoia, knowledge, and the law:   
 . . . paranoia offers a first instance of how a distinctive historical period 
can be secured by observing a distinctive mode of formal-aesthetic 
production. Paradoxically, that very mode aims to forestall the very 
consciousness to which it vicariously gives rise. For in the age of 
revolutionary terror and government suppression (1789-98), 
knowledge is achieved dialectically, namely, by suspecting, 
investigating, and potentially indicting surface appearances and 




For Shelley, who seeks to re-mobilize the founding principles of Republican 
ideology, Zastrozzi functions too as just such a “surface appearance” “draped 
over the irrational” fears of reactionary ideology.   
     Matilda too is figured as a phallic object, which, not surprisingly, 
creates difficulties in her attempts to seduce Verezzi. Matilda occupies an 
especially dangerous position for Verezzi because she represents the 
possibility, in fantasy, of the full realization of the sexual relationship. She is 
beautiful, sexually uninhibited, culturally sophisticated, and presumably a 
woman of social standing like Julia. From a distance she engenders an 
alluring fascination, but approached too closely she becomes the monstrous 
Thing that threatens to swallow him up and annihilate his subjectivity. 
Matilda must masquerade as Verezzi’s object-cause of desire; that is, as the 
objet petit a in Verezzi’s fantasy frame. In other words, Matilda must 
desublimate herself from a phallic object of terrifying jouissance into a 
compelling image of desire which both conceals and indexes a “feminine 
mystique.”  
 The importance of objet petit a in a love relationship can be 
understood in terms of Lacan's sexuation formulas, in which the feminine and 
masculine subject positions (these are not imaginary ego identifications) are 
structured asymmetrically in relation to the failure of the Symbolic to satisfy 
the drive (jouissance).23 Each position is structured differently in response to 
this failure, which can be summarized as follows: All men are subject to the 
phallic function of symbolic castration and wholly captured within it. The 
male's position coincides with the phallic function and he is "whole" due only 
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to the limitation and boundary (posited as an exception) established by his 
full entry into the Symbolic. Women, however, are not fully identified with the 
phallic function, hence the woman is "not-all." She may say yes and no, or yes 
or no to it. In short, "woman's failure is with the signifier and man's failure is 
with the object" (Wright 177).  
 There is no symmetry between genders (“there is no sexual 
relationship”) because the woman must either masquerade as the fantasy 
object of the male (be the phallus), or attempt to assume a masculine position 
by identifying with the phallus (have the phallus), which puts the woman in 
competition with the man for the phallus, for a privileged position within the 
Symbolic. However, the woman has the option of identifying with the signifier 
of the barred Other, which signifies the lack in the Symbolic order, a 
jouissance which is related to the materiality of the signifier itself and to the 
Real beyond castration. However, such an identification with the lack in 
language, while opening up the possibility of an asexual kind of jouissance, 
does not include the sexual relationship with a male. As Emily Apter describes 
it: "There is no absolute femininity beneath the veil, only a set of ontologically 
tenuous codes that normatively induct the feminine subject into the social 
practice of "being" woman through mimesis and parroting" (243).24  
 According to Lacan's sexuation formula, the male identifies with the 
female as objet petit a; that is, she must occupy the place of the object-cause 
of desire in his fantasy scenario, she must "fit his formula" (Zizek, Plague 8). 
To do so, however, she must, as Apter points out, masquerade as the object of 
desire to fill-out his lack in a complementary way. There is no mystery 
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concerning Matilda’s desire: “I adore you to madness—I love you to 
distraction. If you have one spark of compassion, let me not sue in vain—
reject not one who feels it impossible to overcome the fatal, resistless passion 
which consumes her” (83). Verezzi’s response to Matilda is one of “cold 
esteem,” but in the following passage we get a glimpse of how Matilda will 
indeed become the object of his desire:  
 He could not love Matilda; and though he never had seen her but in the 
most amiable light, he found it impossible to feel any sentiment 
towards her, save cold esteem. Never had he beheld those dark shades 
in her character, which if developed could excite nothing but horror 
and detestation: he regarded her as a woman of strong passions, who, 
having resisted them to the utmost of her power, was at last borne 
away in the current—whose brilliant virtues one fault had obscured—as 
such he pitied her: but still could he not help observing a comparison 
between her and Julia, whose feminine delicacy shrunk from the 
slightest suspicion, even of indecorum. Her fragile form, her mild 
heavenly countenance, was contrasted with all the partiality of love, to 
the scintillating eye, the commanding countenance, the bold expressive 
gaze, of Matilda. (84) 
 
To successfully seduce Verezzi, Matilda must appeal to the narcissistic 
component of his sexual economy. Verezzi resists Matilda for much of the 
novel, but as she begins to understand how to incite his desire, Verezzi’s 
image of her softens: ““Emotions of pity, of compassion, for one whose only 
fault he supposed to be love for him, conquered V’s softened soul” (86). And a 
bit later:  
 Still did he feel his soul irresistibly softened towards Matilda—her love 
for him flattered his vanity; and though he could not feel reciprocal 
affection towards her, yet her kindness in rescuing him from his former 
degraded situation, her altered manner towards him, and her 
unremitting endeavours to please, to humour him in every thing, called 




Matilda’s “altered manner,” which “she knew well how to assume,”  coupled 
with the beauty of her “symmetrical form,” finally begins to work: “By 
affecting to coincide with him in every thing—by feigning to possess that 
congeniality of sentiment and union of idea, which he thought so necessary to 
the existence of love, she doubted not soon to accomplish her purpose” (115). 
Matilda does indeed “accomplish her purpose,” but only after she has 
managed to substitute herself in the place formerly occupied by Julia, whom 
Verezzi now believes to have been murdered by Zastrozzi: “Oh Matilda! 
dearest, angelic Matilda! . . . I am even now unconscious what blinded me—
what kept me from acknowledging my adoration of thee!—adoration never to 
be changed by circumstances—never effaced by time” (129). Matilda has 
successfully broken Verezzi’s melancholic fixation on the lost object of his 
desire and entered his fantasy frame as the object-cause of his “unconscious” 
desire.  
 Throughout the course of the novel, Zastrozzi and Matilda undergo a 
metamorphic shift from powerful, phallic objects of paranoiac fantasy to 
impotent objects that reveal the fundamental lack of split subjectivity 
(between the phallus and object-cause of desire). But these are still objects. 
The final procedure of demystification is to subjectivize the paranoiac image 
itself, to reveal the split subject beneath the fascinating presence. Shelley’s 
antagonists, Matilda and Zastrozzi, express a subjectivity that is far more 
complex than his protagonists, Verezzi and Julia. One is tempted to frame the 
actions of Matilda and Zastrozzi in terms of Kant’s distinction between 
“radical” and “diabolical” evil, which he discusses in Religion within the 
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Limits of Reason Alone. Radical evil is an ethical position in which one’s 
actions are determined solely by pathological motives. The pathological 
subject is determined by self-interest and gratification at the expense of the 
other—sexual gratification, greed, etc. all express the pathological subject’s 
determination by nature and culture. Diabolical evil, on the other hand, 
characterizes a position in which the subject adopts the pursuit of evil itself as 
a moral maxim (i.e., a categorical imperative in the form of Milton’s Satanic 
“Evil be thou my good.”), even at the expense of one’s own pathological 
interests, or even one’s life.25   
 Matilda clearly is a candidate for radical evil, and Zastrozzi for 
diabolical evil. Matilda violently pursues her passions until her self-interest is 
at stake. After Matilda kills Julia, she suddenly begins to reflect upon the 
eternal consequences: “The guilty Matilda shrunk at death—she let fall the 
upraised dagger—her soul had caught a glimpse of the misery which awaits 
the wicked hereafter, and, in spite of her contempt of religion—spite of her, till 
now, too firm dependence on the doctrines of atheism, she trembled at 
futurity; and a voice from within, which whispers “thou shalt never die!” 
spoke daggers to Matilda’s soul” (143). Zastrozzi, however, suffers no such 
spiritual crisis, and pursues his maxim of revenge, even at the expense of his 
own life. He informs the Council:  
 “I have been candid with you. Judge, pass your sentence—but I know 
my doom; and, instead of horror, experience some degree of 
satisfaction at the arrival of death, since all I have to do on earth is 
completed.” . . . Even whilst writhing under the agony of almost 
unsupportable torture his nerves were stretched, Zastrozzi’s firmness 
failed him not; but, upon his soul-illumined countenance, played a 
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smile of most disdainful scorn; and, with a wild, convulsive laugh of 
exulting revenge—he died. (156) 
 
Diabolical and radical evil posit a fully interpellated subject, an automaton 
who follows his or her pathological motives because she or he cannot choose 
not to. The demonic subjects of radical and diabolical evil are, thus, consistent 
with the paranoiac image of the transgressive Other. But as Kant argues, 
although absolute freedom is impossible and we cannot purify ourselves 
completely from our pathological determinations (we are after all trapped in 
finite, material bodies) we can exercise our freedom by choosing the way in 
which we are determined. And one of the signs of this freedom is guilt. What 
distinguishes Shelley’s Gothic (and here we can see the emergence of a 
Romantic gothicism), is the self-reflexivity and psychological dissonance that 
his gothic antagonists experience. These moments are not explored in any 
depth in the novel—the narrator is too anxious to propel Matilda and 
Zastrozzi into their next heinous deed—but they appear nonetheless and 
constitute a kind of textual unconscious that compels us to peer beyond the 
paranoiac image and consider Matilda and Zastrozzi as subjects rather than 
simply as objects of paranoiac fantasy. There are several moments when 
Matilda pauses to reflect upon her actions, and in these moments we 
recognize her as a split subject: “I almost shudder . . . at the sea of wickedness 
on which I am about to embark! But still, Verezzi—ah! for him would I even 
lose my hopes of eternal happiness. In the sweet idea of calling him mine, no 
scrupulous delicacy, no mistaken superstitious idea, shall prevent me from 
deserving him by daring acts— . . .” (79). A moment later she exclaims: “Oh, 
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madness! Madness!” . . . “is it for this that I have plunged into the dark abyss 
of crime?—is it for this that I have despised the delicacy of my sex, and, 
braving consequences, have offered my love to one who despises me—who 
shuns me, as does the barbarous Verezzi?” (82). And this iconic image, in 
which Matilda sits perched like a gargoyle overlooking a sublime display of 
nature’s destructive energy, captures perfectly Matilda’s status as both 
fantasmatic object and split subject: 
 Matilda sat upon a fragment of jutting granite, and contemplated the 
storm which raged around her. The portentous calm, which at intervals 
occurred amid the reverberating thunder, portentous of a more violent 
tempest, resembled the serenity which spread itself over Matilda’s 
mind—a serenity only to be succeeded by a fiercer paroxysm of passion. 
(119) 
 
Even Zastrozzi has moments, though few, of conscientious reflection that 
suggest a moral capacity for guilt: “Zastrozzi sat for some time immersed in 
heart-rending contemplations; but though conscience for awhile reflected his 
past life in images of horror, again was his heart steeled by fiercest vengeance 
. . . “ (75); and “. . . he thought of his past life, and his awakened conscience 
reflected images of horror. But again revenge drowned the voice of virtue—
again passion obscured the light of reason, and his steeled soul persisted in its 
scheme” (68). This guilt-inducing “voice of virtue” that reflects “images of 
horror” speaks through and for Matilda and Zastrozzi and well exemplifies 
the split between superego and the Law. As Mladen Dolar explains, “. . . the 
surplus of the superego over the Law is precisely the surplus of the voice; the 
superego has a voice, the Law is stuck with the letter” (Gaze and Voice, 14). 
Throughout Shelley’s work, we find many such instances where the voice and 
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gaze as “objects” produce a constellation of unsettling and often terrifying 
effects. The paradoxical status of the voice and gaze as objects is that they do 
not appear in the subject’s visual or aural field of perception. The gaze and 
voice signify that which is excluded from the perspective of the subject and 
point to an alterity or radical otherness, the fact that we can never fully 
identify with the object because we are constrained by our own point of 
reference. Thus, the examples par excellence of the object-gaze and the 
object-voice are darkness and silence (a pertinent example of which can be 
found in Shelley’s “Mont Blanc”). A distinguishing characteristic of the Gothic 
is that these objects are materialized in fantasy formations in ways that 
introduce the object-gaze and object-voice into the diegetic reality of the work 
itself. The alterity of the Other, it’s fundamental undecidability, is given 
concrete form. According to Dolar:  
 As soon as the object, both as gaze and as the voice, appears as the 
pivotal point of narcissistic self-apprehension, it introduces a rupture 
at the core of self-presence. It is something that cannot itself be 
present, although the whole notion of presence is constructed around it 
and can be established only by its elision. . . . If it appears as a part of 
the image, as it occurs, for example in the experience of the double, 
which has filled a whole library of romantic literature, it immediately 
disrupts the established reality and leads to catastrophe. (15)     
 
In short, the Gothic is the discourse of the psychotic. The specular doubling, 
fears of persecution, encounters with the jouissance of the Other, etc., that 
drive the action of Shelley’s Zaztrozzi, St. Irvyne, and The Wandering Jew, 
are early attempts to explore and understand the psychological dissonances 
associated with a failed encounter with the Other (as language, culture, 
ideology) and others (individual egos, including the subject’s own).        
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 Finally, I want to draw attention to Shelley’s most effective strategy for 
representing the subjectivization of the paranoiac image. Critics who interpret 
the images and actions of Matilda and Zastrozzi only in terms of Verezzi’s 
state of mind, as images drawn from the unconscious of his own psychological 
processess, miss the radical intersubjectivity at work between all of the 
characters. And those who suggest that Matilda and Zastrozzi are the only 
characters who are allowed to “fulfill their desire,” we must ask the question: 
whose desire? In Lacanian terms, the “subject’s desire is always the desire of 
the Other.” That is, desire can be for the Other, determined by the Other, or a 
desire for the Other’s desire—the “Other” being either the “big Other” itself 
(the symbolic register of language, ideology, culture, etc. out of which the 
effect of subjectivity is precipitated) or other individual others with whom one 
interacts. The most terrifying or uncanny moments in Shelley’s Gothic occur 
when characters discover (or we as readers discover despite the characters’ 
limited knowledge of their own self-experience) that their desire is not their 
own, that their free-will and actions are determined primarily by the desires 
of the Other as they are internalized in the formations of the ego, ego-ideal 
and superego.  
 Zastrozzi stages the process through which the desire of the Other is 
internalized, transferred, expressed, and subverted. For example, we can 
briefly restate the action of the novel in the following terms: Zastrozzi 
assumes for himself the desire of his mother, which sets in motion his 
merciless schemes to destroy Verezzi. Split between the “desire of the 
m(O)ther” and the “name of the father,” Zastrozzi occupies a perverse 
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position as the object-instrument of his disgraced mother’s desire for 
retribution: “’Never shall I forgot her last commands.—My son, said she, my 
Pietrino, revenge my wrongs—revenge them on the perjured Verezzi—revenge 
them on his progeny for ever’” (155). Matilda, in her union with Verezzi, 
assumes as her own the desire of Julia. Matilda’s desire does not fully reach 
its object until she murders Julia. Matilda’s stated desire actually masks her 
real desire, which is to destroy her sexual and social rival: “. . . Julia must die, 
and expiate the crime of daring to rival me, with her hated blood” (79). “’Julia, 
the hated, accursed Julia’s image, is the phantom which scares my otherwise 
certain confidence of eternal delight: could she but be hurled to destruction— 
. . .’” (131). Matilda’s phallic, destructive intensity, so well-veiled to Verezzi, 
finally reaches its apex when Matilda murders Julia in a “ferocious” 
confluence of desire and jouissance:  
 “Nerved anew by this futile attempt to escape her vengeance, the 
ferocious Matilda seized Julia’s floating hair, and holding her back with 
fiend-like strength, stabbed her in a thousand places; and, with 
exulting pleasure, again and again buried the dagger to the hilt in her 
body, even after all remains of life were annihilated. 
  At last the passions of Matilda, exhausted by their own violence, 
sank into a deadly calm: she threw the dagger violently from her, and 
contemplated the terrific scene before her with a sullen gaze. (143)   
 
In this moment, Shelley’s subjectivized paranoiac image reverts back to its 
original, horrifying presence, which ultimately realizes the desire of both the 
narrator and reader as reactionary others. That is, reactionary desire is 
satisfied, even though Shelley had frustrated that desire by humanizing the 
paranoiac images of Zastrozzi and Matilda. They reassume their status as 
Jacobin monsters, thus confirming the obscene enjoyment that underlies the 
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reactionary ethical stance. And, finally, by committing suicide, Verezzi 
ironically assumes as his own the desire of Zastrozzi. Thus, the actions of 
these “others” can only be understood within the larger context of the “big 
Other” (the patriarchal symbolic), from which both Zastrozzi and Matilda are 
excluded—Zastrozzi, as the illegitimate offspring of Verezzi’s father, and 
Matilda, whose sexual passion for Verezzi threatens the stability of the fully 
regulated sexual relationship, as exemplified by Verezzi and Julia.  
 On the one hand, Zastrozzi draws attention to the inter-subjective 
relations that actually drive and sustain the paranoiac fantasy, but on the 
other hand, Shelley is also careful to maintain the tension between the 
demystification of the fantasy and its reduction to an explanatory network of 
causal relations, which empties the Gothic of its uncanny effect and reduces it 
to a species of the philosophical novel. Verezzi’s traumatic encounters with 
Zastrozzi and Matilda exemplify not only the rigidity of Burkean aesthetic 
categories, but also the limitations of a moral psychology derived from either 
Smithian sympathetic identification or a Benthamian utilitarian calculus of 
pleasures and pains, the two predominant strains of mid-eighteenth- and 
early-nineteenth-century ethical discourse. As a consequence of the attempt 
to establish a subjective position free from the artificial and corrupted 
determinations of culture, tradition, and ecclesiastical authority, the 
Enlightenment philosophes were faced with the difficult problem of 
formulating an ethics grounded in “natural disposition” and confirmed by 
presumably universal affects such as pleasure and pain.26 An ethics derived 
from sympathetic identification with the other, however, suffers from the 
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problem of what to do if and when no identification with the other is possible. 
In other words, an ethics of sympathy, when pushed to its limits results in a 
narcissistic reflection of one’s own values and we sympathize with those 
whose values fundamentally reflect our own. As Zizek explains, a “logic of 
respect retains the subject (the one doing the recognizing) in his place, in his 
subjectivity. And, any ‘respect’ worth its salt would ultimately destroy this 
place, would entail complete and total subjective destitution—and this is what 
the respect view can't theorize.” The same logic holds for an ethics founded 
upon a Levinasian respect for the alterity of the “absolute Other,” and this is 
where Shelley’s Gothic finds its traction, in Verezzi’s unbearable encounters 
with the inscrutable gaze of Zastrozzi and the threatening sexuality of 
Matilda.27 To put it simply, how does one respond when sympathetic 
identification with the Other is impossible, when the inscrutable desire of the 
Other “presses too close” and threatens the consistency of one’s subjectivity? 
The radical intersubjectivity of identity, the metonymic movement of desire, 
and the destabilization of the imaginary stability of the ego, are the 
mechanisms that produce the terrifying effects of Shelley’s Gothic and 
complicate the notion of a free, autonomous subject of Enlightenment 
revolutionary agency.   
 If the Enlightenment critical procedure is to demystify the image of the 
Other (nature, sexual difference, power, etc.) by bringing it under the 
determinations of the symbolic, then the gothic strategy would be to reveal 
how this determined image is non-identical with itself.28 The demystification 
of gothic effects, as exemplified in Radcliffe for example, may indeed reveal 
 54 
 
the illusions produced through epistemological error, but the price to be paid 
for this demystification is a further mystification of the network of 
intersubjective relations that point to another register of the Gothic, the “real” 
of desire, i.e. the impenetrable desire of the Other and its irreducible excess, 
the engine which drives paranoiac fantasies of conspiracy and persecution, 
the implications of which were not lost on David Hume who, in A Treatise of 
Human Nature, writes: 
 For what is more capricious than human actions? What more 
inconstant than the desires of man? And what creature departs more 
widely, not only from right reason, but from his own character and 
disposition? An hour, a moment is sufficient to make him change from 
one extreme to another, and overturn what cost the greatest pain and 
labour to establish. Necessity is regular and certain. Human conduct is 
irregular and uncertain. (92) 
 
 While the Gothic—in its figurative and narrative extravagance—may at 
first appear to be an unsuitable aesthetic mode through which to ground 
concrete ideological critique, Shelley deftly subverts the diegetic reality of the 
narrative in favor of a reality that explores the socio-psychological dynamic 
that creates the dialectical tension between transgressive revolutionary action 
and paranoiac conservative reaction.29 And perhaps most fundamentally, 
Shelley raises the following question: To what extent are those who are 
excluded from or marginalized within the dominant ideology still subject to its 
norms and prohibitions? 
 In his Memoirs of Shelley, Thomas Love Peacock cites The Cenci as one 
of the few times Shelley “descended into the arena of reality” (73), but it is in 
his early gothic novels that Shelley first grounds abstract philosophical, social, 
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sexual, and ethical antagonisms within the concrete register of intersubjective 
relations. The “ineffectual Angel” strain of criticism—the result of a 
complicated cultural machine starting with Mary Shelley, Hogg, and Hunt and 
later solidified by Peacock and Arnold30—has long since been displaced by the 
post-structuralist Shelley who deconstructs the concrete representations of 
diegetic reality to reveal the abstract structures of language and ideology 
which produce the subjective effect of reality. The antagonism between the 
concrete particularity of self-experience and the abstract categories through 
which it is mediated drives much of the productive tension in Shelley’s mature 
work and sustains its enduring gothic sensibility. Although similar, I do not 
equate the post-structuralist subject with the gothic subject, nor the post-
structuralist Shelley with the gothic Shelley. The difference between the two 
hinges on the status of the “object,” or rather, the persistence of the object; i.e, 
the remainder of the real that resists symbolization and therefore cannot be 
reduced to or recuperated within the socio-symbolic field—another example 
of the non-identity of a concept with itself. I will further explore the 
implications of this distinction and the unsettling persistence of the object—as 
voice and gaze—in my analysis of Prometheus Unbound in chapter four. 
 Zastrozzi (along with St. Irvyne and The Wandering Jew) provides a 
baseline account, so to speak, of Shelley’s earliest interests in a wide range of 
disciplines—aesthetics, politics, ethics, psychology, and philosophy—and 
explores issues such as the perversion of justice into revenge; the narcissistic 
pursuit of self-gratification and the subsequent impasse of an ethics founded 
upon sympathy; the difficulties of sustaining an emancipatory ideological 
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position against oppressive orthodoxies of established authority; and most 
significantly, the challenges, both aesthetic and practical, of articulating a 
subjective position capable of surviving its own destitution when, after 
demystifying the “painted veil” of fantasy, one confronts the void in which 
“Hope and Fear”—those “twin destinies” that drive the negative dialectics of 
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the pieces of contemporary fiction which for a time had caught his fancy—
romances of pseudo-passion and the pseudo-sublime written in staccato 
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implications of their own theories. A notable example: although he 
proclaimed the materialist maxim that “Nothing that exists can be either 
against nature or outside of nature,” Diderot was hesitant to apply natural 
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 In a passage from The Theory of Moral Sentiments, Adam Smith offers 
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revenge:  
 These passions, however, are regarded as necessary parts of the 
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CHAPTER TWO 
St. Irvyne; or, The Rosicrucian:  
Gothic Drive and Romantic Desire  
 
St. Irvyne; or, The Rosicrucian is Shelley’s second gothic romance and the 
last work of prose fiction he would publish. The novel was published in 1811 
during Shelley’s first year at Oxford, although he likely completed most of it in 
1810 while still at Eton. Like Zastrozzi, the aesthetic of St. Irvyne reflects 
Shelley’s interest in and enjoyment of the popular productions of the Minerva 
Press and, particularly, Lewis’s The Monk, The Castle Spectre, and Tales of 
Wonder (a collection of gothic ballads and lyrics written and compiled with 
Southey and Scott); Radcliffe’s The Italian and The Romance of the Forest; 
and Dacre’s Zofloya. Shelley also draws from Godwin’s St. Leon; Rousseau’s 
Julie; ou la nouvelle Héloïse, and Schiller’s Die Räuber for characterization 
and settings.1 St. Irvyne further develops, if not exaggerates to a feverish 
pitch, the primary psychological theme established in Shelley’s first gothic 
romance Zastrozzi (1810): the destructive cycle of vengeance fueled by 
passion, jealousy, and aggression when one’s identity is put under pressure by 
threats, real or imagined, from others or by exclusion from one’s socio-
cultural context itself. 
 St. Irvyne contains two plotlines. The first opens on a stormy night 
with Wolfstein taking up the company of a brotherhood of monks after they 
have dissuaded him from a suicidal act. The monks are then ambushed by 
bandits, who lead Wolfstein to a subterranean cavern where he enlists as one 
of their band. Wolfstein is later captivated by the alluring beauty of Megalena, 
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who has been abducted by the bandits after they have robbed and murdered 
her father. Wolfstein plots to poison Cavigni, chief of the bandits, only to be 
saved from almost certain death by an enigmatic bandit named Ginotti. 
Eventually, Wolfstein and Megalena plot their escape from the bandits, but 
during their escape they encounter Ginotti, who demands that Wolfstein must 
swear that at some future point he will bear witness to his life story and 
provide him with a fitting burial. After that point, Wolfstein encounters 
Ginotti from time to time, usually after moments of doubt and romantic 
difficulties, such as when Wolfstein finds himself being seduced by Olympia 
during his own seduction of Megalena. Megalena then learns of Olympia’s 
designs on Wolfstein and demands that he murder Olympia. Wolfstein 
reluctantly agrees, but when the moment arrives, Wolfstein freezes and 
refuses to carry out the murder of the sleeping Olympia. When she awakes 
and discovers Wolfstein’s intention, she takes his dagger and commits suicide. 
At this traumatic moment, Ginotti appears again and requests that Wolfstein 
fulfill his oath. He recounts to Wolfstein the story of his life and arranges to 
give him the elixir of eternal life at the ruins of an abbey next to St. Irvyne's 
castle. Wolfstein meets with Ginotti, and the exchange is made, which results 
in both of their deaths. 
 While the Wolfstein/Megalena/Ginotti narrative is pure gothic 
romance, the second narrative, which concerns a young woman named Eloise 
de St. Irvyne and her suitor Fitzeustace, begins as gothic romance and then 
transitions to a sentimentalist mode. We learn the history of Eloise’s last six 
years of her life during her return to the castle of St. Irvyne. After the death of 
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her mother in Geneva, Eloise was seduced by the charming, though nefarious, 
Nempere. Eloise becomes pregnant, causing Nempere to abandon her and 
pass her off to Mountfort, an Englishman, as payment for a gambling debt. 
Mountfort then inexplicably murders Nempere and decides to place Eloise 
under the protection of Fitzeustace. Eventually, Eloise marries Fitzeustace 
and they both return to England, where Fitzeustace adopts her illegitimate 
child as his own. 
 While more ambitious than Zastrozzi, St. Irvyne is a fascinating mess, 
beset with contradictions and structural gaffes.2 For example, chapters five 
and six are missing entirely, without explanation. The main plot breaks off 
unexpectedly to introduce a parallel narrative that appears to bear little 
relation to the main one, reconciled only in a brief concluding paragraph. And 
in several instances Shelley seems to lack any interest in the narrative 
machinery itself.3 The narrator often interjects phrases such as “it is sufficient 
to conceive what cannot be so well described” (185) and “Needless were it 
minutely to describe each trivial event” (187) and “No incident worthy of 
narration occurred to disturb the uninterrupted tenour of their existence” 
(189).  Taking issue with Frederick Frank’s observation that such gaps and 
impasses (common stylistic devices of gothic literature) are “a deliberate ploy 
to intensify the reader’s consternation” (xiv), Stephen Behrendt instead 
suggests that “Shelley’s aim likely was less consternation than plain 
engagement. Whatever would more effectively draw the reader into the joint 
act of creation with the author by which the work was ‘created’ or ‘performed’ 
in the reader’s consciousness—that seems to have been fair game for Shelley 
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even early in his career” (37). Behrendt’s reading is a generous one, although I 
would argue that given the energetic density with which Shelley describes the 
phenomenology of trauma, he simply lacked patience or interest in the 
diegetic requirements of prose fiction. Those situations that Shelley’s narrator 
finds tedious and unworthy of further narration would occupy many pages of 
detailed elaboration from the pen of Radcliffe, Lewis, or Godwin. However 
fantastical the subject matter, the gothic novel is still a descendant of the 
realist fiction of Richardson and Fielding. And “reality” is precisely the 
category that Shelley wishes to place under pressure. Yet Shelley is less 
interested in the deconstruction of realist narrative conventions, in the mode 
of Sterne’s Tristram Shandy for example, choosing instead to focus on the 
ways in which reality, to sustain its consistency, depends upon the mediation 
of a supplemental idealization.  
 The Lacanian term for this supplement, which also functions as 
reality’s condition of possibility, is fantasy: the subject’s relation to the object-
cause of desire. As Zizek explains, desire, whose metonymic movement is 
mediated through fantasy, is a protection against the real of drive: “. . . 
fantasy is the very screen that separates desire from drive: it tells the story 
which allows the subject to (mis)perceive the void around which drive 
circulates as the primordial loss constitutive of desire” (Plague 32). St. 
Irvyne’s importance for understanding Shelley’s early development can be 
found in the way in which Shelley attempts to represent the traumatic 
consequences of a failure in one’s fantasy frame. In these instances, the 
narration is vivid and compelling. Tellingly, Shelley’s narrative omissions 
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occur at those moments when the characters have been able to re-establish, 
through fantasy, a sense of normality, which Shelley would later figure as a 
“painted veil which those who live call life.” The “hope” and “fear” that lurk 
behind the veil of fantasy are Shelley’s primary objects of interest and find 
expression in the parallel narratives of the Romantic sentimentalism of the 
Eloise/Fitzeustace/Nempere plot and the gothic barbarism of the 
Wolfstein/Megalena/Ginotti plot. 
 Figurations of the veil in Shelley’s work take many forms and generate 
significances that cannot simply be reduced to a metaphysical boundary 
between the phenomenal and the noumenal or an epistemological boundary 
between the known and the unknown. While it is easy to get caught up in 
trying to determine Shelley’s shifting philosophical beliefs, at a fundamental 
level his early figurations of the veil can be located at the level of intra- and 
interpersonal psychological dynamics—among the combinatory relations of 
subject, self, and Other.4 When the subject’s symbolic universe collapses and 
the veil of fantasy is lifted, the impenetrable and traumatic alterity of the 
Other is encountered. Desire gives way to drive, pleasure to jouissance, and 
reality to the Real.   
 In his Romantic Psychoanalysis, Joel Faflak defines Romanticism “as 
a body of writing struggling to find its own identity . . .” (8) and that 
“Romanticism constitutes itself as a scene of psychoanalysis to deal with the 
trauma of Romanticism’s search for itself” (5). My own study is very much in 
sympathy with Faflak’s project, and although Faflak does not discuss Shelley 
in any detail, his focus on “the emergence of psychoanalysis in Romanticism” 
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is particularly relevant for Shelley, along with Wordsworth, Coleridge, De 
Quincey, and Keats, to whom Faflak devotes the body of his argument. In both 
form and aesthetic, St. Irvyne is a transitional work for the young Shelley as 
he sought to find a more effective register through which to represent in 
materialist terms his increasingly abstract sensibility. St. Irvyne can be read 
as a thought experiment where the Gothic becomes the surrogate for poetry as 
Shelley attempts to work out the complications associated with expressing 
psychological imagery within the narrative constraints of prose fiction. 
Shelley’s frustrations with the formal requirements of prose is exemplified in 
the narrative of St. Irvyne itself when, on several occasions, the characters 
pause to write or recite a poem or to sing a song that more accurately reflects 
their emotional and psychological state5. Where, in The Castle of Otranto, 
Horace Walpole introduced the literalized fantastic into realistic prose fiction, 
the Romantics will perform a further reversal by introducing a psychological 
realism into the figurative realm of poetry. One can already detect in St. 
Iryvne Shelley’s movement towards the poetic6. Where Zastrozzi displays a 
crisp, economical narrative style, the diction of St. Irvyne reflects a lyrical 
quality more reminiscent of Radcliffe than Lewis or Dacre. A brief comparison 
between the opening passages of Zastrozzi and St. Irvyne demonstrates this 
shift. From Zastrozzi: 
      Torn from the society of all he held dear on earth, the victim of 
secret enemies, and exiled from happiness, was the wretched Verezzi! 
      All was quiet; a pitchy darkness involved the face of things, when, 
urged by fierest revenge, Zastrozzi placed himself at the door of the inn 
where, undisturbed, Verezzi slept. (61) 
 
And from St. Irvyne: 
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      Red thunder-clouds, borne on the wings of the midnight whirlwind, 
floated, at fits, athwart the crimson-coloured orbit of the moon: the 
rising fierceness of the blast sighed through the stunted shrubs, which, 
bending before its violence, inclined towards the rocks whereon they 
grew: over the blackened expanse of heaven, at intervals, was spread 
the blue lightning's flash; it played upon the granite heights, and, with 
momentary brilliancy, disclosed the terrific scenery of the Alps, whose 
gigantic and misshapen summits, reddened by the transitory 
moonbeam, were crossed by black fleeting fragments of the tempest 
cloud. The rain, in big drops, began to descend, and the thunder-peals, 
with louder and more deafening crash, to shake the zenith, till the long-
protracted war echoing from cavern to cavern, died, in indistinct 
murmurs amidst the far-extended chain of mountains. In this scene, 
then, at this horrible and tempestuous hour, without one existent 
earthly being whom he might claim as friend, without one resource to 
which he might fly as an asylum from the horrors of neglect and 
poverty, stood Wolfstein;—he gazed upon the conflicting elements; his 
youthful figure reclined against jutting granite rock; he cursed his 
wayward destiny, and implored the Almighty of Heaven to permit the 
thunder bolt, with crash terrific and exterminating, to descend upon 
his head, that a being useless to himself and to society might no longer, 
by his existence, mock Him who ne'er made aught in vain. (159) 
    
This shift in representation from simple description to a more complex 
phenomenological mode anticipates the phantasmagoric sequences found in 
Alastor, Laon and Cythna, and Prometheus Unbound, where the “operations 
of the human mind” are expressed metaphorically through a cacophony of 
violent naturalistic images. For Wolfstein, no Romantic correspondence 
between nature, symbol, and imagination is possible. Not only is he alienated 
from society, but nature itself is a traumatic abyss of otherness in which his 
split subjectivity is expressed in the fields of vision and sound:  
 Yet, unheeding the exclamations of the maddened Wolfstein, fiercer 
raged the tempest. The battling elements, in wild confusion, seemed to 
threaten nature’s dissolution; the ferocious thunderbolt, with 
impetuous violence, danced upon the mountains, and, collecting more 
terrific strength, severed gigantic rocks from their else eternal 
basements; the masses, with sound more frightful than the bursting 
thunder-peal, dashed towards the valley below. Horror and desolation 
marked their track. (160) 
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The “dissolution” of nature that leaves “horror” and “desolation” in its tracks 
establishes a powerful metaphor of repressed trauma that survives as a 
fundamental fantasy in the unconscious, a figure Shelley would use in 
Prometheus Unbound where “In each human heart terror survives / The ravin 
it has gorged” (I.i.618-19). In Shelley’s Goddess, Barbara Charlesworth Gelpi 
insightfully points out that in these lines “the gothic rantings of Shelley’s 
adolescent fiction come to controlled expression” (154). The cause of the 
“terror” that survives in the heart of Wolfstein is never revealed to the reader. 
All we are told of Wolfstein is that he was a “wealthy potentate in Germany” 
who was exiled from the “lap of luxury and indulgence” (163). The narrator 
never explains the circumstances of his exile, and even Wolfstein himself 
cannot bear to think of or discuss with Megalena the “event which imposed 
upon him an inseparable barrier to ever again returning” (163).  
 Interestingly, given the novel’s debt to Godwin’s St. Leon and Schiller’s 
Die Räuber, Shelley avoids supplying a detailed account of Wolfstein’s 
background or establishing a causal chain of events that would sharpen his 
critique of the societal or personal corruption out of which those events 
originated. The “event” that “led him to quit his native country” is “almost too 
dreadful for narration” (175). Whatever the “event” was, it cannot be inscribed 
into Wolfstein’s symbolic universe, and Shelley maintains its mysterious 
ambiguity by denying it a narrative context. As an irruption of the real that 
“resists symbolization,” the event indexes a constitutive antagonism in 
Wolfstein’s psychic economy that draws him away from the normative circuit 
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of desire and towards the all-consuming void of drive. And for Shelley, where 
there is a void, there is a veil. In St. Irvyne, it is in the “impossibility of the 
sexual relationship” where the antagonism between the void of subjectivity 
and the veil of fantasy is represented most explicitly and is shown to produce 
consequences well-beyond the relation between the masculine and feminine.              
 In his Seminar XX, Lacan offers his most succinct formulation of the 
impossibility of the sexual relationship as “that which doesn’t stop not being 
written” (94). As readers of Shelley well know, his portrayals of the sexual 
relationship are fraught with frustrations, impasses, disappointments and 
despair. Relationships are represented in all of their complexity, but they are 
never “written”; that is, they arrive at no final formula that would efface all 
difference into the totality of the “One,” an unmediated link between self and 
other that does not appropriate difference within a narcissistic condensation 
of the other into an ideal image or object that serves to fill the lack in the 
desiring subject7. Although satisfying relationships are certainly attainable, 
the relation between the masculine and the feminine (structural positions in 
relation to the castrating function of language, not biologically determined) is 
always mediated by the subject’s fantasy frame: “everything we are allowed to 
approach by way of reality remains rooted in fantasy” (95).  
 If sexual difference is “real” and thus impossible to symbolize, then the 
gothic romance is its symptom. Alastor, Laon and Cythna, Epipsychidion, 
Julian and Maddalo, and Prometheus Unbound are well-known examples 
that document Shelley’s struggle to represent poetically this antagonism. 
Because of Shelley’s apparent frustration with the diegetic demands of prose 
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fiction, however fantastical the subject matter, through poetic discourse he 
finds a more effective mode for expressing the “unreality” of the fantasy frame 
itself. Shelley’s fiction, however, does offer its own insights into the veil of 
fantasy by positing the traumatic consequences of its breakdown. Like Verezzi 
from Zastrozzi, the main characters in St. Irvyne suffer a catastrophic 
separation from a socio-symbolic network that provides the coordinates for 
their fantasy frames, exposing the void of subjectivity unsupported by fantasy. 
Wolfstein desperately tries to fill the void and re-establish his fantasy frame 
by entering into a romantic relationship with Megalena. For Wolfstein, 
Megalena appears as a sublime object that arrests his gaze and reflects a 
formal permanence into which his distempered mind can find refuge and 
structure:    
 . . . the hapless Wolfstein, ever the victim of impulsive feelings, found 
himself bound to her by ties, more lasting than he had now conceived 
the transitory tyranny of woe could have imposed. For never had 
Wolfstein beheld so singularly beautiful a form;—her figure cast in the 
mould of most exact symmetry; her blue and love-beaming eyes, from 
which occasionally emanated a wild expression, seemingly almost 
superhuman; and the auburn hair which hung in unconfined tresses 
down her damask cheek—formed a resistless tout ensemble. (168) 
 
Megalena is also the victim of a traumatic encounter and, like Wolfstein, seeks 
an escape from her unbearable situation. Where Wolfstein identifies with 
Megalena as sublime sexual object, Megalena identifies with his phallic 
presence: “his figure majestic and lofty, and the fire which flashed from his 
expressive eye, indefinably to herself, penetrated the inmost soul of the 
isolated Megalena” (169). This tenuous relation between the masculine and 
feminine is disrupted by the emergence of a third party, the lascivious leader 
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of the bandits, Cavigni. Having robbed and murdered her father, Cavigni then 
claims Megalena as his “possession” and intends to marry her against her will. 
Whereas Wolfstein is initially fascinated by Megalena’s beauty and form, 
Cavigni is driven solely by acquisitive lust:  
 Cavigni was enraptured with the beauty of Megalena, and secretly 
vowed that no pains should be spared to gain to himself the possession 
of an object so lovely. The anticipated delight of gratified 
voluptuousness revelled in every vein as he gazed upon her; his eye 
flashed with a triumphant expression of lawless love, yet he 
determined to defer the hour of his happiness till he might enjoy more 
free, unrestrained delight, with his adored fair one. (170)  
   
The resemblance between Cavigni and Count Cenci is worth noting. Both 
function as a kind of Freudian primal father from Totem and Taboo, the 
uncastrated Other who freely enjoys and is subject to no prohibitions. Cavigni 
warns Megalena that he will “force the jewel from its casket” (172-73) if she 
refuses to assent to marriage, a thinly veiled threat of rape. The emergence of 
a romantic rival throws Wolfstein back into an emotional frenzy, and 
whatever genuine feelings he may have at first harbored for Megalena turn 
uncannily similar to those of Cavigni: “his bosom was the scene of the wildest 
anarchy; the conflicting passions revelled dreadfully in his burning brain:—
love, maddening, excessive, unaccountable idolatry, as it were, which 
possessed him for Megalena, urged him on to the commission of deeds which 
conscience represented as beyond measure wicked, . . .” (172).  
 In my analysis of Zastrozzi, I argued that one of the primary themes of 
that novel is the way in which the “desire of the Other” always functions as a 
third term that disrupts or negates the harmonious relation between the 
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masculine and feminine. As Lacan puts it, “one’s desire is always the desire of 
the Other.” What drives the action in Zastrozzi is the transference of desire 
from one individual to another, bringing into relief the difference between the 
“subject of the enunciated” and the subject of the enunciation”; that is, the 
split between the subject’s stated desire and the subject’s unconscious desire, 
the “place” from where the subject speaks. On the imaginary level of the ego, 
the subject misrecognizes the other’s desire as his or her own. The same 
dynamic is at work in St. Irvyne where Wolfstein’s desire for Megalena is 
incited and intensified by his jealous response to Cavigni. Megalena ceases to 
become an object of sexual desire and instead becomes an object of status that 
solidifies Wolfstein’s identity as a rival to Cavigni. This shift in the status of 
the object is reflected in the shift of Wolfstein’s gaze from Megalena to 
Cavigni: “With a gaze of insidious and malignant revenge was the eye of 
Wolfstein fixed upon the chieftain’s countenance” (181). Wolfstein’s gaze often 
becomes “fixed” upon an object, suspending the normal circuit of his desire 
and situating him in the monstrous realm of drive (his gambling habit being 
but a socially structured form of drive). He returns again and again to the 
position of subjective destitution in which we find him at the beginning of the 
novel: “. . . he cursed his wayward destiny, and implored the Almighty of 
Heaven to permit the thunderbolt, with crash terrific and exterminating, to 
descend upon his head, that a being useless to himself and to society might no 
longer, by his existence, mock Him who ne’er made aught in vain” (159). And 
in yet another instance where one of Shelley’s early protagonists foreshadows 
the endless suffering of Prometheus, Wolfstein addresses his compulsion to 
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the death drive directly to the big Other: “What, what is death?—Ah, 
dissolution! thy pang is blunted by the hard hand of long-protracted 
suffering—suffering unspeakable, indescribable” (159-60).    
 It is not surprising then that relationship between Wolfstein and 
Megalena is destined to fail. They exist for one another only as objects that 
function as an anchor for the fantasy frame that sustains their access to a 
consistent reality. By chance alone they find themselves in each other’s 
fantasy frame at a traumatic moment. Upon immediately recognizing in the 
other the object that could fill their respective lack, their “courtship” consists 
of a single exchange:  
 At the sight of him Megalena arose from her recumbent posture, and 
hastened joyfully to meet him; for she remembered that Wolfstein had 
rescued her from the insults of the banditti, on the eventful evening 
which had subjected her to their control. 
  “Lovely, adored girl,” he exclaimed, “short is my time: pardon, 
therefore, the abruptness of my address. The chief has sent me to 
persuade you to become united to him; but I love you, I adore you to 
madness. I am not what I seem. Answer me!—time is short.” 
  An indefinable sensation, unfelt before, swelled through the 
passion-quivering frame of Megalena. “Yes, yes,” she cried, “I will—I 
love you—.” (173)      
 
 Megalena’s desire too is incited by romantic rivalry when, later, the 
sexually precocious Olympia attempts to seduce Wolfstein. Megalena’s 
reaction is so strong that she demands that Wolfstein kill Olympia. He 
reluctantly agrees, but when the fateful moment arrives Wolfstein is unwilling 
to kill Olympia and she takes her own life, stabbing herself with the dagger 
Megalena had given to Wolfstein. As Peter Finch points out, however, this 
episode “demonstrates the pervasively violent nature of Wolfstein’s sexuality: 
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behind his heroic masculinity lies a sexual desire riddled with potentially 
murderous hostility” (41). Finch goes on to argue: 
 . . . the phallus is neither possessed nor controlled by the masculinity 
that it privileges but depends instead upon the dual images of 
femininity, the otherwise uncontrollably sexual woman (Megalena) and 
the otherwise unattainably innocent woman (the re-configured 
Olympia), against which it is defined. Within this economy of 
representations the Phallus is used to control female sexuality on the 
one hand and to annex a feminized realm of purity and virtue on the 
other, punishing the first image of Woman as the sexual Other and 
violating and concealing the second’s asexual otherness. (42)  
 
While I agree with Finch that Wolfstein’s failure to possess the phallus (a 
signifier that would guarantee the stability of his identity) is the primary 
motivation that determines his actions, I take issue with his characterizations 
of Megalena as the “uncontrollably sexual woman” and Olympia as the 
“unattainably innocent woman.” Just after their escape from the banditti, it is 
Wolfstein who is overcome by sexual passion for Megalena, and he attempts 
to overcome her virtue by appealing to the necessity of natural inclinations: 
 . . . overcome by the passion which, by mutual indulgence, had become 
resistless, he cast himself at her feet, and, avowing most unbounded 
love, demanded the promised return. A slight spark of virtue yet 
burned in the bosom of the wretched girl; she essayed to fly from 
temptation; but Wolfstein, seizing her hand, said, “And is my adored 
Megalena a victim then to prejudice? Does she believe, that the Being 
who created us gave us passions which never were to be satiated? Does 
she suppose that Nature created us to become the tormentors of each 
other?” (188) 
 
And conversely, Olympia is described in terms similar to that of Victoria, 
Charlotte Dacre’s sexually driven protagonist from Zofloya:  
 From habitual indulgence, her passions, naturally violent and 
excessive, had become irresistible; and when once she had fixed a 
determination in her mind, that determination must either be effected, 
or she must cease to exist. Such, then, was the beautiful Olympia, and 
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as such she conceived a violent and unconquerable passion for 
Wolfstein. (197) 
 
Megalena’s jealousy of Olympia is understandable: given their similarities in 
personality and temperament, Wolfstein and Olympia are mirror images of 
each other. This alone may explain why Wolfstein is unable to kill Olympia. 
To do so would mean killing that part of his desire that Megalena is unable to 
fulfill. And yet Wolfstein still clings to Magelana despite the fact that she fails 
to embody the image he has of her in his fantasy frame. He needs the 
semblance of a normal sexual relationship grounded in fantasy and desire to 
protect him from his destructive tendency towards jouissance and drive. The 
Megalena/Olympia duality that Finch identifies thus fails to recognize a 
crucial point: it is precisely this gap between Megalena as image-object in 
fantasy space and her individual particularity that marks the impossibility of 
the sexual relationship: 
 Megalena was not the celestial model of perfection which his warm 
imagination had portrayed; he begin to find in her, not the exhaustless 
mine of interesting converse which he had once supposed. Possession, 
which, when unassisted by real, intellectual love, clogs man, increases 
the ardent, uncontrollable passions of women even to madness. . . . 
Wolfstein no longer regarded her with that idolatrous affection which 
had filled his bosom towards her. (192)               
 
The problem for Wolfstein, therefore, is not one of privileging one kind of 
femininity over another, but lies in the fact that no articulation or 
combination of the feminine is adequate to fill the void of the primordial lost 
object. The narrator, however, in one of many similar judgments suggests that 
just such a scenario is possible and that the impediment to the relationship 
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consists in Wolfstein’s failure to incorporate an intellectual component into 
the relationship: 
 Yet the love with which Wolfstein regarded Megalena, notwithstanding 
the strength of his expressions, through fervent and excessive, at first, 
was not of that nature which was likely to remain throughout existence; 
it was like the blaze of the meteor at midnight, which glares amid the 
darkness for awhile, and then expires; yet did he love her now; at least 
if heated admiration of her person and accomplishments, 
independently of mind, be love. (189)         
 
In the parallel narrative of Eloise and Fitzeustace, which I will discuss more 
fully in a moment, Shelley attempts to represent an ideal relationship 
grounded in sympathy and intellect. But the price to be paid for that idealism 
is the sacrifice of physical intimacy—a sexual relationship without the sex.  
 The murderous love triangle between Wolfstein, Megalena, and 
Olympia extends the critique of the destructive consequences of jealousy first 
articulated in the Verezzi, Matilda, and Julia narrative from Zastrozzi. There 
is, however, one crucial distinction between the two that significantly alters 
the scope of that critique: in Zastrozzi, Matilda’s duplicitous actions are 
conscious choices. She chooses to pursue a course of “radical evil” despite the 
consequences. She learns that to appeal to Verezzi she must wear a mask of 
genteel femininity, to masquerade herself as the object-cause of his desire. In 
St. Irvyne, on the other hand, deception itself is shown to be a structural 
component of the sexual relationship; that is, neither Megalena nor Wolfstein 
consciously attempt to deceive the other, to pretend to be something they are 
not. The gap between the image and the individual leads to a misrecognition 
that is retroactively assumed to be a conscious deception. Neither of them 
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turn out to be who the other thought they were. Furthermore, neither turn out 
to be who they think they are. This alterity (the gap between subject and ego) 
within both the self and the other remains inaccessible, an absent cause that 
cannot be accounted for and yet produces a series of effects.  
 The importance of the Gothic in understanding Shelley’s development 
lies not in the transition from a supposed gothic immaturity to Romantic 
high-mindedness. The Gothic in Shelley’s work “always returns to its place,” 
to quote one of Lacan’s definition of the real. The real both resists and 
demands its articulation, but it cannot be mediated. The Triumph of Life, 
Shelley’s last poem, reads like a ghastly procession of philosophers and poets 
that European culture had called upon (including Shelley) to mediate the 
alterity of the Other. In Triumph, Shelley attempts to “traverse the fantasy,”— 
to create a space of possibility, to shatter the imaginary unity of the world, so 
that new forms of being might become possible. The Gothic returns in Shelley 
at those moments when dialectic fails and the terrifying abyss of the Other 
leads one to ask yet again, as in the final line of The Triumph of Life,—“What 
is Life?”—an appeal to the very Other from which the question originates. 
Shelley’s Gothic, therefore, serves as critique against, and answer to, the 
forms of being that would occupy Shelley’s fantasy space throughout his 
career. It is particularly instructive to read Shelley’s Gothic against his later 
philosophical and political thought, not merely as a precursor but as a critique 
of those later positions. It is in this sense that the philosophy of Godwin, 
crucial to Shelley’s development, develops as a reaction-formation against the 
psycho-ideological impasses that Shelley explores in his early work.                      
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 I would argue that St. Irvyne offers a proleptic critique of Shelley’s 
later adherence to Godwinian necessity and rationalist perfectibility. In 
Political Justice, Godwin articulates a theory of society that depends upon 
transparency not only between self and other but also, even more crucially, 
between self and will—a consciousness and identity fully transparent to itself. 
Just as matter is subject to the immutable laws of physical necessity, so must 
the mind (another modality of matter) be subject to a similar chain of cause 
and effect: “the theory of the human mind is properly, like the theory of every 
other series of events with which we are acquainted, a system of mechanism; 
understanding by mechanism nothing more than a regular succession of 
phenomena, without uncertainty of event, so that every consequent requires a 
specific antecedent, and could be no otherwise in any respect than as the 
antecedent determined to be” (360-61). All the “actions of men are necessary,” 
Godwin writes, and “the man who is acquainted with all the circumstances 
under which a living or intelligent being is placed upon any given occasion is 
qualified to predict the conduct he will hold, with as much certainty as he can 
predict any of the phenomena of inanimate nature” (336, italics mine). When 
“all the circumstances” that form the causal chain of human behavior are 
brought before the understanding, Godwin concludes that: 
 Multitudes will never exert the energy necessary to extraordinary 
success, till they shall dismiss the prejudices that fetter them, get rid of 
the chilling system of occult and inexplicable causes and consider the 
human mind as an intelligent agent guided by motives and prospects 
presented to the understanding, and not by causes of which we have no 
proper cognisance and can form no calculation. . . . Remove the causes 
of this ignorance or this miscalculation, and the effects will cease. (110) 
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Godwin’s theory, which anticipates the Habermasian ideal of communicative 
rationality, is a powerful argument that would later empower Shelley in 
deconstructing the ideological foundations of established authority and to 
refute its prejudiced claims of structural necessity. We can, of course, 
speculate about Wolfstein’s background and acknowledge his life of “luxury 
and indolence” as the context in which his tempestuous and undisciplined 
character was formed.8  But in keeping the background of Wolfstein shrouded 
in mystery, the novel emphasizes how the link between the void of subjectivity 
and the inscrutability of the Other are revealed when the veil of the subject’s 
fantasy is lifted.  
 At the mercy of his disordered temperament, Wolfstein is a mystery 
even to himself, “instinctively impelled to deeds of horror and danger” (164). 
Godwin’s philosophy cannot account for the agency of the unconscious and is 
operative only at the level of imaginary relations between self and other. One 
might argue that when Coleridge’s ancient mariner inexplicably shoots the 
albatross, he pierces the heart of Godwin’s philosophy as well. One could 
argue that this split between self-presence and self-alienation occurs in the 
founding gesture of Romanticism itself: Wordsworth’s and Coleridge’s Lyrical 
Ballads, where the Ancient Mariner’s obsessive drive to account for his 
traumatic encounter with inscrutable necessity by constructing a fantasy 
scenario drawn from the medieval imaginary threatens to destabilize the 
Wordsworthian poetics of simplicity and ameliorating correspondence 
between thought and emotion9.  
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 To determine “all the circumstances” that have served as the cause of 
one’s actions would require the subject to bring the unconscious under the 
power of the understanding and will. This self-identical correspondence 
between the imaginary and the symbolic is the fantasy of the utilitarian 
subject—a thinking automaton who is capable of determining moral actions 
through an absolute calculus of pleasures and pains. The salient point of 
Lacan’s theory of fantasy is that it operates on an unconscious level, 
structuring the subject’s relation to the object-cause of desire rather than to 
the self’s relation to an object of desire. The “object-cause” is simply the gap 
between need (imaginary) and demand (symbolic) that resists full satisfaction 
and triggers the movement of desire from one partial object to the next.  
 I have hesitated to discuss the significance of Ginotti up to this point 
because although he is the key to interpreting the psychological dynamics of 
St. Irvyne, his presence in the novel is, ironically, unnecessary in terms of the 
causal sequence of events. He neither encourages nor discourages Wolfstein 
to kill Cavigni. And even after Wolfstein’s confession to the murder, when 
Ginotti intervenes on Wolfstein’s behalf and promises to the bandits in return 
for Wolfstein’s safety that they “shall no more behold him (183),” the 
narrative had already suggested that the bandits were under the spell of 
Wolfstein’s powerful presence and likely would not have harmed him: 
 His magnanimity and courage, even whilst surrounded by the most 
threatening dangers, and the unappalled expression of countenance 
with which he defied the dart of death, endeared him to the robbers: 
whilst with him they all asserted that they felt, as it were, instinctively 
impelled to deeds of horror and danger, which, otherwise, must have 
remained unattempted even by the boldest. (164) 
 
80 
After the initial shock, they likely would have looked upon him as their new 
leader. Nor does Ginotti influence Wolfstein’s original intent to kill Olympia. 
These key moments that drive the action of the narrative would have taken 
place regardless of Ginotti’s presence in the novel. Only after Wolfstein has 
committed these murderous and self-destructive acts does Wolfstein posit 
Ginotti as the cause of his actions: “for of the misfortunes which had 
succeeded his association with the bandits, he had not the slightest doubt in 
his own mind, that Ginotti was the cause” (193). Recall also that after 
Olympia’s suicide Wolfstein minimizes his culpability by placing the blame 
solely on Megalena: “. . . he could not but now regard her as a fiend, who had 
been the cause of Olympia’s destruction; who had urged him to a deed from 
his nature now shrunk as from annihilation” (206).  
 Wolfstein’s defining characteristic is to project his own culpability and 
guilt onto others, refusing to take responsibility for his actions. He is often 
described as being “unappalled” by the horrific things he does. His lack of 
conscience in these moments would seem to contradict the narrator’s claims 
that Wolfstein is tormented by his conscience: “Remorse for his crimes 
tortured him: yet, steeling his conscience, he essayed to smother the fire 
which burned in his bosom; to change the tenour of his thoughts—in vain! he 
could not” (185). The split in Wolfstein between “unappalled” disaffection and 
“tortured” affection, distinguishes Wolfstein as a more psychologically 
complex character than any other in Shelley’s gothic novels, and the function 
of Ginotti is clearly meant to externalize some aspect of the turmoil of 
Wolfstein’s psychic economy. The crucial link between the two occurs 
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immediately after Wolfstein has posited Ginotti as the “cause” of all his woes. 
Wolfstein vows  
 to unravel the mystery in which he saw Ginotti was shrouded; and 
resolved, therefore, to devote that night towards finding out his abode. 
With feelings such as these, he rushed into the street, and followed the 
gigantic form of Ginotti, who stalked onwards majestically, as if 
conscious of safety, and wholly ignorant of the eager scrutiny with 
which Wolfstein watched his every movement. . . . he resolved to follow 
Ginotti, even to the extremity of the universe. (193) 
     
Of the few critics who have taken St. Irvyne seriously enough to offer a 
detailed reading of the novel, most agree that the novel is, in the words of 
Frederick Frank, an “impressive performance in the craft of terrifying the 
mind with phantasmatic images of various unwanted selves which hide in the 
unconscious” (ix). For Jerrold Hogle, the “battle of thesis-antithesis thus 
appears as the central cosmic paradox, the problem of a One becoming the 
Many in order to be revealed in something different from itself that is still 
itself all along” (80). And Peter Finch, in the best reading of the novel to date, 
argues that Ginotti is a “preternaturally powerful Father-figure” (64) who 
haunts Wolfstein’s conscience as a precursor of the Freudian superego. While 
I agree with Finch that Ginotti does function as a kind of superegoic agency 
for Wolfstein, I hesitate to ascribe to Ginotti the characteristics of a 
“preternaturally powerful Father-figure.” Unlike Schedoni, Radcliffe’s sublime 
villain from The Italian, Ginotti does not stand-in as a representative of 
corrupted ecclesiastical or state power, which would confer upon him the 
authority of the patriarchal symbolic and its prohibitions. He more accurately 
represents an Enlightenment Faustian figure that tempts, more than pricks, 
Wolfstein’s active conscience. This shift from the dominant ecclesiastical 
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ideology to an emergent Enlightenment ideology is significant in several ways. 
First, Ginotti himself, like Wolfstein, is an outcast, not because he is a 
corrupted figure of state power but because his scientific drive has alienated 
him from the normative heterosexual circuit of desire. Here the link between 
Radcliffe’s critique of the Catholic Church and Shelley’s critique of 
Enlightenment merge. If Radcliffe identifies the gap between the stated, 
idealized, ideology of power and the corrupted individuals (in all their 
pathological tics and weaknesses) through whom that power operates, then 
Shelley locates a similar gap between the abstraction of scientific 
rationalization and the individuals who embody its process.  
 But can we really ascribe to Ginotti a superegoic agency that sparks 
Wolfstein’s guilty conscience? It is important to note that Wolfstein’s guilty 
conscience is already fully present before Ginotti appears on the scene: 
“Conscience too, awakened conscience, upbraided him for the life which he 
had selected, and, with silent whisperings, stung his soul to madness” (165). 
Ginotti first appears after Wolfstein has joined the group of Alpine bandits. 
Initially, Wolfstein finds Ginotti intriguing but not necessarily threatening:  
 although mysterious and reserved, his society was courted with more 
eagerness, than such qualities might, abstractedly considered, appear 
to deserve. None knew his history—that he concealed within the 
deepest recesses of his bosom; nor could the most suppliant entreaties, 
or threats of the most horrible punishments, have wrested from him 
one particular concerning it. Never had he once thrown off the 
mysterious mask, beneath which his character was veiled, . . . 
something lurked behind which yet remained unknown. (172-73) 
 
Only when Wolfstein begins to contemplate murdering Cavigni to gain the 
love of Megalena for himself does Ginotti begin to transform, in Wolfstein’s 
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mind, into a figure of paranoiac, conspiratorial anxiety. Even then, however, 
Ginotti is less an externalization of the superego and than he is an image of 
Wolfstein’s ego-ideal. More specifically, Ginotti materializes the gap between 
Wolfstein’s ideal-ego and his ego-ideal, between how he would like to see 
himself and how he would like others to see him: 
 Every one submitted to Ginotti: for who could resist the superior 
Ginotti? From the gaze of Ginotti Wolfstein’s soul shrank, enhorrored, 
in confessed inferiority: he who had shrunk not at death, had shrunk 
not to avow himself guilty of murder, and had prepared to meet its 
reward, started from Ginotti’s eye-beam as from the emanation of 
some superior and preter-human being. (183) 
 
 His soul sank within him at the idea of his own littleness, when a 
fellow-mortal might be able to gain so strong, though sightless, an 
empire over him. He felt that he was no longer independent. . . . His 
soul shrank with mingled awe and abhorrence from a being who, even 
to himself, was confessedly superior to the proud and haughty 
Wolfstein. (195)   
 
Wolfstein admires Ginotti for his calm steadiness, self-assurance, and the 
respect he garners from others. There is little to suggest that Ginotti wields 
any prohibitive agency over Wolfstein; in fact, Ginotti represents precisely the 
opposite: a being who is unconstrained by prohibitions who exists outside of 
the injunctions of the socio-ideological context within which Wolfstein 
identifies himself. Ginotti is both mirror and screen for Wolfstein. In the 
inscrutable gaze of the other, he projects his desire for a stable identity but 
receives in return a reflection fraught with mystery and terror. Ginotti’s 
relation to Wolfstein is thus radically ambiguous. Whatever term we apply to 
him—ideal-ego, ego-ideal, superego, unconscious, desire of the Other, etc.—
fails to contain him, shifting from one moment to the next along with 
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Wolfstein’s psychological dynamics. In this sense, Ginotti embodies, literally, 
the void of Wolfstein’s subjectivity—the fundamental point at which 
signification fails to interpellate a subject—thus staging the impossibility of 
Godwinian self-transparency. Wolfstein and Ginotti circle around each other, 
pursue each other, but rather than reaching a common ground of 
understanding, Ginotti, from Wolfstein’s point of view, becomes even more 
sublime and menacing, to the point of omnipresence. It is here, in the final 
confrontation between Wolfstein and Ginotti, that Wolfstein’s fantasy frame 
dissolves completely and places him within the realm of drive. 
 Ginotti’s drive to pursue eternal life inversely mirrors Wolfstein’s drive 
to pursue death, thus staging the paradoxical notion that “every drive is a 
death drive.” Like Coleridge’s ancient mariner, Ginotti is a subject of pure 
drive. Having acquired the object of his desire (the elixir vitae), he is left 
without any substantial content that would give significance to eternal life, no 
objects of desire. In other words, without any socio-symbolic support for his 
unique mode of existence, he is driven to communicate his secret with the aim 
of inscribing it in the form of symbolic exchange. Only then can he “die.” 
What Ginotti ultimately desires is symbolic castration, the proof of which 
becomes clear in his insistence, without any proof to sustain his belief, in the 
existence of God. Without the castrating cut of the paternal metaphor that 
would circumscribe his existence and provide it with meaning, Ginotti 
occupies an uncanny space between symbolic and real death. Like the 
Wandering Jew, Ginotti is undead, non-mortal; a being who retains the 
predicates of humanity but is abjected from the normative socio-cultural 
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context. The crucial moment for Wolfstein occurs when, before conferring 
upon him the secret of the elixir vitae, Ginotti demands that Wolfstein fulfill 
his vow: “Wolfstein, dost thou deny thy Creator?”—“Never, never.”—“Wilt 
thou not?”—“No, no,—any thing but that” (252). At this point the “frightful 
prince of terror” appears, Ginotti’s frame “moulder[s] to a gigantic skeleton” 
leaving only “two pale and ghastly flames” glaring from his “eyeless sockets,” 
and Wolfstein dies, the “power of hell” having no “influence” over him. Simply 
put, Ginotti is reduced to pure gaze, to the scopic drive that had defined him 
in life, while Wolfstein, upon accepting the paternal metaphor, suffers the 
“death” of symbolic castration.  
 Another way to approach this would be to consider what would happen 
if the subject achieved full consciousness of its unconscious desires. In a 
sense, this is what happens when Ginotti reveals all of his secrets to Wolfstein.  
Would such knowledge obliterate the subject? Wolfstein’s paranoiac idea that 
Ginotti is the “cause” of all his woes would actually be accurate, although his 
refusal to take responsibility for actions or change his behavior still marks his 
failure to engage in the process of acquiring increased self-awareness that 
Godwin stresses. Mladen Dolar argues: 
 As soon as the object, both as gaze and voice, appears as the pivotal 
point of narcissistic self-apprehension, it introduces a rupture at the 
core of self-presence. It is something that cannot itself be present, 
although the whole notion of presence is constructed around it and can 
be established only by its elision. So the subject, far from being 
constituted by self-grasp in the clarity of its presence to itself, only 
emerges in an impossible relation to that part that cannot be 
presentified. Only insofar as there is a Real (the Lacanian name for that 
part) as an impossibility of presence, is there a subject. . . . For the 
object embodies the very impossibility of attaining auto-affection, it 
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introduces the scission, the rupture in the middle of the full presence 
and refers it to a void. (15-16)   
 
To identify fully with one’s specular Other, then, is to fully identify with a 
void, of which the specular other is the materialization of a negative 
magnitude. And it is the function of fantasy to shield the subject from that 
void and provide a psychical apparatus that creates the field of reality in 
which the subject locates itself in language.    
 We can approach this dynamic from yet another angle, similarly 
related. In an attempt to tie together the loose narrative strands of the novel, 
the final paragraph of the novel informs us of an uncanny connection: 
 Ginotti is Nempere. Eloise is the sister of Wolfstein. Let then the 
memory of these victims to hell and malice live in the remembrance of 
those who can pity the wanderings of error; let remorse and repentance 
expiate the offences which arise from the delusion of the passions, and 
let endless life be sought from Him who alone can give an eternity of 
happiness. (252) 
 
Many readers of St. Irvyne have had difficulty relating these two distinctive 
narrative strands to one another. Shelley himself, in a 19 November 1811 letter 
to his perplexed publisher Joseph Stockdale, defended the ending of St Irvyne 
by claiming: “[w]hat I mean as Rosicrucian is the elixir of eternal life which 
Ginotti had obtained. Mr Godwin's romance St. Leon, turns upon that 
superstition & on a re-examination you will perceive that Mountfort 
physically did kill Ginotti, which must appear from the latter's paleness” 
(Letters I, 21). Shelley’s less than convincing explanation has prompted 
several critical interpretations that attempt to make sense of Shelley’s 
purpose. Kenneth Neill Cameron, no great admirer of Shelley’s early forays 
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into the Gothic, observes that “... if Nempere and Ginotti are the same person, 
he is killed twice, once by Mountfort in plot two and then again by the secret 
elixir in plot one. Nor is there any indication how this suddenly revealed 
relationship of characters makes any real connection between the two plots. 
There does not seem to be any interrelationship, either in action or in 
motivation, between the two even if Eloise is Wolfstein’s sister and Nempere 
is really Ginotti” (33). David Halliburton is slightly less literal-minded when 
he supposes that “... Shelley means to convey the idea that Ginotti, killed by 
Mountfort, comes to his appointed meeting with Wolfstein as a spirit. 
Although Ginotti has already been, in his own words, “blasted to endless 
torment,” he has still one mission on earth: to induce Wolfstein to renounce 
God as he has done. ... Having already been killed, he is rather being given 
that form which he will retain until the end of time” (44). John Murphy writes 
that “Shelley’s intention might have been to suggest that Ginotti-Nempere is a 
corrupting force that seeks to destroy Wolfstein’s soul and his sister’s body, 
but since the novel is not fully worked out, one can only speculate about the 
relationship between the two plots” (31). Finch, again, offers a compelling 
solution:  
 The Rosicrucian motif appears to have served Shelley primarily as 
metaphor for the perpetuation and transmission of the authority of a 
preternaturally powerful Father-figure from one generation to the next, 
and it is sexual desire rather than secret alchemy which the novel 
implies is the most significant means of effecting this disciplinary 
transmission. . . . ‘St. Irvyne’ is thus, as both place and name, a site of 
monstrous inheritance: the family-space within which the ambivalent 
legacy of the dark Father is transferred from its privileged but cursed 




As I have already discussed, I disagree with Finch’s reading that 
Ginotti/Nempere represents a “powerful Father-figure.” In establishing a 
speculative identity between Ginotti and Nempere, Shelley carries out a 
critique of phallic presence similar to his unmasking of Zastrozzi. By 
subjectivizing the sublime, paranoiac image of Zastrozzi held by Verezzi, 
Pietro Zastrozzi is shown to be an ordinary individual with his own desires, 
insecurities, and frailties. If Pietro is the castrated version of Zastrozzi, then 
Nempere is the castrated version of Ginotti. To Eloise, Nempere still retains 
his power to fascinate, but to Mountfort and Fitzeustace, he is just another 
libertine with a gambling problem who has taken advantage of an 
unsuspecting young women.  
 In what can only be described as a shocking turn of events, Mountfort 
returns one night to Eloise and Fitzeustace—“his clothes stained with blood, 
his countenance convulsed and pallid as death” (246)—and confesses that he 
has killed Nempere. By eliminating Nempere from the narrative (ironically 
through murder!)10, Eloise and Fitzeustace are free to pursue their 
sentimental relationship. Although Fitzeustace displays a passion for Eloise 
eerily similar to that of Wolfstein for Megalena, the key difference is that he 
looks beyond his melancholic fixation to engage in a sympathetic exchange of 
affection with Eloise: 
 Fitzeustace madly, passionately doted on Eloise: in all the energy of 
incontaminated nature, he sought but the happiness of the object of his 
whole affections. He sought not to investigate the causes of his woe; 
sufficient was it for him to have found one who could understand, 
could sympathize in, the feelings and sensations which every child of 
nature whom the world’s refinements and luxury have not vitiated, 
must feel,—that affection, that contempt of selfish gratification, which 
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every one, whose soul towers at all above the multitude, must 
acknowledge. He destined Eloise, in his secret soul, for his own. (243)            
 
We might note here that Fitzeustace’s “sympathy” in this passage extends only 
to Eloise’s sympathetic identification with “his” feelings and sensations, but 
such is the tenor of sympathy for the young Shelley. Similarly, for Eloise: 
 Eloise, though a something prevented her from avowing them, felt the 
enthusiastic and sanguine ideas of Fitzeustace to be true: her soul, 
susceptible of the most exalted virtue and expansion, though cruelly 
nipped in its growth, thrilled with delight unexperienced before, when 
she found a being who could understand and perceive the truth of her 
feelings, and indeed anticipate them, as did Fitzeustace; . . . . (247)    
 
The juxtaposition of the gothic Wolfstein/Megalena/Ginotti narrative against 
the sentimental Eloise/Fitzeustace/Nempere narrative still leaves us with 
some unanswered questions, despite Shelley’s attempt to resolve the 
difficulties in the concluding paragraph. While it is clear that Shelley intends 
to present a scenario and an aesthetic in which the “sexual relationship” (in 
the Lacanian sense) is possible and to identify the means of achieving it, we 
are left with several inconsistencies that cannot be explained away simply by 
accusing Shelley of sloppiness. If Wolfstein and Eloise are brother and sister, 
then why is he German and she French? Why when we first meet Eloise is she 
returning to St. Irvyne alone, a “poor outcast wanderer” to whom the “vice 
and unkindness of the world hath torn her tender heart”? (208) when the 
narrative that follows records the last five years of her life up to her marriage 
to Fitzeustace? The last paragraph of the novel before the conclusion states: 
“They soon agreed on a point of, in their eyes, so trifling importance, and 
arriving in England, tasted that happiness, which love and innocence alone 
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can give. Prejudice may triumph for awhile, but virtue will be eventually the 
conqueror” (250).   
 There is one explanation for these inconsistencies that would further 
strengthen my claim that the fundamental theme of the novel concerns the 
significance of fantasy as a protection against the real of the drive: the 
scandalous possibility that if we accept the speculative identities between 
Ginotti and Nempere, and between Ginotti and Wolfstein, then we must 
conclude that a speculative identity exists between Wolfstein and Nempere. 
Such a relation suggests that the “event too dreadful for narration” (which led 
to Wolfstein’s unexplained exile) is actually Wolfstein’s incestuous desire for 
his sister, a forbidden transgression which resulted in Eloise’s pregnancy. And 
furthermore, the sentimental narrative of Eloise and Fitzeustace can be 
interpreted as a scenario in which the trauma of this incestuous drive is 
mediated through the fantasy frame of Eloise. Thus the “event” is mediated in 
two different aesthetic modes—the Gothic and the sentimental—to mirror the 
respective fantasy frames of Wolfstein and Eloise. Wolfstein and Eloise exist 
in two different ideological universes, and Shelley sharpens this distinction by 
placing Wolfstein in the German lineage of gothic barbarism and by placing 
Eloise in the French lineage of gentrified sentimentalism. Wolfstein projects 
his unconscious desire upon Ginotti, while Eloise projects her unconscious 
desire upon Nempere in an attempt to transfer it from Wolfstein.  
 The connection between Wolfstein and Nempere is not arbitrary and is 
supported in several moments in the text of the novel, the most obvious being 
in the way Nempere seduces Eloise: 
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 “Why,” said Nempere, “are we taught to believe that the union of two 
who love each other is wicked, unless authorized by certain rites and 
ceremonials, which certainly cannot change the tenour of sentiments 
which it is destined that these two people should entertain of each 
other?” 
  “It is, I suppose,” answered Eloise, calmly, “because God has 
willed it so; besides,” continued she, blushing at she knew not what, “it 
would—“ 
  “And is then the superior and towering soul of Eloise subjected 
to sentiments and prejudices so stale and vulgar as these?” interrupted 
Nempere indignantly. “Say, Eloise, do not you think it an insult to two 
souls, united to each other in the irrefragable covenants of love and 
congeniality, to promise, in the sight of a Being whom they know not, 
that fidelity which certain otherwise?” 
  . . . “Surely, the adoration of two beings unfettered by restraint, 
must be most acceptable! . . .” (230-31) 
 
And recall Wolfstein’s appeal to Megalena, which I cited earlier: 
 . . . “And is my adored Megalena a victim then to prejudice? Does she 
believe, that the Being who created us gave us gave us passions which 
never were to be satiated? Does she suppose that Nature created us to 
become the tormentors of each other?” (188) 
 
The similarities here should not shock us, but offer a compelling insight into 
the future poet of Laon and Cythna and The Cenci. My discussion does not 
focus on the pycho-biographical implications of Shelley’s work, but it is worth 
noting here that Shelley could be working through some of his own 
unconscious tensions regarding his incestuous desire for his sister Elizabeth, a 
point explored by James Bieri in his recent biography of Shelley .11 Such a 
reading also brings to bear the incestuous intellectual and familial resonances 
of Shelley’s surrogate father-figure, William Godwin, and his eventual 
marriage to Mary Godwin. As Anne Williams remarks in Art of Darkness: “ 
‘Gothic,’ in contrast to other forms of romance (or any mode of literary 
expression), is determined—indeed ‘overdetermined’—by the rules of the 
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family. . . . Gothic plots are family plots; Gothic romance is family romance” 
(22). Although Shelley had not yet met Mary during the time he was writing 
the novel, the unconscious desires that circulate in the subtexts of his early 
Gothic works casts a provocative shadow over the dynamics of his future 
familial relationships.   
 I end this chapter with a naive question: why do these characters who 
are freed from prohibitions end up in such despair? Why are they so 
monstrous? Shouldn’t the suspension of prohibitions result in a free-flowing 
wave of Marcusian (or Promethean) Eros? Far from representing a “dark 
Father figure,” we should assume precisely the opposite: that 
Ginotti/Nempere represents the absence of the father and his prohibitions. 
The paradox of prohibition is that in addition to its often repressive or 
tyrannical effects, prohibitions also function as a means to pacify the subject’s 
unbearable relation to jouissance. In other words, the phallic function both 
cuts one off from the Real but also protects one from its traumatic effects. 
Through fantasy, the obsessive fixation of drive is replaced by the metonymic 
movement of desire, which is itself created because of the differential 
structure of language. Zizek argues that “the unapproachable Thing which 
resists subjectivization, this point of failure of every identification, is 
ultimately the subject itself. (Everything 245). In St. Irvyne, Shelley 
articulates “this point of failure of every identification” by locating it in the 
interplay of gazes and the phantasmatic content that Wolfstein and Eloise 
project into those inscrutable gazes of the Other. Neither is able to confront 
the truth of their forbidden desire nor reconcile the incestuous, 
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“unapproachable Thing” within a normative heterosexual circuit of desire. At 
the risk of misreading Shelley’s Humean axiom that “nothing exists but as it is 
perceived” (SPP 506) from his essay “On Life,” we should take this “nothing” 
literally—as void or vacancy—rather than as all things exist only as they are 
perceived, as Shelley no doubt meant12. The void of the subject and of the 
Other, the “nothing” that acquires positive content when the subject attempts 
to fill the void or create a veil of fantasy as protection against it, is the 
preoccupation of Shelley’s early work and returns again and again in his 





               
  











                                                
1 The significance, however, of the borrowings from Godwin and Schiller are 
deployed for different reasons in St. Irvyne. The novel lacks the depth of 
philosophical, historical, and cultural critique that inform those works. 
Shelley encountered Godwin first as a novelist and had not yet made his turn 
to Godwinian rationalism. The first mention of Godwin’s works in Shelley’s 
letters appears in a 26 November 1811 letter to Elizabeth Hitchener. Shelley 
recommends to Hitchener that she read, in the following order, St. Leon (“is 
very good”), The Enquirer (“is good very good”), Political Justice (“is long, 
sceptical good”), and Caleb Williams (“is good”). Although he may have 
encountered Godwin’s Political Justice while at Eton, in a 16 January 1812 
letter to Godwin he emphasizes that “I have desired the publications of my 
earlier youth to be sent to you, you will perceive that Zastrozzi and St. Irvyne 
were written prior to my acquaintance with your writings.” In a previous 
letter, 10 January 1812, Shelley explains: 
 
 From a reader I became I [a] writer of Romances; before the age of 
seventeen' I had published two 'St. Irvyne' and 'Zastrozzi' each of which 
tho quite uncharacteristic of me as now I am, yet serve to mark the 
state of my mind at the period of their composition. I shall desire them 
to be sent to you; do not however consider this as any obligation to 
yourself to misapply your valuable time.—It is now a period of more 
than two years since first I saw your inestimable book on 'Political 
Justice'; it opened to my mind fresh & more extensive views, it 
materially influenced my character, and I rose from its perusal a wiser 
and a better man.—I was no longer the votary of Romance; till then I 
had existed in an ideal world; now I found that in this universe of ours 
was enough to excite the interest of the heart, enough to employ the 
discussions of Reason. I beheld in short that I had duties to perform.—
Conceive the effect which the Political justice would have upon a mind 
before jealous of its independance, and participating somewhat 
singularly in a peculiar susceptibility.—My age is now nineteen; at the 
period to which I allude I was at Eton.—No sooner had I formed the 
principles which I now profess, than I was anxious to disseminate their 
benefits. (227-28) 
 
2 Not surprisingly, many Shelley scholars have criticized St. Irvyne in the 
same disparaging terms as Zastrozzi. Kenneth Neill Cameron dismisses 
Shelley’s early Gothic works for their “inherent ridiculousness” (28); David 
Halliburton argues that “St. Irvyne shows little if any advance over the earlier 
work in the development of ideas” (47); John Murphy notes that “one should 
not anticipate significant change in the young author’s techniques or thematic 
interests until Queen Mab appears” (25); and Jerrold Hogle claims that 
Shelley’s fiction “appears to be a mass of blunders, especially by the classic 
standards of ‘realistic’ novels” (“Stream,” 78).    
95 
                                                                                                                                      
3 John Murphy, for example, notes that “Distinct problems arise from two 
irreconcilable plots, loose development of themes, and vague relationships 
between central characters” (29). Frederick Frank, however, in the 
Introduction to his edition of St. Irvyne, suggests that the narrative omissions 
and inconsistencies in the novel playfully mimic similar stylistic oddities in 
other Gothic and sentimental novels (xiii).     
4 Shelley’s radical skepticism itself, of course, creates a self-generating 
ontological veil, the contradictions of which I will discuss in chapter four on 
Prometheus Unbound. 
5 Another illuminating angle from which to contrast the aesthetic differences 
and similarities between Shelley’s poetry and prose of the period is to examine 
his treatment of similar themes in the Esdaile Notebook (much of which was 
written concurrently with his novels), a collection of poems that remained 
unpublished during his lifetime but which contain many instances where 
Shelley expresses poetically similar themes that appear in his gothic novels.    
6 Anne Williams, in Art of Darkness: A Poetics of Gothic, argues that the 
gothic cannot be defined by genre or conventions, but rather as a poetic mode, 
where “language both mediates the unspeakable ‘other’ and shows the 
impossibility of that mediation. . . . Gothic is a discourse that shows the cracks 
in the system that constitutes consciousness, ‘reality’” (66). Again, this 
excellent, recent study of the Gothic and Romanticism ignores Shelley, but his 
poetry illustrates perfectly the Gothic aesthetic Williams articulates. 
7 The one significant exception would be, of course, Prometheus Unbound, 
where the union of Prometheus and Asia signifies the triumph of “eternal 
Love” over the cycle of vengeance and hatred that has consumed Prometheus 
and Jupiter for over 3,000 years. I will confront this issue in chapter four and 
call into question this example of the fulfillment of the Lacanian “sexual 
relationship.”  
8 See, for example, Political Justice (V.2 and 3) for Godwin’s analysis of the 
corrupted and “unnatural” upbringing and education of princes.   
9 Wordsworth’s attempts to minimize the influence of Coleridge’s poems in 
the volume speaks to this tension, as is Coleridge’s own revisions of the poem 
which sought to reduce its “obscurity” and “strangeness.” In the first edition 
of the Lyrical Ballads, The Rime was placed at the beginning of the volume, in 
the second edition Wordsworth had it moved to end. See R.L. Brett’s and A.R. 
Jones’s “Introduction” (pp. xix-liv) to their edition of the Lyrical Ballads for 
more on this fascinating struggle.  
10 I’m tempted here to draw a connection between Mountfort creating through 
murder the possibility for the ideal love between Eloise and Fitzeustace and 
Demogorgon’s role in creating the possibility for Prometheus and Asia to 
fulfill their love relationship by eliminating Jupiter as the impediment. Such a 
reading may do more violence than is warranted to Prometheus Unbound, but 
the structural implications are similar. 
11 See James Bieri, Percy Bysshe Shelley (p. 142) for more on Shelley’s 
possible incestuous desire for his sister Elizabeth. 
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12 In Shelley’s A Defence of Poetry, he does revise this phrase to read “All 




The Wandering Jew: 
Superstition and Subjectivity  
 
Edward Dowden, one of Shelley’s earliest biographers, noted that the 
character of the Wandering Jew “haunted Shelley’s imagination, and was not 
lost to view in after years” (20). The Wandering Jew appears explicitly, 
though under different guises and names, as the Stranger in “Ghasta; or The 
Avenging Demon” (1810), as the speaker in “The wandering Jew’s Soliloquy” 
(?1809-10), as Paulo in The Wandering Jew (1810), as Ahasuerus in Queen 
Mab (1813), Alastor (1816), and Hellas (1822); and as a mysterious outsider 
in the prose fragment The Assassins (1814). So not only does the Wandering 
Jew figure prominently in Shelley’s earliest work, he also appears in Hellas, 
Shelley’s last completed poem, thus confirming the enduring significance of 
gothic motifs and themes throughout his career. But the Wandering Jew’s 
presence and the significance of his struggle is also implicitly felt in many 
other works, most significantly Prometheus Unbound: as the protagonist in 
The Wandering Jew, Paulo’s endurance of the torments inflicted by a 
perceived implacable deity and the complexity of his psychological dissonance 
establishes him as the earliest analogue for the character of Prometheus, both 
of which fuse the eternal suffering of an outcast with the firm defiance of 
Milton’s Satan.  
 In each iteration of the legend in Shelley’s poetry, however, the 
significance of the Wandering Jew changes in accordance with the ideological 
work Shelley has him perform. These different registers are important in 
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understanding how Shelley manipulates the supernatural and the 
superstitious elements in his works within the context of psychological 
transference and desire. But there is also an ambivalence in Shelley towards 
the Wandering Jew that is not easily reconciled. In Romantic Returns: 
Superstition, Imagination, History, Deborah Elise White identifies a crucial 
tension in Romantic poetics between the demystification of superstition and 
the liberation of the imaginative power that creates superstition: 
 Pre-Romantic and Romantic writings both participate in modernity’s 
work of demystification even as they oppose it. They do this by 
subsuming superstition to a more general figure of imagination or, an 
equivalent figure for the pre-Romantics, fancy. At the level of 
imagination, superstition can be explained as an effect rather than 
experienced as a cause. The thematization of its errors is, therefore, 
almost always a stalking horse—or a red herring. The real thesis of the 
romance à thèse is the “truth” that imagination lies at the origin of all 
superstitious errors. It is, so to speak, the aufhebung or sublation of 
superstition—that which both negates and preserves it in a presumably 
more enlightened synthesis. . . . Yet, from the very inception of a “pre”-
Romanticism, imagination has awakened the suspicion that it is, after 
all, only another superstition—less a model of demystification than the 
institution of a new mystery. (10-11) 
 
This split between superstition as a reified form of error and superstition as 
the index of an underlying imaginative productivity that is itself susceptible to 
further reification, provides an illuminating context in which to consider 
Shelley’s treatment of the Wandering Jew. Two examples, one from Queen 
Mab and the other from Hellas, illustrate succinctly the tension White 
describes and will add further context to my reading of The Wandering Jew.  
 Queen Mab, generally considered to be Shelley’s first major poetic 
achievement, is a didactic poem of 9 cantos in which Shelley articulates a 
radical atheistic-materialist perspective from the point of view of an all-
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knowing Fairy who educates a young girl while she dreams concerning the 
secrets of the past, present, and future,—an irony in itself worth mentioning 
and which also speaks to Shelley’s efforts to resist the reification of his own 
metaphysical grounds. Whereas Paulo, in The Wandering Jew, occupies an 
uncertain position in relation to the God he believes to be punishing him—his 
psychological angst is purely self-generated—Ahasureus in Queen Mab is a 
figure of “fearless resignation” and possesses the “wisdom of old age,” having 
been witness to the history of the perpetual “crime and misery, / Which flows 
from God’s own faith” (VII.236-37). Echoing the defiance of Milton’s Satan, 
Ahasuerus declares: 
    But my soul, 
 From sight and sense of the polluting woe 
 Of tyranny, had long learned to prefer 
 Hell’s freedom to the servitude of heaven. 
 Therefore I rose, and dauntlessly began 
 My lonely and unending pilgrimage, 
 Resolved to wage unweariable war 
 With the almighty tyrant, and to hurl 
 Defiance at his impotence to harm 
 Beyond the curse I bore. The very hand 
 That barred my passage to the peaceful grave 
 Has crushed the earth to misery, and given 
 Its empire to the chosen of slaves. (VII.193-204)              
 
Of interest here is that although Mab has summoned the phantasm of 
Ahasureus to serve as witness to the tyranny of the Christian God and to 
chronicle the history of misery his followers have perpetuated in his name,—
in much the same way Paulo will function in The Wandering Jew—Mab 
dismisses him with a wave of her wand as an error in human thought, “a ghost 
of ages gone” (VIII.42): 
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  The Fairy waved her wand: 
  Ahasuerus fled 
 Fast as the shapes of mingled shade and mist, 
 That lurk in the glens of a twilight grove, 
  Flee from the morning beam: 
 The matter of which dreams are made 
 Not more endowed with actual life 
 Than this phantasmal portraiture 
 Of wandering human thought. (VII.267-75) 
 
Reiman and Fraistat note that Shelley employs the Wandering Jew here “as a 
means of discrediting Christian values and beliefs and insisting upon the 
fictionality of its central events. These events and the existence of God are true 
from the perspective of the Wandering Jew only because he is himself ‘a 
wondrous phantom’ (VII.64), part of the larger fiction constructed by 
Christianity” (CPPBS II, 575). But yet, in Hellas (1822), a drama concerning 
the Greek struggle for independence for which Shelley had great hopes, 
Shelley returns to the legend and seems to figure Ahasuerus as an 
embodiment of thought itself. When the tyrant Mahmud (the Turkish 
potentate), having been troubled by three disturbing visions, summons 
Ahasuerus for council, Ahasuerus informs him:  
 The future and the past are idle shadows 
 Of thought’s eternal flight—they have no being. 
 Nought is but that which feels itself to be. (783-85) 
 ... 
     . . . Thought 
 Alone, and its quick elements, Will, Passion, 
 Reason, Imagination, cannot die; 
 They are, what that which they regard, appears, 
 The stuff whence mutability can weave 
 All that it hath dominion o’er, worlds, worms, 
 Empires and superstitions— (792-801)  
 
As George K. Anderson remarks: 
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 Nowhere, apart from Hellas, is Ahasuerus such a doughty exponent of 
the philosophy of the abstract ideal. No other writer of the romantic 
age, major or minor, has within the short span of a dozen years so 
transformed an important creature of his poetic imagination. It is 
almost possible to say that Shelley has laid down the basic framework 
within which move all of the later nineteenth-century aspects of the 
Wandering Jew. (187) 
 
And yet, still further complicating the issue, Shelley, in his Notes to Hellas, 
explains his representation of the Wandering Jew: 
 I could easily have made the Jew a regular conjuror . . . . I have 
preferred to represent the Jew as disclaiming all pretension or even 
belief in supernatural agency and as tempting Mahmud to that state of 
mind in which ideas may be supposed to assume the force of sensations 
through the confusion of thought with the objects of thought, and the 
excess of passion animating the creations of imagination. 
       It is a sort of natural magic, susceptible of being exercised in a 
degree by any one who should have made himself master of the secret 
associations of another’s thoughts. (SPP, 463) 
 
So does Ahasuerus here represent the “exponent of the philosophy of the 
abstract ideal” or does he, as Shelley suggests in his Note, represent a clever 
practitioner of mental manipulation who uses his “natural magic” to deceive 
Mahmud? If, following White’s distinction, the Ahasuerus of Queen Mab 
corresponds to a demystification of superstition, then the Ahasuerus of Hellas 
corresponds to the tension between demystification and the “institution of a 
new mystery.” And Paulo, protagonist of The Wandering Jew, a poem written 
before Queen Mab and Hellas, exists in the imaginative space between 
demystification, imagination, and reification. His status as both subject and 
superstition remains undecidable throughout the text, able to contain 
multiple registers of significance depending upon the frame of reference from 
which we interpret his story and his actions.  
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 In the preface to the poem, Shelley states that the Wandering Jew is 
“an imaginary personage, noted for the various and contradictory traditions 
which have prevailed concerning him” and that he is a “groundless” 
superstition (43). What then are we to make of Shelley’s purpose in devoting 
an entire poem to this superstition? The reader is immediately conditioned to 
question the veracity of what follows and to expect perhaps that the poem will 
follow in the Radcliffean tradition of the “supernatural explained,” in which 
Paulo is shown to be a fraud or delusional, which would shatter the fantastical 
reality established in the poem and restore the context to an empirically 
verifiable reality. While the poem does on occasion make gestures in that 
direction, supernatural elements appear throughout and are experienced by 
characters other than Paulo.  
 When supernatural occurrences are explained, there is often a sense of 
disappointment, that the explanation is somehow insufficient despite its 
plausibility (which is another way of saying that the alterity of the Other is 
simply re-assimilated into the field of symbolic reality). Shelley is less 
interested in debunking the supernatural, choosing instead to represent the 
insidious way the supernatural comes into being for the subject, how it 
functions in psychological and ideological contexts, how it serves as a vehicle 
for desire, and how the undecidability of the supernatural becomes reified 
into superstitious formations. Superstitions and the supernatural are very 
“real” to those who believe in them, and to simply explain them away in terms 
of an objective or independent reality runs the risk, as White suggests, of 
mystifying the ideological ground that supports the supposed reality that 
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replaces it. In his brilliant reading of Shelley’s major poetry in Shelley’s 
Process, Jerrold Hogle argues that Shelley’s poetry is driven by a process of 
“radical transference,” a “ceaseless transition between elements of thought” 
(vii) where form and content are continually destabilized as they pass through 
each other in the creation of new forms of thought. This practice of 
“deterritorialization,” to use Deleuze’s and Guatari’s term, provides an 
aesthetic vehicle through which Shelley’s iconoclastic aims and linguistic 
skepticism find expression. And Shelley’s different figurations of the 
Wandering Jew exemplify this practice at the level of literary convention and 
genre. Shelley often takes an established literary form, empties it of its 
ideological content, and establishes a fresh context in which the traces of that 
former context introduce a productive tension between residual and emergent 
forms of consciousness.1 Paulo retains the traces of the Wandering Jew 
legend, but is also liberated from those anti-Semitic conventions and is 
transfigured into both an icon of resistance and a desiring subject in his own 
right.  
 For this reason alone it is surprising that the poem has received scant 
critical attention, but understandable given the poem’s complicated textual 
history. Few of Shelley's poems present greater textual problems than the The 
Wandering Jew. In part this is due to the claim of Shelley’s cousin Thomas 
Medwin that the work was a collaboration between himself and Shelley. But 
with the recent publication of Donald H. Reiman’s and Neil Fraistat’s 
authoritative edition of Shelley’s work in The Complete Poetry of Percy 
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Bysshe Shelley (vol. I, 2000), much of the textual confusion has been laid to 
rest, with the evidence pointing to Shelley as the sole author.2  
 Another reason for the lack of critical attention is the characteristic 
disdain heaped upon Shelley’s early gothic works. For Kenneth Neil Cameron, 
the poem combines “the worst features of Original Poems [1810] in long 
narrative from” (34). George K. Anderson, author of the one indispensable 
study in English on the Wandering Jew legend, declares that the poem's 
"florid romantic verse" and "heated lyricism" results in verse that is 
"uninspired," a plot that’s "silly" and a whole that is simply "bad" (187). 
Reiman characterizes the poem as "immature and worthless," (Shelley, 19) 
although he does recognize its importance as Shelley's first effort to construct 
a long poem that demonstrates budding Shelleyan characteristics such as 
allusiveness and a tendency to suggest rather than state intervening events in 
the plot. Reiman and Fraistat do, however, in CPPBS point to “the diction, the 
pace, and quality of verse, the metaphysical, religious, and psychological 
concerns, and the great intensity of the four-canto poem” (199) as marks of 
Shelley’s developing style. 
 The plot of the poem is quite simple. Canto I opens with the arrival of 
the protagonist Paulo (the Wandering Jew) to seventeenth-century Padua. 
Paulo is drawn to the ringing of church bells where he observes a distressed 
young novitiate, Rosa, about to undergo the rite of investiture. Paulo quickly 
intervenes and sweeps Rosa away to a mountain retreat and takes her as his 
mistress. In the succeeding cantos, Paulo relates his history and reveals his 
identity as the Wandering Jew to Rosa and to his traveling companion  
105 
Victorio, who also falls in love with Rosa. Paulo’s harrowing tale of 
persecution by a vengeful God and his several attempts at suicide shock and 
fascinate his listeners. In the final canto, Victorio himself attempts to commit 
suicide because of Rosa’s unrequited love, but is persuaded not to by a Witch 
who instead offers him a potion that will poison Paulo, in exchange for his 
soul and allegiance to the Devil. When Victorio returns to kill Paulo he 
mistakenly poisons Rosa instead. The fragment breaks off as Paulo, hovering 
over the body of Rosa, demands answers to questions that have plagued him 
during the course of his miserable existence:  
 Who is the God of Mercy?—where 
 Enthroned the power to save? 
 Reigns he above the viewless air? 
 Lives he beneath the grave? 
 To him would I lift my suppliant moan, 
 That power should hear my harrowing groan;— 
 Is it then Christ's terrific Sire? 
 Ah! I have felt his burning ire, 
 I feel,—I feel it now.— (IV.408-16) 
 
The final three lines are ambiguous, given that Paulo’s God is absent 
throughout the entire poem, leaving us to wonder from where, and from 
whom, the “fiendish” voice of judgment comes: 
 “O Demon! I am thine!” he cried.  
 A hollow fiendish voice replied, 
 “Come! for thy doom is misery.” (IV.427-29) 
 
 In chapter one, I argued that in his first gothic novel, Zastrozzi, Shelley 
employs a two-fold narrative-critical strategy: first, to demonstrate that gothic 
stereotypes such as the hyper-sexualized Matilda and the demonically 
vengeful Zastrozzi are images drawn from anti-Jacobin paranoiac fantasy; 
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and second, to then subjectivize those images by giving them an agency that 
allows Shelley to explore the inter-subjective dynamics that generate such 
paranoiac fantasies. This same strategy is also evident in The Wandering Jew, 
where Paulo is given a voice and a platform to express his subjectivity, far 
exceeding any agency given to his literary precursors. Where Zastrozzi 
explores the psychology of paranoiac fantasy, The Wandering Jew expands 
this exploration to include the transmission and perpetuation of superstition. 
Shelley’s reflexive skepticism towards these fantastical images invite us to 
look beyond the diegetic reality established in the poem and to recognize the 
ideological and psychological mechanisms that produce and sustain such 
reality.  
 When, in Canto III, Paulo relates his history to Rosa and Victorio, the 
basic facts of his story closely follow the legend of the Wandering Jew as it 
was first condensed from a number of apocryphal sources into writing by 
Roger of Wendover in the thirteenth century: 
 “How can I paint that dreadful day, 
 That time of terror and dismay, 
 When, for our sins, a Saviour died, 
 And the meek Lamb was crucified! 
 ‘Twas on that day, as borne along  
 To slaughter by the insulting throng, 
 Infuriate for Deicide, 
 I mock’d our Saviour, and cried, 
 ‘Go! Go!’ ‘Ah! I will go,’ he said, 
 ‘Where scenes of endless bliss invite, 
 To the blest regions of the light; 
 I go—but thou shalt here remain, 
      Nor see thy dying day 
      Till I return again.” (III.9-22)           
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Here Paulo carries the guilt of Christ’s death as it functions in the anti-Semitic 
imaginary, a guilt he fully internalizes into his own superego. Although a Jew, 
Paulo despairs of having mocked “our Saviour,” the “our” confirming his 
identification with Christianity while also posited as its exception. Paulo is 
thus caught within an indefinite judgment, a neither/and relationship: 
neither Christian nor Jew, yet something of each; just as he is neither dead 
nor alive but undead, an unJew and unChristian3. Placed in a subjective 
position outside of, yet fully submitted to, the law, the voice of the obscene 
supereogic supplement begins to speak:  
 Then full on my remembrance came 
 Those words despised, alas! too late! 
 The horrors of my endless fate 
      Flash’d on my soul and shook my frame; 
      They scorch’d my breast as with a flame 
 Of unextinguishable fire; 
 An exquisitely torturing pain 
 Of frenzying anguish fired my brain. 
 By keen remorse and anguish driven, 
 I called for vengeance down from Heaven. 
 But, ah! the all-wasting hand of Time, 
 Might never wear away my crime! (III.50-61) 
 . . . 
 The self-inflicted torturing pangs 
 Of conscience lent their scorpion fangs, 
 Still life prolonging, after life was fled. (III.67-69) 
 
As Paulo continues his tale he speaks of being “Rack’d by the tortures of the 
mind” (III.160) and longing to “plunge beneath / The mansions of repelling 
death!” (III.161). After attempting suicide, Paulo exclaims: “Oh! would that I 
had waked no more! / Vain wish! I lived again to feel / Torments more fierce 
than those of hell! (III.192-94). Throughout the first three Cantos, Paulo 
represents a passive, though hystericized, subject who endures his suffering at 
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the mercy of an unmerciful, vengeful God. He is an icon of elegiac resignation 
more than of sublime resistance at this point in the poem, and the more we 
learn of his suffering the more attention it draws to what Shelley conceived to 
be the tyrannical injustice of the God of orthodox religious belief. Emptied of 
his anti-Semitic content and positioned as a mirror that reflects the 
irrationality and cruelty of religious orthodoxy, Paulo functions as a screen 
upon which others project their own desire, including the reader.  
 In Lacanian terminology, the supernatural represents an excess of the 
Imaginary over the Symbolic; that is, a breakdown in “symbolic efficiency” 
(explanatory power) leads to the creation of an overabundance of images that 
attempt to account for and visualize the gaps in the Symbolic so that the 
subject can make some kind of sense, however horrifying, of the uncertainty 
and fear when one experiences when confronted with the uncertainty of a 
traumatic event. The gothic aesthetic exaggerates this process by literalizing 
the figurative language and fantastical images that are produced when 
language fails to symbolize the unrepresentable: i.e., the unconscious, desire, 
the subject, the Other. And if the Gothic seems absurd it is because when 
metaphor is literalized its supposed equivalence to the object, or psychological 
process it describes, is shown to be radically insufficient, which leads to even 
more elaborate images in an attempt to fill the gap.  
 This incongruous relation between the Imaginary and the Symbolic 
manifests itself as the Real. So when Lacan insists that the Real is that which 
“resists symbolization,” and that it is an index of “impossibility,” we must 
remember that the Real manifests itself at the moment when the impossible 
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and the necessary converge. Lacan’s point is that the impossible happens, and 
when it does happen (what Alain Badiou would call an “event”) this traumatic 
irruption cannot be accounted for in terms of a given symbolic universe. The 
gothic aesthetic is, of course, replete with these kinds of traumatic events and 
horrifying images. And because they appear as the impossible, they are often 
perceived as evil. The very mechanism of representation posits its own limits 
and designates a certain beyond which it refers to as “unrepresentable.” In 
this case, we can say that the place of something that has no image is 
designated symbolically; and it is this very designation that endows whatever 
finds itself in this place with the special power of fascination. Since this 
unrepresentable is usually associated with the transgression of the given 
limits of the Symbolic, it is spontaneously perceived as “evil,” or at least 
disturbing. 
 For Shelley, the significance of the Wandering Jew is that he is a being 
who finds himself in that uncanny space where impossibility and necessity 
intersect (that is, where the impossible encounter retroactively assumes a 
position of necessity) , not only in his own relationship to an external power 
whose motives he cannot comprehend, but also in his relation to others for 
whom he himself is an incomprehensible being. One encounters him precisely 
as the impossible, and his terrifying presence as an inscrutable Other sets in 
motion a complex series of psycho-social responses that attempt to normalize 
his presence and bring it back into the fabric of symbolic consistency, even if 
that means defining him as an exception, an outsider. That is, he is 
appropriated into the symbolic as an exception that gives form to the 
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impossibility he signifies. Such is the formula for superstition. But Shelley 
complicates his status as an outsider by reframing his position from one of 
exception to one of immanence, a projection of Christian ideology that gives 
form to fears and desires that cannot be openly articulated. Although no one 
would mistake the aesthetic quality of Shelley’s early gothic productions like 
The Wandering Jew with his mature poetic accomplishments, Shelley’s 
approach to the legend is an ambitious attempt to dramatize the same kind of 
psychological complexities found in his later work, but without the illusory 
safety net that his budding idealism will provide later (but that will create 
difficulties of its own).                
 For the Wandering Jew himself, in a more general or allegorical sense 
his story also stages the impossibility and necessity of entering the Symbolic 
and becoming a subject. His resistance against God, the paternal metaphor, is 
a resistance to interpellation into a socio-symbolic context, Christianity, that 
excludes him as a Jew. He is dead in the Symbolic, but alive in the Imaginary, 
immortal in the sense that he represents a past that refuses to be appropriated 
into an emergent ideology, a past that the present must retain as a perverse 
warning that to resist Christianity is tantamount to subjective destitution. 
Like Coleridge’s Ancient Mariner, Paulo’s “death in life” is the supplemental 
image that confers significance to the “life in death” promised by Christianity.  
 Shelley immediately complicates this mutually exclusive relation by 
establishing two very different settings through which Paulo travels: an idyllic 
countryside and a church where a young girl named Rosa is about to 
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unwillingly enter her novitiate. The poem opens with an idealized description 
of the surrounding countryside and its inhabitants: 
 So soft the clime, so balm the air, 
 So pure and genial were the skies, 
 In sooth ’twas almost Paradise,— (I.13-16) 
 
This pre-lapsarian setting describes “days of innocence and joy” where 
“peasants danced upon the lawn” and “thrill to amorous ecstacy” . . . 
“Subdued by the pow’r of resistless Love.” They are “Free from the world’s 
tumultuous cares, / From pale distrust, from hopes and fears, / Baneful 
concomitants of time,—” (I.47-49). The image of this harmonious totality is 
interrupted by the emergence of a “stranger” (whom we later find out is 
Paulo) who introduces the threat of disruption: “Too soon shall the tempest’s 
blast the year, / And sin’s eternal winter reign around” (I.56-57). Like the 
narrator of Zastrozzi, the narrator in The Wandering Jew appears to be 
complicit with the Christian point of view and identifies the arrival of Paulo 
with the arrival of sin. This allows Shelley to present the poem from a point of 
view that is not overtly antagonistic to Christian morality, while at the same 
time establishing a context for the reflexive skepticism and irony that 
subsequent events invite us to consider. 
 At the very moment the stranger enters the scene, he is startled by 
church bells and is immediately overcome with anxiety and dread: 
 But, hark! A convent’s vesper bell— 
 It seemed to be a very spell— 
 The stranger checked his courser’s rein, 
 And listened to the mournful sound: 
 Listened—and paused—and paused again: 
 A thrill of pity and of pain 
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 Through his inmost soul had past, 
 While gushed the tear-drops silently and fast. (I.76-83) 
 
Paulo is drawn towards the church, where the mood and atmosphere stands 
in sharp contrast to the pastoral harmony of the countryside: 
 Peal upon peal the music floats— 
 Now they list still as death to the dying notes; 
 Whilst the soft voices of the choir, 
 Exalt the soul from base desire; 
 Till it mounts on unearthly pinions free, 
 Dissolved in heavenly ecstacy. 
 
 Now a dead stillness reigned around, 
 Uninterrupted by a sound; 
 Save when in the deadened response ran, 
 The last faint echoes down the aisle, 
 Reverberated through the pile, (I.110-20) 
 
Even though the narrator describes the Mass with solemn piety, it stands in 
stark contrast to libidinal energy and natural harmony described in the 
opening scene, where “base desire” is tempered by joy and sympathy and 
sublimted into “amorous ecstacy.” “Death” is the operative word in the 
description, from the “deadened response” of the “still as death” congregation 
to the “dying notes” of the choir. The repressive atmosphere of the ceremony 
is further exemplified by the nun who is overseeing the ceremony: 
 Now her dark and penetrating eyes 
 Were raised in suppliance to heaven, 
 And now her bosom heaved with sighs, 
 As if to human weakness given. (I.128-31) 
 
The abbess is described in terms not unlike the demons we will encounter 
later: 
 Her stern, severe, yet beauteous brow 
113 
 Frowned on all who stood below; 
 And the fire which flashed from her steady gaze, 
 As it turned on the listening crowd its rays, 
 Superior virtue told,— 
 Virtue as pure as heaven’s own dew, 
 By which, untainted, never knew, 
 To pardon weaker mould. 
 The heart though chaste and cold as snow— 
 ‘Twere faulty to be virtuous so. (I.132-41) 
 
As the opening scene makes clear, the harmonious consistency of the idyllic 
landscape and its inhabitants is only possible when viewed from a distance. As 
we move closer to the church and are introduced to individual characters, the 
scenery and mood shifts and begins to reflect their cognitive dissonance, 
anxiety, and repression. The ideal image exists then only as an idea in the 
poem and one that is never encountered in the real experiences of any of the 
characters. One can imagine cinematically this movement from ideality to 
reality, a Romantic noir so to speak, as the wide angle shot of the idyllic 
landscape gradually pans across the scene and slowly zooms in on the 
stranger (Paulo) and then into the church. The harmony initially presented, 
which is more pagan than Christian, is shown to be an illusion, or at least an 
image that is at odds with the pious solemnity of the church, and draws our 
attention to the deceptive lure of the image. Beneath the suppliant, virtuous 
image of the abbess flows a libidinal energy that belies her austere self-
presentation. Similarly, when we first meet Rosa she too is described in ideal 
images. As the “fainting novice” is brought to the altar: 
 The roses from her cheek are fled, 
 But there the lily reigns instead; 
 Light as a sylph’s, her form confest, 
 Beneath the drapery of her vest, 
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    A perfect grace and symmetry; 
 Her eyes, with rapture form’d to move, 
 To melt with tenderness and love, 
    Or beam with sensibility, 
 To Heaven were raised in pious prayer, 
    A silent eloquence of woe;  (I.148-57) 
 . . . 
 
 They dragged her to the altar’s pale, 
 The traveller leant against the rail, 
 And gazed with eager eye,— 
 His cheek was flushed with sudden glow, 
 On his brow sate a darker shade of woe, 
 As a transient expression fled by. (I.168-73) 
 
As Reiman and Fraistat point out, Shelley likely modeled Rosa on several 
characters from his favorite gothic novels, including Radcliffe’s The Italian, 
Henry Ireland’s The Abbess, and perhaps took her name from “Rosa Matilda” 
(Charlotte Dacre), the author of Confession’s of a Nun of St. Omer and 
Zoflyoa, whose Victoria shares many resemblances to Matilda in Shelley’s 
Zastrozzi.4 The Gothic is, of course, populated with young damsels in distress 
who flee a strong paternal figure or repressive social structure, but I want to 
draw attention to another text that adds psychological context to Rosa’s 
predicament: Diderot’s La Religieuse. It’s uncertain whether or not Shelley 
read La Religieuse, but he admired Diderot’s philosophical works (whose 
influence is most readily apparent in Queen Mab). In the young novitiate 
Suzanne, Diderot fashions a character that exhibits, like Rosa, a passionate 
resistance to church establishment and who displays a psychological depth 
that far exceeds most of the one-dimensional characters found in many gothic 
novels, women who are acted upon but possess little agency of their own. On 
the surface, Rosa does not appear to rise above the level of a stereotype. She is 
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young, beautiful, and a victim of her circumstances. But if we allow Rosa the 
benefit of a will and the means to express her desire, then I argue that such a 
maneuver creates an additional context for the poem’s actions and deepens 
the psychological implications. Like Diderot’s Suzanne, Shelley’s young 
novitiate Rosa conceals a subterraneous realm of desire that, although never 
explicitly represented, nevertheless produces a series of effects in the poem.   
 The ringing of the vesper bell links together two significant events of 
the poem. The bell is a signifier of interpellation and misrecognition for both 
Paulo and Rosa. Paulo is reminded of his status as a wandering outcast and 
Rosa is horrified at the prospect of becoming a novice. Neither is an identity 
of their choosing. We’ve already seen how Paulo’s disposition worsens as he 
hears the church bells, and as Rosa is about to be brought to the alter she 
displays a passionate outburst of fear and resistance: 
 At length she shrieked aloud, 
 She dashed from the supporting nun, 
 Ere the fatal rite was done, 
 And plunged into the crowd. 
 Confusion reigned throughout the throng, 
 Still the novice fled along, 
 Impelled by frantic fear, 
 When the maddened traveller’s eager grasp 
 In firmest yet in wildest clasp 
 Arrested her career. (I.185-94) 
 
Thus we have the conjunction of three traumatic responses: Paulo’s self-
recognition as wandering outcast, Rosa’s resistance to church authority, and 
the anxious confusion of the congregation. In each case, the circuit of 
normative desire has been shattered by an eruption of jouissance. And it is at 
this very moment, when conventional morality is disrupted and the 
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conflicting desires of everyone involved converge, that the figure of the 
Wandering Jew materializes. This establishes the ground for a dual reality in 
the poem: on the one hand, we have the story of Paulo and his history of 
persecution; and on the other hand, we have an examination of how figures 
such as the Wandering Jew come into being as a materialization of inherent 
fears and desires. For Rosa, Paulo is a projection of wish-fulfillment; but for 
the church hierarchy and the congregation, the Wandering Jew represents the 
dangers of transgression, and, more specifically, a temptation that threatens 
young womens’ virtue, as it is defined by the church.  
 When in the Preface Shelley points to the “various and contradictory 
traditions” (43) that have been generated concerning the Wandering Jew, he 
recognizes that the Wandering Jew is essentially a signifier without a 
signified, an empty vessel into which an ideology can externalize antagonisms 
that must remain unacknowledged for society to maintain it’s consistency. As 
Bruce Felsenstein points out, the legend of the Wandering Jew “underlines 
the sense of difference between the host group and Other, while 
simultaneously defending the vested beliefs of the host group. The Wandering 
Jew as Other, it is now generally recognized, is primarily a projection of 
Christian values and beliefs” (61). And as Zizek, in Tarrying with the 
Negative, explains: 
 The element which holds together a given community cannot be 
reduced to the point of symbolic identification: the bond linking 
together its members always implies a shared relationship towards a 
Thing, towards Enjoyment incarnated. This relationship towards the 
Thing, structured by means of fantasies, is what is at stake when we 
speak of the menace to our “way of life” presented by the Other: it is 
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what is threatened when, for example, a white Englishman is panicked 
because of the growing presence of “aliens.” (201) 
 
In other words: “Society doesn’t exist. The Jew is its symptom.” As the 
“Thing,” a disruptive element in the social fabric, Paulo materializes into the 
Wandering Jew.   
 In Paulo, Shelley gives this empty signifier a signified and then allows 
Paulo to narrate his struggle to resist the forces that define him. And in fact, 
by giving the Wandering Jew an identity and subjectivity, he seems out of 
place, even in a poem that bears his name in the title. Nowhere in Shelley’s 
literary precursors for the Wandering Jew (most notably Lewis’s The Monk 
and Schubart’s Der ewige Jude, both drawn from Roger of Wendover’s 
medieval popularization of the myth) does the Wandering Jew find himself in 
love with a young novice and involved in a murderous love triangle.5 But 
Shelley utilizes this somewhat absurd turn of events to dramatize Paulo’s 
search not only for an object of desire but also the means to organize his 
desire. And he seems to find his object of desire in Rosa.  
 After they make their escape from the church, the narrative description 
mirrors the impending passion between Paulo and Rosa: 
 Hark! hark! the demon of the storm! 
 I see his vast expanding form 
 Blend with the strange and sulpherous glare 
 Of comets through the turbid air. 
 Yes, ’twas his voice, I heard its roar, 
 The wild waves lashed the caverned shore 
 In angry murmurs hoarse and loud, 
 Higher and higher still they rise; 
 Red lightnings gleam from every cloud  
 And paint wild shapes upon the skies; 
 The echoing thunder rolls around, 
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 Convulsed with earthquake rocks the ground. (1.203-14) 
 
Characters in gothic literature fall in love at the drop of a hat, and in Shelley’s 
early work this is no exception, but soon afterwards all hell, literally, breaks 
loose. If love is idealized (even fetishized) in the aesthetic of sensibility, it is 
pathologized in the aesthetic of the Gothic. Although Shelley will later make 
great claims for the power of a philosophically-informed universal “Love,” its 
often shattering effects in the context of individual desire and sexual 
difference is never completely sublimated (i.e., Alastor, Epipsychidion, Julian 
and Maddalo). And, to return once again to Deborah Elise White’s distinction 
between demystification of superstition and its reinscription, Shelley’s gothic 
works raise the unsettling possibility that love itself is a superstition, which is 
precisely why it is so traumatic. In the Gothic, love is experienced as the Real, 
as a traumatic disruption of the subject’s inner sense of consistency and, in 
this structural sense, a form of evil. How gothic characters deal with that 
radical, yet often exhilarating, threat to identity constitutes the space of 
ethics; that is, how does one react to the jouissance of the Other? Rosa’s first 
reaction to this mysterious other who has escorted her to safety is one of fear 
and dread:  
 Rising from her death-like trance, 
 Fair Rosa met the stranger’s glance; 
 She started from his chilling gaze, 
 Wild was it as the tempest’s blaze, 
 It shot a lurid gleam of light. 
 A secret spell of sudden dread, 
 A mystic, strange, and harrowing fear, 
 As when the spirits of the dead, 
 Drest in ideal shapes appear, 
 And hideous glance on human sight— 
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 Scarce could Rosa’s frame sustain, 
 The chill that pressed upon her brain. (I.238-49) 
 
The figurative language Shelley employs here precisely describes the 
supernatural “reality” we encounter later in the poem, first in Paulo’s 
description of his own history and then in Victorio’s (his friend and 
companion) encounter with a witch who promises him a potion that when 
administered to Rosa will cause her to fall in love with him rather than Paulo. 
But Rosa overcomes her initial fear and is then able to identify 
sympathetically with Paulo, not as an image of otherness but as a fellow 
human being who suffers as she does.   
 Anon, that transient spell was o’er, 
 Dark clouds deform his brow no more, 
 But rapid fled away; 
 Sweet fascination dwelt around, 
 Mixed with a soft, a silver sound,  
 As soothing to the ravished ear, 
 As what enthusiast lovers hear; (250-56) 
 
The “transient spell” signifies the fear associated with the unknown. 
Throughout the course of the poem we are witness to a number of spells, 
ancient books of “mystic characters,” and demonic languages that are 
accompanied by strange, fleeting sounds that Shelley uses to emphasize that 
what we are encountering exists on the liminal boundaries of language and 
image where no direct causal relationship can be determinately established 
and where the performative powers of language dominate the stability of the 
denotative. Demons and witches carry these traces of the symbolic with them 
and are often subject to them in specific ways, as long as one has the 
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“knowledge” to control them. Paulo, for example, despite his powerlessness 
against God, nevertheless claims:         
 “Oft I invoke the fiends of hell, 
 And summon each in dire array— 
 I know they dare not disobey 
 My stern, my powerful spell. (III.310-13) 
 
Paulo’s own description of his powers earlier, however, is expressed in the 
field of vision and limited to the finite materiality of the natural world: 
 “I pierce with intellectual eye, 
 Into each hidden mystery; 
 I penetrate the fertile womb 
 Of nature; I produce to light 
 The secrets of the teeming earth, 
 And give air’s unseen embryos birth: 
 The past, the present, and to come, 
 Float in review before my sight: 
 To me is known the magic spell, 
 To summon e’en the Prince of Hell, 
 Awed by the Cross upon my head, 
 His fiends would obey my mandates dread, 
 To twilight change the blaze of noon, 
 And stain with spots of blood the moon. 
 But that an interposing hand 
 Restrains my potent arts, my else supreme command. (III.232-47) 
 
Paolo’s command of the performative, his knowledge of the “magic spell” that 
summons demons, and his insight into the “hidden” mysteries of the teeming 
earth would suggest that he has full control over the symbolic. And yet 
although he can “penetrate” the “fertile womb of Nature” he is still subject to 
the symbolic castration of a vengeful God, the master signifier, who restrains 
his “potent art.” The sexually charged language of his description clearly 
indicates that Paulo’s difficulties lie not with the object but with the signifier. 
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His libidinal energy finds expression in the Imaginary, which is further 
exemplified by his relationship with Rosa.  
 In Rosa, Paulo appears to have found an object around which his desire 
can circulate: 
      “Long has Paulo sought in vain, 
 A friend to share his grief;— 
 Never will he seek again, 
 For the wretch has found relief, 
 Till the Prince of Darkness bursts his chain, 
 Till death and desolation reign— 
 Rosa, wilt thou then be mine? 
 Ever fairest, I am thine!” (I.270-77) 
 . . . 
 
 “We’ll taste etherial pleasure; 
 Such as none but thou canst give,— 
 Such as none but I receive, 
 And rapture without measure.” (I.316-19) 
 
Paulo’s “love” for Rosa is rooted in sensuality. In a letter of 1 Jan. 1811, Shelley 
writes to his friend Thomas Jefferson Hogg: 
 Considering matters in a philosophical light, it evidently appears (if it 
is not treason to speak thus cooly on a subject so deliriously extatic) 
that we were not destined for misery.—What then shall happiness arise 
from? Can we hesitate? Love! dear love, and tho every mental faculty is 
bewildered by the agony, which is in this life its too constant attendant, 
still is not that very agony to be preferred to the most thrilling 
sensualities of Epicurism? (34) 
 
Paolo mistakes the “the thrilling sensualities of Epicurism” for mature love, 
and, unsurprisingly, soon after he declares his love for Rosa his mind begins 
to return to his despair: 
 Friendship or wine, or softer love, 
 The sparkling eye, the foaming bowl, 
 Could with no lasting rapture move, 
 Nor still the tumults of his soul. 
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 And yet there was in Rosa’s kiss 
 A momentary thrill of bliss; 
 Oft the dark clouds of grief would fly, 
 Beneath the beam of sympathy; 
 And love and converse sweet bestow, 
 A transient requiem from woe.— (II.69-78) 
 ... 
  
 The music of her siren tongue 
 Lull’d forcibly his griefs to rest. 
 Like fleeting visions of the dead, 
 Or midnight dreams, his sorrows fled: 
 Waked to new life, through all his soul 
 A soft delicious langour stole, 
 And lapt in heavenly ecstasy 
 He sank and fainted on her breast. (II.120-27) 
 
Rosa is still an object of his desire and not a subject. And although we pity 
Paulo, he has not attempted to communicate with Rosa on a meaningful level 
or attempt to understand her own sense of alienation; unlike Rosa, who 
shares Paulo’s sensual longing, yet yearns to peer beneath Paulo’s troubled 
facade and offer him sympathetic understanding and trust: 
      “Strange, awful being,” Rosa said, 
 “Whence is this superhuman dread, 
 That harrows up my inmost frame? 
 Whence does this unknown tingling flame, 
 Consume and penetrate my soul? 
 By turns with fear and love possessed, 
 Tumultuous thoughts swell high my breast; 
 A thousand wild emotions roll, 
 And mingle their resistless tide; 
 O’er thee some magic arts preside; 
 As by the influence of a charm, 
 Lulled into rest my griefs subside, 
 And safe in thy protecting arm, 
 I feel no power can do me harm: 
 But the storm raves wildly o’er the sea, 
 Bear me away! I confide in thee!” (II.326-40) 
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In moments such as these where the figurative language and the emotions 
they describe rest in poignant balance, it encourages us to put aside the 
supernatural aspects of the poem and focus on the inter-subjective dynamics 
between the characters: and more specifically, how superstition is transmitted 
from one person to the next, and one generation to the next when the 
difference between metaphor and object is destabilized.  
 Shelley dramatizes this process by introducing metaphors that then 
materialize into the reality of the action. For example, when Victorio first 
encounters the Witch the scene is described as follows:  
  Suddenly a meteor’s glare, 
 With brilliant flash illumed the air; 
 Bursting through clouds of sulpherous smoke, 
 As on a Witch’s form it broke, 
 Of herculean bulk her frame 
 Seemed blasted by the lightning’s flame; 
 Her eyes that flared with lurid light, 
 Were now with bloodshot lustre filled. 
 They blazed like comets through the night, 
 And now thick rheumy gore distilled; 
 Black as the raven’s plume, her locks 
 Loose streamed upon the pointed rocks, 
 Wild floated on the hollow gale, 
 Or swept the ground in matted trail; 
 Vile loathsome weeds, whose pitchy fold 
 Were blackened by the fire of Hell, 
 Her shapeless limbs of giant mould 
 Scarce served to hide—as she the while  
 “Grinned horribly a ghastly smile.” 
 And shrieked with demon yell. (IV.171-90) 
 
Here Shelley is clearly articulating how superstitions come into being as 
literalizations of metaphor and natural phenomena. The flash of the meteor is 
described “as” a Witch that “seems” to be bursting through the clouds. And 
what begins as a metaphorical mirroring and projection of Victorio’s 
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conflicting passions and tempestuous desire suddenly transforms into the 
Witch herself as a way for Victorio to comprehend and give shape to those 
unconscious desires. And can we not apply the same logic to Paulo’s 
experiences as well?  
 It’s crucial to note that all of the supernatural events in the poem occur 
in isolation and are specific to the character to whom they happen. We only 
know of Paulo’s supernatural encounters through his retelling. We never see 
him experience them and he never exhibits any supernatural powers towards 
other characters. Similarly, Victorio experiences the supernatural in isolation 
as well, and Rosa experiences nothing of the supernatural. Equally relevant is 
that Victorio only experiences the supernatural after hearing Paulo’s tale. For 
Victorio and Rosa the supernatural becomes a possibility only because of their 
trust and belief in what Paulo has told them.  
 Here ceased the tale. Convulsed with fear, 
 The tale yet lived in Rosa’s ear— 
 She felt a strange mysterious dread, 
 A chilling awe as of the dead; 
 Gleamed on her sight the demon’s form. 
 Heard she the fury of the storm? 
 The cries and hideous yells of death? 
 Tottered the ground her feet beneath? 
 Was it the fiend before her stood? 
 Saw she the poniard drop with blood? 
 All seemed to her distempered eye 
 A true and sad reality. (III.444-55) 
 
Paulo’s memories now exist as possibilities in the imaginations of Rosa and 
Victorio. And when Victorio, in despair that Rosa loves Paulo and not him, 
attempts to commit suicide he is thwarted by a female demon in a scene that 
closely mirrors Paulo’s own encounter with temptation. The transmission of 
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superstition reveals how the psychology of transference operates in Shelley’s 
figurations of the Wandering Jew. If the Ahasuerus of Hellas represents the 
“subject presumed to know,” then Paulo represents the “subject presumed to 
believe.” Mahmud invests Ahasuerus with a knowledge that sets in motion the 
transference and Paulo invests his absent God with the knowledge that sets in 
motion his transference. We could extend this dynamic further by suggesting 
that Paulo assumes several subject positions. As an image of anti-Semitism, 
he is a subject presumed to enjoy; as one who has peered into the mysteries of 
nature he is a subject presumed to know; as the love object of Rosa he is a 
subject presumed to desire. The crucial point to make is that all of these 
subject positions are conferred upon him by those with whom he interacts. 
Whether or not he does possess secret knowledge or has been cursed by God 
or actually loves Rosa, the important point is that they believe so, which 
triggers the transference and sets in motion the transmission of superstitious 
belief from one subject to the next. This process is also clearly evident in other 
gothic Romantic works, particularly in Keats’s Lamia, where Appolonius 
functions as the subject presumed to know who interpellates Lamia as a 
serpent, and in Coleridge’s Rime of the Ancient Mariner, who transmits his 
own superstitious beliefs to the wedding guest by the persuasive power of his 
performance alone. 
 In the epigraphs to the poem, Shelley includes several passages from 
Milton’s Paradise Lost, that “magnificent fiction,” as Shelley describes it in 
the Preface to Prometheus Unbound. Satan’s lament from Book IV, which 
serves as the epigraph to Canto I, is instructive: 
126 
 “Me miserable, which way shall I fly? 
 Infinite wrath, and infinite despair— 
 Which way I fly is hell—myself am hell; 
 And in this lowest deep, a lower deep, 
 To which the hell I suffer seems a heaven.” 
 
If the mind is its own place, then we should consider a reading of Paulo’s story 
that puts aside for a moment the supernatural elements, and ask: Can we 
believe what he says about himself? Can we believe the supernatural elements 
that Victorio encounters later in the poem? To deny the characters their 
supernatural experiences and explain them away as mere psychic projections 
risks a reductionist reading that posits Paulo as a garden variety psychotic and 
destroys the balance between, in Tzvetan Todorov’s terms, the “uncanny” and 
the “marvelous”; that is, the uncanny characterizes an empirical reality whose 
strangeness hints towards the supernatural but later establishes its 
impossibility,  and the marvelous characterizes a reality in which the 
supernatural is fully accepted as a fact of the narrative universe.6 A reality that 
exists in suspension between the uncanny and the marvelous, where neither is 
privileged over the other and are treated with equal validity, which prompts a 
hesitation in the reader, Todorov calls the “fantastic.” And it is in the realm of 
the fantastic where Shelley is most comfortable and best able to express the 
empirical ground for the unrepresentable psychological dynamics of the 
characters, because in many ways Paulo is psychotic, in the precise Lacanian 
sense. He is a subject of symbolic foreclosure, a refusal to submit to the 
paternal metaphor which anchors the symbolic and provides the unitary 
signifier around which language acquires its meaning. For the psychotic, 
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metaphor is impossible and all signifiers are given literally. The psychotic’s 
world is pregnant with signification, but with no grounding terms. Entry into 
the symbolic and the acceptance of symbolic castration produces lack, but it is 
a necessary step in becoming a subject and forging a substantive identity. 
Symbolic castration is the price one pays for becoming a self.  
 With this in mind, it is crucial to note that “God” appears nowhere in 
the poem, yet his influence is everywhere, and in different guises: as a 
tyrannical antagonist in Paulo’s mind, as the moral context for the priests, 
nuns, and congregation; and as a deistic entity for the narrator and the joyful 
peasants of the opening scene. Like Paulo, God is an empty signifier, he 
functions, in Lacanian terms, as the “other” of the “big Other.” He pulls the 
strings from behind the scene, but is ultimately inaccessible. The belief in an 
“other of the big Other” produces a variety of paranoiac and psychotic 
responses. The function of this “other” is to fill in the gaps of the big Other—
language, ideology—to mask the fact that the big Other does not exist, that the 
differential structure of language has no ultimate ground. The other of the big 
Other is posited as an image of desire when the subject faces an encounter 
with the Real, when the symbolic cannot account for a traumatic event 
experienced as the impossible. In this sense, Paulo and the God who torments 
him share a structural resemblance: each are a signifier without a signified, 
but God is a privileged master signifier in the ideology of Christianity, and 
Paulo is an empty signifier as its exception. 
 Paulo exists in an uncanny space between the two deaths—symbolic 
death and physical death,—“undead” rather than “immortal.” Although he is 
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unable to die a physical death, he is at the same time incapable of recognizing 
the eternal within himself: his self-consciousness and will. His existential 
despair is so overwhelming that he cannot ameliorate it by articulating it into 
the symbolic texture of causality: 
 I sicken even unto death. 
 Oh! hard would be the task to paint 
 And gift with life past scenes again; 
 To knit a long and linkless chain, 
 Or strive minutely to relate 
 The varied horrors of my fate. (III.433-38) 
 
It is productive to read Kierkegaard’s The Sickness Unto Death alongside 
Shelley because they approach the same problem from radically different 
perspectives. For Kierkegaard, despair—the “sickness unto death”—is 
experienced when one is unable to reconcile the finite with the infinite, the 
self with the creator, necessity with freedom. Despair is the product of a mis-
relation between the two and can take one of three forms: a denial of the self, 
a denial of the creator, or a denial of the relation itself. In The Sickness Unto 
Death, Kierkegaard writes: 
 The formula that describes the state of the self when despair is 
completely rooted out is this: in relating itself to itself and in willing to 
be itself, the self rests transparently in the power that established it. 
(14) 
 . . . 
 Death is not the end of the sickness [unto death], but death is 
incessantly the end. To be saved from this sickness by death is an 
impossibility, because the sickness and its torment—and the death—are 
precisely this inability to die. (21) 
 
Shelley, of course, as a self-proclaimed atheist has no interest in reconciling 
with Kierkegaard’s god, but the formula is equally valid if we substitute 
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“master signifier” or “big Other” for “god.” Paulo’s despair is directed towards 
a symbolic that affords him no identity, and yet he is unable or unwilling to 
risk complete subjective destitution by traversing his fundamental fantasy and 
abandoning, rather than renouncing, the symbolic structure that determines 
his identity. Because he has no other means available to him to organize his 
desire, he is caught in an eternal quest for a new master. If, for Kierkegaard, 
the eternal signifies the positive presence of a god, then for Shelley the eternal 
signifies the negative presence of lack in the symbolic. Paulo organizes his 
desire by positing this “other” of the big Other, giving this lack a presence that 
allows him to sustain his identity. For the mature Shelley it will fall to 
Prometheus to risk his own subjective destitution by abandoning the 
phantasmatic other and to identify with the void itself beneath the symbolic. 
 What conclusions can we ultimately draw from the poem? Is Paulo a 
Promethean hero who should be commended for his resistance against a 
vindictive God? Or do we point to his ultimate failure and weakness in 
expressing his freedom, or his inability to look beyond his narcissism and 
meaningfully share himself with Rosa? Shelley himself may have been of two 
minds about this. On the one hand, in 3 Dec. 1811 letter to Hogg he writes: 
“For the immoral ‘never to be able to die, never to escape from some shrine as 
chilling as the clay-formed dungeon which now it inhabits’ is the future 
punishment which I believe in” (35). Paulo may be weak, but he is not 
immoral in a way Shelley would find damning. For in another letter to Hogg 
(20 Dec. 1810) Shelley writes: “Oh! I burn with impatience for the moment of 
Xtianity's dissolution, it has injured me; I swear on the altar of perjured love 
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to revenge myself on the hated cause of the effect which even now I can 
scarcely help deploring.—” (30). Here Paulo would seem to be a surrogate for 
Shelley’s own views. But the interpretive tension The Wandering Jew 
maintains throughout—between psychosis and allegory, desire and 
superstition—and elevates the material above its generic precursors. The 
Wandering Jew offers an illuminating account of the complex questions of 
language, desire, fantasy, and identity that I will interrogate further in the 


















                                                                                                                                      
1 See, for example, Susan Wolfson’s analysis of “The Mask of Anarchy” in 
“Social Form: Shelley and the Determination of Reading” in her Formal 
Charges: The Shaping of Poetry in British Romanticism (pp. 193-226).  
2 For the full textual history of The Wandering Jew, see CPPBS I, pp. 189-207. 
3 In Tarrying with the Negative, Zizek distinguishes between the “indefinite 
judgment” and the “negative judgment”: “. . . noumena are objects of 
indefinite-limiting-judgment. By saying “the Thing is non-phenomenal,” we 
do not say the same as “the Thing is not phenomenal”; we do not make any 
positive claim about it, we only draw a certain limit and locate the Thing in 
the wholly nonspecified void beyond it” (p. 111). Shelley’s poetry is replete 
with instances of the indefinite judgment, which contributes to the uncanny 
effect these images produce, a point I will address further in my discussion of 
Prometheus Unbound.    
4 See CPPBS I, 213.  
5 See Anderson’s The Legend of the Wandering Jew, pp. 90-95 for a survey of 
the Wandering Jew in British Folk Tales; and pp. 174-211 for representations 
of the legend during the Romantic era. See also David Punter’s The Literature 
of Terror, chapter three: “Gothic and Romanticism” (pp. 99-129) for a 
discussion of the motif of the wanderer as anti-hero.  
6 See chapter three, “The Uncanny and the Marvelous,” from Tzvetan 
Todorov’s The Fantastic, pp. 41-57.  
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CHAPTER FOUR 
The Gothic Prometheus 
 
 Throughout the first three chapters I have drawn a distinction between 
the Gothic-Shelleyesque and the Romantic-Shelleyan modes of subjectivity. 
In Zastrozzi, St. Irvyne, and The Wandering Jew, Shelley employs the gothic 
aesthetic as a representational site to articulate a subjectivity associated with 
antagonism, drive, jouissance, monstrosity, perversion, and lack. This 
Shelleyesque subject, which is predominate in his early work through the 
Alastor volume (1816), inhibits the emergence of the Shelleyan subject of 
synthesis, desire, pleasure, sublimity, benevolence, and being. In those early 
works, the Shelleyesque and the Shelleyan are set in antagonistic opposition 
where horror and beauty annihilate one another. And the attempts to mediate 
the “real” of the Gothic through ideal fantasy formations generates its own set 
of failures as the gap between the ideal and the actual perpetually negate each 
other in a self-generating series of ontological veils, or fantasy frames. 
Shelley’s Gothic, thus, stages the product of that failure, a ghastly monument 
to the non-identity of the concept to its object, the subject to its ego, and 
fantasy to its object of desire.   
 Prometheus Unbound (1819), because of its visionary and utopian 
aspirations, serves as an instructive example of how Shelley’s gothic 
sensibility informs his mature work. From a strictly formal perspective, the 
drama mirrors a standard gothic plot: two lovers (Prometheus and Asia), 
separated by an oppressive patriarchal structure (Jupiter) seek to escape their 
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confinement and re-establish an egalitarian sexual union based upon 
freedom, love, and sympathetic identification with others. Looking back to the 
conflict between gothic (masculine) and sentimental (feminine) aesthetics in 
St. Irvyne, I would argue that Prometheus Unbound represents a similar, 
though more mature, attempt to resolve the antagonism of sexual difference. 
The gothic aesthetic for Shelley represents not an imaginative fantasy outside 
the realm of experience, but the actual horror of the present “what is.” 
Shelleyan idealism, then, is mediated through the Gothic. Prometheus 
Unbound is Shelley’s most optimistic and ambitious attempt to achieve this 
mediation, to traverse—poetically and politically—the gap between “what is” 
and “what might be,” to release that “glorious Phantom” of futurity that “will 
illumine our tempestuous day” (“England in 1819”). Although Shelley’s drama 
is notoriously abstract and replete with dense, though exquisite, passages of 
descriptive poetry, both the present “what is” and potential “what might be” 
are clearly articulated. 
 As the drama opens, Prometheus—the “Champion of mankind”—
having been confined by Jupiter to a rocky precipice in the Indian Caucasus 
and tortured unremittingly, addresses his adversary: 
 Monarch of Gods and Dæmons, and all Spirits 
 But One, who throng those bright and rolling Worlds 
 Which Thou and I alone of living things 
 Behold with sleepless eyes! regard this Earth 
 Made multitudinous with thy slaves, whom thou 
 Requitest for knee-worship, prayer and praise, 
 And toil, and hecatombs of broken hearts, 
 With fear and self-contempt and barren hope: 
 Whilst me, who am they foe, eyeless in hate, 
 Hast thou made reign and triumph, to thy scorn, 
 O’er mine own misery and thy vain revenge.— (I.1-11) 
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In his opening monologue, Prometheus establishes the gothic context from 
which the rest of the drama proceeds. The Jupiterian world is one of tyranny, 
servitude, hopelessness, mental and physical degradation and corruption, all 
produced through the destructive cycle of hatred and revenge. The entropic 
phenomenology of the Prometheus/Jupiter dyadic relationship inversely 
produces a corresponding proliferation of corruption and death in the natural 
environment. After Prometheus’s enchainment, the Earth, his mother, 
informs us of the impact on herself: 
 Lightning and Innundation vexed the plains; 
 Blue thistles bloomed in cities; foodless toads 
 Within voluptuous chambers panting crawled; 
 When Plague had fallen on man and beast and worm, 
 And Famine,—and black blight on herb and tree, 
 And in the corn and vines and meadow-grass 
 Teemed ineradicable poisonous weeds 
 Draining their growth, for my wan bosom was dry 
 With grief,—and the thin air, my breath, was stained 
 With the contagion of a mother’s hate 
 Breathed on her child’s destroyer—. . . (I.169-79) 
 
The imagery here is similar to that of Byron’s “Darkness” (1816), itself a 
powerful example of the kind of gothic framing and apocalyptic dread found 
in Prometheus Unbound: 
                                    The world was void, 
 The populous and the powerful was a lump, 
 Seasonless, herbless, treeless, manless, lifeless-- 
 A lump of death—a chaos of hard clay. 
 The rivers, lakes, and ocean all stood still, 
 And nothing stirr’d within their silent depths; 
 Ships sailorless lay rotting on the sea, 
 And their masts fell down piecemeal; as they dropp’d 
 They slept on the abyss without a surge— 
 The waves were dead; the tides were in their grave, 
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 The Moon, their mistress, had expir’d before; 
 The winds were wither’d in the stagnant air, 
 And the clouds perish’d; Darkness had no need 
 Of aid from them—She was the Universe. (69-82) 
To argue that the reality established at the beginning of the drama is one of a 
gothic nightmare requires no argument at all. Prometheus is trapped in a 
realm where “shapeless sights come wandering by, / The ghastly people of the 
realm of dream, / Mocking me” (I.36-38). Prometheus, even though he is 
denied sleep, inhabits a waking nightmare that borders on the delusional, if 
not psychotic.  
 Like the Gothic-Jupiterian nightmare of Act I, the Romantic-
Promethean utopia of Acts III and IV are clearly articulated. After 
Prometheus “recalls” his curse and opens himself once again to his love for 
Asia, a series of events occur that ultimately lead to the renovation of the 
universe itself and the emergence of the Promethean age. Having surveyed the 
wondrous changes, the reborn Spirit of the Earth reports: 
 Those ugly human shapes and visages 
 Of which I spoke as having wrought me pain, 
 Past floating through the air, and fading still 
 Into the winds that scattered them; and those 
 From whom they past seemed mild and lovely forms 
 After some foul disguise had fallen—and all 
 Were somewhat changed—and after brief surprise 
 And greetings of delighted wonder, all 
 Went to their sleep again: and when, the dawn 
 Came—wouldst thou think that toads and snakes and efts 
 Could e’er be beautiful?—yet so they were 
 And that with little change of shape or hue: 
 All things had put their evil nature off . . .  (III.iv.65-77) 
And the Spirit of the Hour, at the conclusion of Act III, informs us: 
 
 The painted veil, by those who were called life, 
 Which mimicked, as with colours idly spread, 
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 All men believed and hoped, is torn aside— 
 The loathsome mask has fallen, the man remains 
 Sceptreless, free, uncircumscribed—but man: 
 Equal, unclassed, tribeless and nationless, 
 Exempt from awe, worship, degree,—the King 
 Over himself; just, gentle, wise—but man: 
 Passionless? no—yet from guilt or pain 
 Which were, for his will made, or suffered them, 
 Nor yet exempt, though ruling them like slaves, 
 From chance and death and mutability, 
 The clogs of that which else might oversoar 
 The loftiest star of unascended Heaven 
 Pinnacled dim in the intense inane. (III.iv.190-204) 
 
What is striking about Shelley’s utopia is that it conceives of a mode of being 
without antagonism—no class struggle, no identity politics, no pain nor guilt, 
and no reified gender determinations. As the Earth, who in the Epithalamion 
of Act IV is now gendered as masculine in her duet with the feminine Moon, 
rejoices: “The joy, the triumph, the delight, the madness, / The boundless, 
overflowing bursting gladness, / The vapourous exultation, not to be 
confined!” (IV.319-21). In short, what Shelley is striving at is a post-Oedipal 
society of undifferentiated libidinal flux, a movement from the castrating 
determinations of the phallic Symbolic to the affective jouissance of the 
maternal Semiotic, where “Language is a perpetual Orphic song, / Which 
rules with Daedal harmony a throng / Of thoughts and forms, which else 
senseless and shapeless were” (IV.415-17).1 The difficulty lies, of course, in 
moving from one mode to the other. As idealistic as Shelley can be at times, in 
no other work does he make quite this ambitious a leap into the 
circumambient air.2 And we must consider whether Shelley is enabling the 
conditions of possibility for such a renovation or is rather revealing its 
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conditions of impossibility,  thereby creating an imaginative space for further 
aesthetic interventions.   
 D. J. Hughes has argued that the visionary utopia of Act IV is kind of 
virtual reality where the “gradual emptying-out of the phenomenal and 
gradual presence of the noumenal” (117) is realized by “cleansing the 
ontological situation, restoring our sense of the potential, turning, through a 
series of verbal strategies, the actual back upon itself” (108). Hughes’s 
emphasis on restoring the latent potentiality of intellectual intuition is further 
elaborated by Timothy Webb’s analysis of Shelley’s use of negatives in 
Prometheus Unbound, such as the negative constructions found in the Spirit 
of the Hours’ speech above and Asia’s and Panthea’s journey to the realm of 
Demogorgon. For Webb, potentiality is created “through a series  of 
negatives” that “suggests both the limitations of human understanding and 
the possibility of a realm in which the seemingly negative is caught up, 
transformed, redeemed, or even regenerated, by some higher reality” (37). 
Jerrold Hogle offers perhaps the most powerful argument in favor of the 
capacity of the imagination to remake the world in Prometheus Unbound. 
Arguing against the “integrative and totalizing direction” he finds in Earl 
Wasserman’s and Stuart Curran’s reading of the drama, Jerrold Hogle argues 
rather for a “demythologizing, not remythologizing” (169) reading where 
“older mythic patterns” are dispersed “into new, iconoclastic, and constantly 
altered relations with one another” (171). The “pyrotechnics” (as Barbara 
Gelpi puts it) of Hogle’s notion of “radical transference” is well-exemplified in 
this passage on Asia’s transfigurative powers: 
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 What she sends into forms in nature no longer appears exactly what it 
was once it is reconstituted by its new surroundings. That is why Asia 
must probe into the mysteries of the “depths” in objects, even though 
she has often provided them, and why the surfaces of objects must then 
beckon her to “follow” them toward the deeper impulses generating 
their self-veiling growth. To receive, be, or project a transference, even 
in Asia’s case, is finally not to recognize the fact completely once the 
movement has occurred. It is, for a time, to see, as we have noted 
already, an implied depth elsewhere as possibly absolute “Spirit,” a 
self-generated, external essence facing a less self-contained interpreter, 
who must assume that depth to be the ground of visible surfaces . . . . 
(186-87) 
 
Hogle’s notion of radical transference is so powerful, in fact, that it acquires a 
quasi-mystical agency of its own as it “obscures itself in its own veilings” 
(187). The performative power of language to transform the world not simply 
remodels objects but obliterates them in a Dionysian rush of deconstructive 
indeterminacy, creating space for the “virtual world” that Hughes identifies, 
similar to our presently emerging realm of cyberspace where identities, 
gender, phenomena, and other structures of an Oedipalized world of 
prohibitions are suspended.         
 Shelley himself, of course, speaks to the power of poetry to create the 
conditions for imaginative and moral renovation. In the Preface to 
Prometheus Unbound, Shelley writes that his aim is to  
 . . . familiarize the highly refined imagination of the more select classes 
of poetical readers with beautiful idealisms of moral excellence; aware 
that until the mind can love, and admire, and trust, and hope, and 
endure, reasoned principles of moral conduct are seeds cast upon the 
highway of life which the unconscious passenger tramples into dust, 
although they would bear the harvest of his happiness. (SPP, 209) 
 
In A Defence of Poetry (1821), Shelley further describes how these “beautiful 
idealisms of moral excellence” operate in conjunction with an epistemology of 
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moral and political change that “strips the veil of familiarity of the world” to 
reveal the beautiful “spirit of its forms”:    
 Poetry turns all things to loveliness; it exalts the beauty of that which is 
most beautiful, and it adds beauty to that which is most deformed; it 
marries exultation and horror, grief and pleasure, eternity and change; 
it subdues to union under its light yoke all irreconcilable things. It 
transmutes all that it touches, and every form moving within the 
radiance of its presence is changed by wondrous sympathy to an 
incarnation of the spirit which it breathes: its secret alchemy turns to 
potable gold the poisonous waters which flow from death through life; 
it strips the veil of familiarity from the world, and lays bare the naked 
and sleeping beauty, which is the spirit of its forms. (SPP, 533) 
  
“Poetry” thus, writes Shelley, “defeats the curse which binds us to be subjected 
to the accident of surrounding impressions” (533). The language of poets “is 
vitally metaphorical; that is, it marks the unapprehended relations of things, 
and perpetuates their apprehension until the words which represent them, 
become through time signs for portions and classes of thought instead of 
integral thoughts” (512). 
 Shelley would seem to be articulating an idealism where, through an 
aesthetic mediation, the error of ugliness and deformation are stripped away 
to reveal the eternal forms of ideal beauty, the “indestructible order” of the 
“true and the beautiful,” (512) as Shelley, following Plato, puts it. Yet he also 
claims that poetry is superimposed upon, added to, or combined with 
deformation, horror, grief, and change; thus subduing “into union” all 
“irreconcilable things.” This tension between demystification and 
transfiguration—or between indeterminate and determinate negation—
corresponds to an aesthetic ideology in Shelley that distinguishes between 
deficiencies in objects versus deficiencies in their concepts. Where the 
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indeterminate negation critiques the object from a perspective of abstract 
ideality and finds the object lacking, the determinate negation critiques the 
object from a perspective of immanence and creates unity out of oppositions. 
Deformity, horror, grief, and change, then, in a purely negative mode, are but 
category errors. When viewed from a radical shift in aesthetic perspective, the 
source of these errors are shown to be merely a deficiency in their concepts.  
As Ross Woodman writes, “The implication is clear: Shelley’s apocalyptic 
vision (i.e., the vision of a universe continuously created as distinct from a 
universe continually perceived) belongs within a verbal universe. . . . It is, like 
Plato’s republic, a pattern set up in heaven” (Apocalyptic Vision, 20). Or, as 
Mary Shelley concisely put it in her 1839 edition of Shelley’s works, “Shelley 
believed that mankind had only to will that there should be no evil, and there 
would be none” (271).  
 Recent critical responses to Shelley’s ambitious drama have largely 
focused upon its plausibility, particularly whether or not Prometheus’ 
psychological purification—whereby he substitutes his hatred for Jupiter with 
his love for Asia—constitutes an adequate enough cause to enable the 
emergence of a utopian republic of freely-desiring subjects. For Stuart 
Peterfreund: “Going with the flow—the unidirectional flow of time, the cyclical 
flow of natural process, and the perpetual flow of language by means of which 
itself and all other sorts of flow are made memorable—is a theme central to 
the meaning of Prometheus Unbound” (239). For Leon Waldoff, the “utopian 
vision is psychologically sounder than it is generally acknowledged to be” and 
that “Prometheus’ aggressive feelings against Jupiter now emerge as moral 
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superiority” (79, 91). John Rieder argues that “Prometheus’s conscious 
forgetfulness does not denote any break or weakening of desire but rather the 
loss of the object of desire and, in the process of purification, the substitution 
of a new (or the original) one, Asia” (782). For Helen Brown Herson, “The 
oxymoronic journey of Prometheus Unbound is a journey toward perfection 
without a single reference point for perfection, a path without an ultimate 
goal, a theodicy without a god. Poetry is the prime mover here, the force of 
primordial love and justice” (374). D. J. Hughes claims that “. . . the first three 
acts of the poem have succeeded in destroying the actuality with which the 
drama opens: Prometheus chained to his rock” (110). David Bromwich notes: 
“One reason the erotic union of Prometheus Unbound succeeds in 
manifesting utopia is that the lovers, like Laon and Cythna, engage in a 
relationship of complete reciprocity, equality, and selflessness. Neither is  
(de-) limited by the fantasy of the other, and each is dedicated not only to the 
couple’s liberation but also to the freedom of humankind. In every way, 
Prometheus and Asia function as each other’s perfect complement” (259). But 
there are also critics who are less than convinced of drama’s success. 
Particularly harsh is Theresa Kelley, who writes: “. . . the Prometheus on 
display here is not the humbled, apologetic god, but the bare-knuckled 
authority who continues to call the shots, even when he is ostensibly the 
divine sufferer whom the Furies will torment (or try to torment) for the rest of 
Act I. . . . [a] god who inaugurates the chain of events that leads to a world 
revolution that is itself violent” (279). And Tilottama Rajan writes: “Perhaps 
the most troubling lacuna in play has to do with the unilateral nature of 
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Prometheus’ forgiveness of Jove, on which the entire action depends. If 
Promethean love is indeed to inaugurate a new age, then surely this love 
cannot remain a paradise for a sect” (303). These are but a few examples of 
the wide-ranging critical approaches to the drama, and I will confront others 
during the course of my own argument. We can begin by focusing our 
attention on the referential context from which any interpretation must rest, 
for the plausibility of the drama depends upon our own complicity with or 
resistance against the metaphysical assumptions Shelley invites us to make.    
 As Earl Wasserman points out in his seminal reading of the drama, 
“Any interpretation of Prometheus Unbound as a work of ‘poetic idealism’ will 
necessarily be conditioned by a determination of the drama’s area of 
reference, the level of reality in which it is enacted; and this in turn must be a 
function of what its protagonist represents” (255). Wasserman situates 
Prometheus in Shelley’s “metaphysics of idealism,” arguing that Prometheus 
represents Shelley’s notion of the “One Mind,” as Shelley defines it. For 
example, in his essay “On Life.” Shelley writes: 
 The words, I, you, they are not signs of any actual difference subsisting 
between the assemblages of thoughts thus indicated, but are merely 
marks employed to denote the different modifications of the one mind. 
Let it not be supposed that this doctrine conducts to the monstrous 
presumption, that I, the person who now write and think, am that one 
mind. I am but a portion of it. The words I, and you and they are 
grammatical devices invented simply for arrangement and totally 
devoid of the intense and exclusive sense usually attached to them. 
(SPP, 508) 
 
Shelley, shadowing forth here Jakobson’s structuralist linguistics, recognizes 
how the pronominal shifter—I, you, they—designates the undecidable status 
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of the speaking subject in relation to the symbolic register (the “one mind”). 
As Lacan puts it, “Indeed, the I of the enunciation is not the same as the I of 
the statement, that is to say, the shifter which, in the statement, designates 
him” (Four, 139). This creates a problem for Wasserman because, as he 
admits, “If at the beginning of the play Prometheus were truly the One Mind 
as Shelley defined the concept, it would follow that he could not be 
represented by language” (359). Wasserman’s solution is to define the one 
mind as “absolute unity of Existence” and that “when Prometheus enters his 
cave with Asia the possibility of narrative has ended because he has passed 
beyond the limits of imagery and language. Only now is he truly the One 
Mind, and therefore he must disappear from the play” (360). I am less 
interested in Shelley’s ever-changing metaphysical positions, and more 
interested in the combinatory relations among subject, self, object, and Other 
that are so richly represented in Shelley’s poetry. Far from some abstract 
notion of the “One Mind” or transcendental subject of apperception, in the 
final analysis, so to speak, Prometheus turns out to be “human, all too 
human.”  
  Although in the Preface, Shelley writes that the imagery in the drama 
has been “drawn from the operations of the human mind” (SPP, 207), 
Prometheus’s hatred for Jupiter is fueled by the agony that he suffers through 
his body. Although we might interpret Prometheus’s physical afflictions 
metaphorically as a mind in turmoil (as we must), to do so would be to under 
appreciate the extent of his suffering and the effect it has on his own mind. 
Shelley’s poetry is so exquisitely delivered throughout the poem that it nearly 
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overshadows that what are witnessing in Act I is a horrific scene of physical 
torture: 
 The crawling glaciers pierce me with the spears 
 Of their moon-freezing chrystals; the bright chains 
 Eat with their burning cold into my bones. 
 Heaven’s winged hound, polluting from they lips 
 His beak in poison not his own, tears up 
 My heart: and shapeless sights come wandering by, 
 The ghastly people from the realm of dream, 
 Mocking me: And the Earthquake-fiends are charged 
 To wrench the rivets from my quivering wounds 
 When the rocks split and close again behind; 
 While from their loud abysses howling throng 
 The genii of the storm, urging the rage 
 Of whirlwind, and afflict me with keen hail. (I.31-43)   
 
 Stephen Bruhm, in Gothic Bodies: The Politics of Pain in Romantic Fiction, 
argues that “Romantic authors share with their Gothic cousins a fascination 
with physical pain, and much Romantic production concerns itself with the 
implications of physical pain on the transcendent consciousness”; “to read the 
Gothic and Romantic together is to set in high relief the Gothic delimitation of 
the Romantic body” (xvi). As one of the Furies states, sent to tempt 
Prometheus to despair after recalling his curse on Jupiter: “In each human 
heart terror survives / The ravin it has gorged” (I.618-19). Although the Fury 
is describing the afflictions of humankind, it is crucial to consider whether or 
not Prometheus himself suffers the same consequences. For everything 
depends upon his will to purify himself of the terrors gorged into his own 
consciousness and, in effect, cleanse his unconscious of repressed terrors. 
Prometheus must, in other words, attain the kind of Godwinian self-
transparency that Shelley called into question in St. Irvyne. If we examine 
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closely, however, those pivotal moments in which Prometheus substitutes his 
hatred for Jupiter with pity, upon which the entire process of imaginative 
renovation turns, we see that the psychological transformation is not so well-
defined as we, or Prometheus, may believe. 
 As the drama opens, Prometheus is “eyeless in hate,” comforted only by 
his knowledge that Jupiter will one day be overthrown. He waits for the 
“crawling Hours”: 
                             . . . one among whom 
 —As some dark Priest hales the reluctant victim— 
 Shall drag thee, cruel King, to kiss the blood 
 From these pale feet, which then might trample thee 
 If they disdained not such a prostrate slave.— (I.48-52) 
 
The intensity of this retributive fantasy is immediately undercut, however, by 
a radical shift in perspective that many critics have pointed to as 
Prometheus’s change of heart: 
 Disdain? Ah no! I pity thee,—What Ruin 
 Will hunt thee undefended through the wide Heaven! 
 How will thy soul, cloven to its depth with terror, 
 Gape like a Hell within! I speak in grief 
 Not exultation, for I hate no more 
 As then, ere misery made me wise.—The Curse 
 Once breathed on thee I would recall. (I.53-59) 
 
Clearly, Prometheus’s use of the word “pity” is still attached to his retributive 
fantasy, which continues through the rest of the statement. It is an ironic 
“pity” meant to further denigrate Jupiter and signify his impotence. When 
Prometheus says that he hates “no more as then,” he refers to a time before 
misery made him wise; but does the “then” refer also to the sentence he has 
just spoken? Prometheus seems to have moved from hatred to wisdom in the 
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span of one sentence, which prompts Stuart Curran to argue that “Shelley has 
set in a linear, dramatic framework what is, in fact, an instantaneous moment 
of inspiration” (103). Other readers, however, have found Prometheus’ 
“instantaneous moment of inspiration” less plausible. For example, Stuart 
Sperry comments that the “notion that Prometheus, through a process of 
deliberate self-inquiry and self-recognition, has acquired the power to 
transform himself is one that we may supply as readers but that the play itself 
never either fully dramatizes or illuminates” (246). Barbara Gelpi observes 
that the “only movement forward is that Prometheus, having reviewed the 
events leading to his present anguish and analyzed his response to them, 
concludes that an attitude of enraged defiance compounds the evil he had 
hoped to destroy. He must abandon that strategy” (151). Theresa Kelley is 
even more skeptical, asking “what is Act I of Prometheus Unbound if it is not 
a staging of Promethean ambition and personal aggrandizement, with more 
than a few flickers of envy and revenge?” (280). I would argue that 
Prometheus’s supposed self-purification of the hatred and revenge he directs 
against Jupiter is complicated by his desire to retain the core of defiance that 
gives form to those destructive emotions. This is not a failure on Shelley’s 
part, but rather an appreciation of the psychological complexity of trauma. 
Prometheus does, however, attempt to convince himself, and the elements 
around him, that he has indeed undergone a significant change in perspective. 
He calls upon the Mountains, Springs, Air, and Whirlwinds to repeat to him 
the Curse that now he has forgotten: 
  If then my words had power 
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 —Though I am changed so that aught evil wish 
 Is dead within, although no memory be 
 Of what is hate—let them not lose it now! 
 What was that curse? for ye all heard me speak. (I.69-73) 
 
Notice how his qualification—“I am changed”—takes the form of an 
afterthought in the midst of calling up a curse that has, although repressed, 
provided the substance of his being. It is important to note that up until this 
point Prometheus has been totally alienated in his hatred of Jupiter, confined 
within a mirrored relationship with his antagonist. He is unaware of, or 
unable or unwilling to communicate with, those around him, including Ione 
and Panthea, who daily visit him and sleep beneath his feet: “torture and 
solitude, / Scorn and despair,—these are mine empire:— / More glorious far 
than that which thou surveyest / From thine unenvied throne, O Mighty 
God!” (I.15-17). Even after his conversion Prometheus continues to use the 
language of domination, tyranny, and empire, terms that retain their traces of 
hierarchy and phallic structures of power. Before he calls upon the Furies to 
unleash their torments, Prometheus confidently declares: “Pity the self-
despising slaves of Heaven, / Not me, within whose mind sits peace serene / 
As light in the sun, throned. . . . (I.428-30) and “Yet am I king over myself, 
and rule / The torturing and conflicting throngs within / As Jove rules you 
when Hell grows mutinous” (491-94).      
 As Susan Brisman has observed: “A total stranger to the Titan of Act I, 
the immaculate character in the Preface seems to stand for the objective of 
purifying sublime language of Satanic sediment. The ‘type of the highest 
perfection of moral and intellectual nature’ is an ideal image that consolidates 
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(identifies and draws energy from) Shelley’s anxiety about developing a new 
language that must advance the cause of resistance without the bullhorns of 
arrogance and wrath” (54). Indeed, the Prometheus of Shelley’s Preface has 
more in common with Byron’s “Prometheus” (1816), who patiently and 
silently suffers as a “symbol and a sign / To Mortals of their fate and force” 
(45-46), making “Death a Victory” (59). Byron’s poem, written in the third 
person, does not allow Prometheus to speak for himself. He remains but a 
symbol of man’s capabilities throughout. Shelley’s Prometheus, on the other 
hand, is a speaking being with a psychological complexity that exceeds not 
only Byron’s representation of the titan, but also Aeschylus’s allegorical 
representation of individuality versus authority in his Prometheus Bound.  
 Prometheus’s subject position in relation to language and the Other, 
however, is difficult to locate. From a psychoanalytical perspective, he would 
seem to embody, as synecdoche, the enchainment of the signifier to the 
signified, subject to the Law of Jupiter and frozen in a state of symbolic 
reification where there is “No change, no pause, no hope!” (I.24). Having 
undergone the cut of symbolic castration (“the bright chains / Eat with their 
burning cold into my bones”), the desire of the mother has been replaced, 
signified, by the paternal metaphor, the symbolic phallus3. As Barbara Gelpi 
explains: 
 ... Prometheus’ situation depicts synchronically the process of 
achieving separate, speaking consciousness as, according to Freudian 
theory, it is diachronically experienced by human subjects throughout 
history. Bringer of language and thus both bestower and epitomizer of 
human consciousness, he is thereby perpetrator and victim of the 
“murder” (Kristeva, Revolution 75) that is its price. His body serves as 
inscription of the sacrifice that has been made: castration. (144) 
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Prometheus’s separation from his mother, the Earth, is brilliantly represented 
by Shelley in their inability to meaningfully relate to one another through 
language. When, in the midst of his agony, Prometheus calls out to the Earth 
and surrounding elements, he senses a presence but cannot mediate the 
experience through words: “I hear a sound of voices—not the voice / Which I 
gave forth.—” (I.112-13). Assuming the voice is his mother’s, Prometheus 
continues: 
 Ha, what an awful whisper rises up! 
 ‘Tis scarce like sound, it tingles through the frame 
 As lightning tingles, hovering ere it strike.— 
 Speak, Spirit! from thine inorganic voice 
 I only know that thou art moving near 
 And love. . . . (I.131-37) 
  
To which the Earth replies “How canst thou hear / Who knowest not the 
language of the dead? . . . I dare not speak like life, lest Heaven’s fell King / 
Should hear, and link me to some wheel of pain / More torturing than the one 
whereon I roll.—” (I.137-38, 140-42). The ensuing “dialogue” between 
Prometheus and the Earth is thus fraught with ambiguity. As Wasserman 
points out, “Obviously the reader is being asked to entertain a complex and 
paradoxical dramatic hypothesis” and that although “Prometheus questions 
and answers the Earth as though their communication were complete, the 
reader must assume that Prometheus is in fact speaking a soliloquy which, 
quite by chance, happens to form a coherent dialogue with Earth” (266). That 
Prometheus and the Earth do form a coherent dialogue despite a common 
frame of intelligibility, introduces an important, though subtle, complication 
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to our understanding of Prometheus’s psychic economy and his relation to the 
Other, as such. What Prometheus encounters is not speech, but the voice as 
object. The object-voice (and object-gaze) are produced when the alterity of 
the Other exceeds intelligibility. The split subject, in other words, is expressed 
in the fields of sound and vision. The best example in Shelley’s poetry of the 
subject confronted by gaze and voice as objects is in his great lyric “Mont 
Blanc,” where 
 Thy caverns echoing to the Arve’s commotion, 
 A loud, lone sound no other sound can tame; 
 Thou art pervaded with that ceaseless motion, 
 Thou art the path of that unresting sound— 
 Dizzy Ravine! and when I gaze on thee 
 I seem as in a trance sublime and strange 
 To muse on my own separate phantasy, 
 My own, my human mind, which passively 
 Now renders and receives fast influencings, 
 Holding an unremitting interchange 
 With the clear universe of things around; 
 One legion of wild thoughts, whose wandering wings 
 Now float above thy darkness, . . . (30-42)    
 
The mind of the poet here is certainly not “passive.” When confronted with 
the alterity of the Other in the modes of gaze and voice, the poet is compelled 
to fill the void with his “own separate phantasy.” At the conclusion of the 
poem, the poet is left in a skeptical position regarding his phantasies, asking 
“And what were thou, and earth, and stars, and sea, / If to the human mind’s 
imaginings / Silence and solitude were vacancy?” (142-44). Although Shelley 
is here articulating poetically his belief that “nothing exists but as it is 
perceived” and questioning whether an independent reality exists outside of 
the perceiving mind, we can reframe the question this way: if the object-voice 
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(silence) and object-gaze (solitude) index a constitutive void, then how 
reliable is the supplemental fantasy that fills in the void of these objects? The 
link between what John Pierce refers to as the “creation of a myth about 
silence” in “Mont Blanc” and the referential ambiguity that characterizes 
Promethean hermeneutics, leads us to ask of Prometheus, how reliable are his 
efforts to interpret the object-voice? When the Earth speaks, are we hearing 
her or are we hearing Prometheus’s interpretation of what he thinks he hears 
or desires to hear? The Earth tells him, although he cannot translate her 
language into his own, “Subtle thou art and good, and though the Gods / Hear 
not this voice—yet thou art more than God / Being wise and kind— . . .” 
(I.143-45). To which Prometheus replies: 
 Obscurely through my brain like shadows dim 
 Sweep awful thoughts, rapid and thick.—I feel 
 Faint, like one mingled in entwining love, 
 Yet ’tis not pleasure. (I.146-49) 
 
This experience of “entwining love” beyond “pleasure” signals an encounter 
with the jouissance of the Other. There are numerous moments in the drama 
where characters encounter indistinct sounds, voices, shadows, and spirits 
that materialize just beyond the edge of intelligibility and then thicken out of 
the mist of obscurity into a meaningful presence. For example, as the Spirits 
of the Human Mind approach to comfort Prometheus, Ione describes their 
“sweet, sad voices” as “despair / Mingled with love, and then dissolved in 
sound.—” (I.756-57).  
 The one feature that is common to all of these liminal encounters with 
the Other is the presence of “love,” even though this feeling of love is often 
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combined with sadness or pain. Although Shelley’s purpose is to represent a 
shift in attitude in relation to an encounter with the Other, one that is 
receptive to and projects love rather than hate, we still must consider whether 
such an encounter can acknowledge the alterity of the Other without filling 
the void with fantasy objects. This is the first of many cruxes that call into 
question the possibility of actualizing a Promethean age without antagonism. 
Although Shelley’s faith that the universe would ultimately appear benevolent 
when experienced without the “loathsome mask” of error that obscures one’s 
view, beauty may actually blind one to antagonisms that have not been fully 
acknowledged. In The Abyss of Freedom, Zizek distinguishes between two 
subjective positions when confronted with the alterity of the Other:   
 The Lacanian proof of the Other’s existence is the jouissance of the 
Other (in contrast to Christianity, for example, where this proof is 
Love). . . . This encounter of the real is always traumatic, there is 
something at least minimally obscene about it. I cannot simply 
integrate it into my universe, there is always a gap separating me from 
it. . . . without the element of the real of jouissance, the Other remains 
ultimately a fiction . . .  (25) 
 
I want to be careful here because the experience of “love” in Lacanian theory 
is usually conceptualized as an imaginary identification mediated through 
fantasy (i.e., “the Other remains a fiction”). The desire of the Other is 
enigmatic and opaque. Fantasy is what fills out this enigma, articulating it, 
giving it form, such that it embodies a determinate demand. For Alain Badiou, 
however, love is one of the possible modes through which the “real” of a 
“truth-event” can occur (the other three being science, politics, and art). And 
to maintain a “fidelity” to that truth-event is, for Badiou, a practice of 
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revolutionary politics. Betraying fidelity to the emergence of a truth-event is 
one of the definitions of evil for Badiou, as is attempting to name the event; 
that is, to fill the void of the “situation” from which the event emerges with a 
positive content or apply a structuring principle to it.4 Prometheus Unbound, 
although it shares many similarities with Badiou’s notion of love as event, 
nevertheless comes dangerously close to fulfilling Badiou’s definition of evil 
by positing a politics of the event in which antagonisms are mediated rather 
than recognized (Shelley’s “unity of oppositions”).        
 The implications are far reaching, because if Prometheus is filling in 
the object-voice with his own “separate phantasies” then that raises the 
possibility that those fantasies are delusions and that his subjective position is 
one of psychosis rather than one of neurosis. In chapter one, I argued that 
Zastrozzi was a study of reactionary paranoiac fantasy; but one could argue, 
conversely, that Prometheus Unbound is a study of revolutionary paranoiac 
fantasy. Let us revisit Peter Starr’s analysis that in a “logic of specular 
doubling . . .  revolutionary action is doomed to repetition because 
revolutionaries invariably construct themselves as mirror images of their 
rivals” (2), which has the potential to lead to a “logic of structural repetition” 
(3). As many critics have noted, Prometheus and Jupiter share a number of 
similarities in Act I. The most notable example occurs when Prometheus 
summons the Phantasm of Jupiter to repeat the curse that Prometheus had 
spoken, thus condensing speaker and receiver into one image. Prometheus 
sees himself in the Phantasm: 
 I see the curse on gestures proud and cold, 
154 
 And looks of firm defiance, and calm hate, 
 And such despair as mocks itself with smiles, 
 Written as on a scroll . . . yet speak—O speak! (I.258-61) 
 
Prometheus too is described throughout Act I as being “proud,” “calm,” and 
“defiant,” echoes of which are part of the curse itself: 
 Fiend, I defy thee! with a calm, fixed mind, 
     All that thou canst inflict I bid thee do; 
 Foul Tyrant both of Gods and Humankind, 
     One only being shalt thou not subdue. 
         Rain then thy plagues upon me here, 
         Ghastly disease and frenzying fear; 
         And let alternate frost and fire 
         Eat into me, and be thine ire 
 Lightning and cutting hail and legioned forms 
 Of furies, driving by upon the wondrous storms. (I.262-71)   
 
As we learned from Prometheus’s opening dialogue, he suffers afflictions that 
the curse reveals he has brought upon himself, and indeed had demanded 
from Jupiter. Leon Waldoff, in his Freudian reading of the Oedipal dynamics 
at work in the drama, argues that Prometheus’s suffering is a self-imposed 
masochism and that his eventual release is a largely an unconscious 
realization that aggression only doubles back on the self in various forms of 
guilt and anxiety. Although Waldoff focuses on the dynamic between 
Prometheus and Jupiter, William Ulmer identifies another source of guilt, one 
that Shelley conveniently omits from the drama. In Act II when Asia descends 
to the realm of Demogorgon and chronicles the history of the Gods and 
human civilization, she informs us:  “Then Prometheus / Gave wisdom, which 
is strength, to Jupiter / And with this Law alone: ‘Let man be free,’ / Clothed 
him with the dominion of wide Heaven” (II.iv.43-46). The crucial point here is 
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that in the battle to overthrow Saturn, Prometheus sided with the Olympian 
Jupiter rather than with his fellow Titans. Thus for Ulmer, “Prometheus is a 
son enormously imperfect in love, and it is Jupiter who does the real dirty 
work by deposing Saturn, the Titanic patriarch” (82n); and “Prometheus 
reconfirms Jupiter’s power with every refusal to internalize and confront his 
own Oedipal aggressions. As the reflex of that refusal, the punishment of 
Prometheus brings back the castration anxieties attendant on filial rebellion” 
(83). So not only does Prometheus provide Jupiter with the means of 
attaining power, he also betrays his fellow Titans in the process. Not 
surprisingly, Prometheus may be displaying a form of self-punishment 
paranoia where he strikes out at ideal-ego figures who possess the power and 
authority he wishes for himself. In this regard, Prometheus bears some 
resemblance to the self-satisfied Apollo from Shelley’s lyric “Song of Apollo” 
(1820): 
 The sunbeams are my shafts with which I kill 
      Deceit, that loves the night and fears the day. 
 All men who do, or even imagine ill 
      Fly me; and from the glory of my ray 
 Good minds, and open actions take new might 
 Until diminished, by the reign of night. (33-38) 
  
 . . . 
  
 I am the eye with which the Universe  
      Beholds itself, and knows it is divine. 
 All harmony of instrument and verse, 
      All prophecy and medicine are mine; 
 All light of art or nature—to my song 
 Victory and praise, in its own right, belong. (31-36) 
 
For Asia tells us that Prometheus 
 
 . . . gave man speech, and speech created thought, 
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 Which is the measure of the Universe; 
 And Science struck the thrones of Earth and Heaven, 
 Which shook but fell not; and the harmonious mind 
 Poured itself forth in all-prophetic song. 
 And music lifted up the listening spirit 
 Until it walked, exempt from mortal care, 
 Godlike, o’er the clear billows of sweet sound; (II.iv.72-79) 
 . . . 
 He told the hidden power of herbs and springs, 
 And Disease drank and slept—Death grew like sleep.— (II.iv.85-86) 
 . . . 
 Such the alleviations of his state 
 Prometheus gave to man—for which he hangs 
 Withering in destined pain— . . .  (II.iv.98-100) 
 
 Prometheus defines himself in terms of his suffering and expresses a 
desperate need for recognition. Prometheus has no signifier of his own 
outside of his relation to the Other, either in the form of Jupiter’s “foe” or 
mankind’s “saviour.” Earlier in the Act, he pleads: 
 I ask yon Earth, have not the mountains felt? 
 I ask yon Heaven—the all-beholding Sun, 
 Has it not seen? The Sea, in storm or calm 
 Heaven’s ever-changing Shadow, spread below— 
 Have its deaf waves not heard my agony? 
 Ah me, alas, pain, pain ever, forever! (I.25-30) 
   . . . 
                           . . . Know ye not me, 
 The Titan, he who made his agony 
 The barrier to your else all-conquering foe? (I.117-19) 
 . . . 
             . . . me alone, who checked— 
 As one who checks a fiend-drawn charioteer— 
 The falsehood and the force of Him who reigns 
 Supreme, and with the groans of pining slaves 
 Fills your dim glens and liquid wildernesses? 
 Why answer ye not, still? brethren! (I.125-30) 
 
And at the conclusion of Act I:  
 
   . . . I would fain 
 Be what it is my destiny to be, 
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 The saviour and the strength of suffering man, 
 Or sink into the original gulf of things . . . 
 There is no more agony and no solace left: 
 Earth can console, Heaven can torment no more. (I.815-820) 
 
Prometheus’s desire is always framed in terms of the other’s desire, and he 
positions himself as the object-instrument of the other’s desire. And in his 
relation to Jupiter, he positions himself as the object of the jouissance of the 
Other. His suffering, therefore, is not a means to procure pleasure, as in 
masochism. His pain and suffering, rather, serve only to procure pleasure for 
the Other. In short, Prometheus is a perverse subject. The perverse logic of 
Prometheus’s subject position is most clearly evident in his curse on Jupiter 
when he says: 
 Aye, do thy worst. Thou art Omnipotent 
     O’er all things but thyself I gave thee power, 
 And my own will. Be they swift mischiefs sent 
      To blast mankind, from yon etherial tower. 
           Let the malignant spirit move 
           In darkness over those I love: 
           On me and mine I imprecate 
           The utmost torture of they hate 
 And thus devote to sleepless agony 
 This undeclining head while thou must reign on high. (I.272-81) 
 
Not only does Prometheus demand Jupiter’s wrath be inflicted upon himself, 
he also demands that “mankind” and “those” he loves also suffer the same 
inflictions. It is not enough that he alone suffers; those whom he loves must 
also suffer so as to fully establish his power over their desire and his own 
status as their benefactor. They must suffer or his own suffering would be 
meaningless. Prometheus’s perverse desire, then, follows a similar logic to 
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that of a man who disfigures his wife in order to prove to her that he will love 
her under any circumstance.   
 The differences between neurosis, psychosis, and perversion can be 
understood in terms of the subject’s structural relation to symbolic castration 
and access to or denial of jouissance.5 Each subject-position is characterized 
by a specific form of negation. In psychosis the negation takes the form of 
foreclosure of the castrating effects of the symbolic order. Metaphorical 
figurations, therefore, are interpreted literally because signifiers and referents 
are collapsed in the psychotic’s experience of reality. There is no doubt 
produced when the psychotic encounters the alterity of the Other because the 
psychotic encounters others as imaginary objects, not as subjects of lack. 
Prometheus is trapped in a dual imaginary relationship with Jupiter, and he 
expresses none of the doubt or anxiety characteristic of the neurotic subject 
who has accepted his/her castration. Despite his enchainment, Prometheus 
refuses to accept his symbolic castration, claiming that Jupiter is “Monarch of 
Gods and Dæmons, and all Spirits / But One . . . (I.1-2).” The “One” he refers 
to here is himself, although he is no doubt mistaken since it is Demogorgon 
who will rise to overthrow Jupiter.6      
 In perversion, however, negation takes the form of a disavowal of 
castration. The perverse subject believes he or she can determine with 
certainty what the Other desires, what forms the Other’s jouissance takes, and 
how to best relate to that form of jouissance. Prometheus claims with 
certainty that he possesses the secrets of Jupiter’s desire, and Jupiter himself 
is convinced that Prometheus does indeed possess that knowledge. Mercury 
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asks Prometheus, “Thou knowest not the period of Jove’s power?” (I.412), and 
Prometheus responds: “I wait, / Enduring thus the retributive hour / Which 
since we spake is even nearer now.—” (I.405-407)  Although he is the god of 
forethought, Prometheus only knows “that it must come” (I.413). In The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis, Lacan explains that perversion “is 
an inverted effect of the phantasy. It is the subject who determines himself as 
object, in his encounter with the division of subjectivity” (185). Freud 
established the points of contact between neurosis, psychosis, perversion, and 
disavowal, noting that: 
 In neurosis a piece of reality is avoided by a sort of flight, whereas in 
psychosis it is remodelled. Or we might say: in psychosis, the initial 
flight is succeeded by an active phase of remodelling; in neurosis the 
initial obedience is succeeded by a deferred attempt at flight. Or again, 
expressed in yet another way: neurosis does not disavow reality, it only 
ignores it; psychosis disavows it and tries to replace it.7 
 
 By interpreting Prometheus as a perverse subject who disavows 
castration rather than repressing or foreclosing it, we can now understand 
how it is he is able to simultaneously express pity and hatred. That is, the 
hatred he has harbored for three thousand years is disavowed rather than 
purified or repressed. Stuart Sperry, commenting on the implausibility of 
Prometheus’s sudden transformation asks: “. . . if Shelley really intended to 
dramatize man’s powers of self-regeneration through an act of inward 
recognition, repentance, and reform, why did he do his work so badly?” (242). 
Sperry likens Prometheus’s conversion to the one undergone by Coleridge’s 
Ancient Mariner, a text I have often pointed to as an exemplary case that 
demonstrates the split between the statement and the enunciation. When 
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Prometheus says “It doth repent me: words are quick and vain; / Grief for 
awhile is blind, and so was mine. / I wish no living thing to suffer pain” 
(I.303-305), he offers a moral platitude no more convincing as the Mariner’s 
because the sentiment “no living thing” does not apply to Jupiter, who is given 
no opportunity to reform or repent himself. Throughout the poem, Jupiter is 
never referred to as anything other than “evil,” or “tyrant,” or “slave.” Even 
after he recalls the curse, Prometheus still refers to the “retributive hour” of 
Jupiter’s overthrow. This is the antagonism that cannot be accounted for in 
the Promethean Age. This is the obscene, radical alterity of the Other that 
confronts the revolutionary subject not with love but with fear. And if 
Shelley’s theory of poetry indeed strives to “create unity out of oppositions” 
and create a space where “discord cannot be” then how does it account for the 
presence of an Other that resists unity? How does it account for the “silence” 
and “solitude” of the voice and gaze as objects? Jupiter is an extreme example, 
of course, but significant because he represents but one example of the 
“object” that resists the kind of transferential drive that Hogle and others 
claim ushers in the renovation of the world. What gets lost in this endless 
series of metaphorical substitutions is the Lacanian “Real,” that which resists 
symbolization, the antagonism that cannot be articulated symbolically, nor 
accounted for in the subject’s fantasy space.     
 When we consider Prometheus’s actions and desires as those of a 
perverse subject, he becomes a far more plausible character, one whose 
physical and mental suffering give him a psychological complexity far greater 
than Shelley may have intended. Recalling a curse, resisting the temptation to 
161 
despair brought on by the Furies, reuniting with Asia after the overthrow of 
Jupiter, and then retiring to an oracular cave to cultivate the arts hardly does 
justice to his psychological complexity and the ambiguity of the drama at 
large. Granted, Shelley does condition the optimism of the play on several 
occasions, particularly at the conclusion of Act III where “chance and death 
and mutability” are the “clogs of that which else might oversoar / The loftiest 
star of unascended Heaven / Pinnacled dim in the intense inane” (III.iv.201-
204). Although Shelley’s renovated man rules these contingencies “like 
slaves,” such a vision would require not only Demogorgon’s instructions to 
“defy Power,” “to love, and bear,” and “hope, till Hope creates / From it’s own 
wreck the thing it contemplates,” but more importantly, it assumes a subject 
who can rule his or her own unconscious and to fully identify with the desires 
of the Other. And this is possible only for the perverse subject because of the 
certainty he ascribes to his own fantasy.    
 The perverse subject position is one well suited to Shelley because it 
enables an interpretation of his works outside of the usual frame of “skeptical 
idealism” that has been so well established by Pulos and Wasserman.8 While I 
largely agree with their assessment of Shelley’s philosophical positions, I 
would also argue that we could reframe the skeptical/idealism binary in terms 
of the perverse structure, where Shelley disavows his skepticism when striving 
for idealism. In other words, the two positions are maintained in abeyance: 
i.e., “I know very well that the universe is an amoral void, but nevertheless I 
choose to believe in a benevolent spirit co-eternal with the universe.” Or, as 
Asia says in her dialogue with Demogorgon: “There was Heaven and Earth at 
162 
first / And light and love”, even though Demogorgon will later tell her that 
“The Deep truth is imageless,” effectively negating her belief that light and 
love are primordial animating spirits of the universe. In this same way, the 
Shelleyesque and the Shelleyan each carry a significant resonance without the 
need to sacrifice one over the other or to resolve the tension between the two. 
A pertinent example of this can be found in Julian and Maddalo, a poem 
written concurrently with Prometheus Unbound, but which Shelley decided 
not to include in the Prometheus volume because it would not “harmonize.”  
 The poem begins as a philosophical dialogue between the idealistic 
Julian, modeled after Shelley, and the cynical Maddalo, modeled after Byron. 
Julian expresses a sentiment that would indeed harmonize with Prometheus 
Unbound: 
 Where is the love, beauty and truth we seek 
 But in our mind? and if we were not weak 
 Should we be less in deed than in desire? 
 . . . 
                                   . . . those who try may find 
 How strong the chains are which our spirit bind; 
 Brittle perchance as straw . . . We are assured 
 Much may be conquered, much may be endured 
 Of what degrades and crushes us. We know 
 That we have power over ourselves to do 
 And suffer—what, we know not till we try; 
 But something nobler than to live and die—  (174-87) 
 
   
To which Maddalo replies “How vain are such aspiring theories” (201). To 
prove his point, Maddalo takes Julian to visit a “Maniac” who has been self-
confined to a madhouse. What began as an urbane philosophical discussion, 
ends with the fragmented soliloquy of the Maniac, who tells a tale of 
unrequited love and melancholy. Of interest is the similarity of the Maniac’s 
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lament to that of Prometheus. The Maniac asks “What Power delights to 
torture us? I know / That to myself I do not wholly owe / What now I suffer, 
though in part I may. / Alas, none strewed sweet flowers upon the way / 
Where wandering heedlessly, I met pale Pain / My shadow, which will leave 
me not again—” (320-325). The Maniac lives “to shew / How much men bear 
and die not!” (459-60). The Maniac is a victim of unrequited love who cannot 
let go of the ideal image of the woman who left him. As he pleads to an 
imaginary image that haunts his mind, he exclaims: “Here I cast away / All 
human passions, all revenge, all pride; / I think, speak, act no ill I do but hide 
/ Under these words like embers . . . (501-504). Shelley is well aware that 
unlike the metaphysics of Prometheus Unbound where “eternal Love” powers 
the machinery of necessity, love is subject to change, chance, and mutability, 
as it is experienced in debilitating despair for the Maniac.  
 The ideal union, the successful fulfillment of the sexual relationship, as 
embodied by the union of Asia and Prometheus, could be read as a realization 
of the fantasy of the Maniac. Furthermore, one could argue that 
Demogorgon’s overthrow of Jupiter stages the fantasy of Beatrice Cenci, for 
whom no escape is possible from the omnipotent phallic figures—father, 
church, community—which contain and abuse her. If, as I have argued, 
Prometheus obtains satisfaction by ensuring the enjoyment of the Other, 
thereby transforming himself into an instrument of the Other’s jouissance, 
then as a perverse subject, he creates an alternative symbolic order in which 
jouissance (“Love,” in the vocabulary of Prometheus Unbound) becomes a 
universal ideological principle. So when we leave Prometheus at the end of Act 
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I, at which point no change has yet taken place other than his own renewed 
capacity for love, we enter his newly created fantasy space. The difference 
being that he shifts his position as the object-instrument of Jupiter’s 
jouissance to the object-instrument of Asia’s jouissance, and by extension 
Panthea’s and Ione’s. 
 Before turning to Panthea’s communication of her dreams to Asia, 
which sets in motion the action of Act II, I want to pause for a moment to 
consider a curious moment in the text that is quickly passed over. After telling 
Asia of her erotically charged dream of the transfigured Prometheus, Panthea 
relates Ione’s own reaction when confronted by the ecstatic effects of the 
dream on Panthea: 
 “Canst thou divine what troubles me tonight? 
 I always knew what I desired before 
 Nor ever found delight to wish in vain. 
 But now I cannot tell thee what I seek; 
 I know not—something sweet since it is sweet 
 Even to desire—it is thy sport false sister! 
 Thou hast discovered some inchantment old 
 Whose spells have stolen my spirit as I slept 
 And mingled it with thine;—for when we just now 
 Kissed, I felt within they parted lips 
 The sweet air that sustained me, and the warmth 
 Of the life-blood for loss of which I faint 
 Quivered between our interwining arms.” (II.i.94-106) 
 
Panthea, rather than responding to Ione, immediately flees to Asia, leaving 
Ione’s questions, and ours, unanswered. Judith Feher-Gurewich points out 
that “the pervert can access psychic gratification only by becoming the agent 
of the other’s fantasy . . . in order to expose the fundamental anxiety that such 
a fantasy camouflages. This no doubt explains why perverse desire produces 
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horror, fear, and dismay in those who witness its mode of operation” (192). 
What Ione has “witnessed,” so to speak, is Prometheus’s perverse desire as it 
is experienced by Panthea, its “mode of operation,” as Feher-Gurewich puts it. 
We can understand why this may have startled Ione when Panthea describes 
the content of her remembered dream: 
 Then two dreams came. One I remember not. 
 But in the other, his pale, wound-worn limbs 
 Fell from Prometheus, and the azure night 
 Grew radiant with glory of that form 
 Which lives unchanged within, and his voice fell 
 Like music which makes giddy the dim brain 
 Faint with intoxication of keen joy: 
 “Sister of her whose footsteps pave the world 
 With loveliness—more fair than aught but her 
 Whose shadow thou art—lift thine eyes on me!” 
 I lifted them—the overpowering light 
 Of that immortal shape was shadowed o’er 
 By love; which, from his soft and flowing limbs 
 And passion-parted lips, and keen faint eyes 
 Streamed forth like vaporous fire; an atmosphere 
 Which wrapt me in its all dissolving power 
 As the warm ether of the morning sun 
 Wraps ere it drinks some cloud of wandering dew. 
 I saw not—heard not—moved not—only felt 
 His presence flow and mingle through my blood 
 Till it became his life, and his grew mine 
 And I was thus absorbed—. . .  (II.i.61-82) 
 
What frightens Ione and disturbs her “linked sleep” with Panthea is the 
introduction of a masculine, Promethean desire into a feminine economy of 
desire, to which Ione had become accustomed during Prometheus’s 
enchainment. That the glorious form of Prometheus’s “immortal shape” is 
clad only with his smile links his newfound desire to that of exhibitionist 
fantasy. The crucial point here is that we encounter this fantasy through 
Panthea’s desire, thus establishing the perverse subject’s certainty regarding 
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the jouissance of the Other. In other words, if, as Lacan repeatedly argues, 
one’s “desire is always the desire of the Other,” then the desire of Panthea and 
Asia, with the exception of Ione, is framed within Prometheus’s perverse 
fantasy frame. They themselves become the object-instrument of Promethean 
desire, as it operates throughout the play. And in relation to Prometheus 
himself, Asia reassumes her status as the object-cause of his desire. To put it 
another way, Asia and Prometheus re-establish the normative hetero-sexual 
circuit of desire, but within a perverse fantasy space where the law of 
Jupiterian “Fear” is replaced by the law of Promethean “Love.”  One master 
signifier is replaced by another, through which the phenomenal reality of the 
play is mediated, from an injunction to “Obey!” to an injunction to “Enjoy!”—
both of which constitute the impossible demand of the super-ego. Although 
only a masochist would prefer the Jupiterian world of servitude, the 
conditions of possibility for the Promethean age exact their own price, 
particularly for women.  
 In both his prose and poetry, Shelley consistently argues on behalf of 
equality for women, for which he has been rightfully commended. From 
Queen Mab, Laon and Cythna, The Cenci, Prometheus Unbound, and his 
essays “A Discourse on the Manners of the Ancient Greeks Relative to the 
Subject of Love,” and “A Philosophical View of Reform,” among others, 
Shelley eloquently exposes the patriarchal machinery that enslaves women to 
unwanted marriage, prostitution, inadequate educational and professional 
opportunities, and repressive reproductive customs. And yet, as much as he 
abhors the degradation of women, he consistently stages an inverse situation 
167 
where women are valorized as a mirror for the idealized aspirations and 
desires of degraded men. In a 12 January 1811 letter to his schoolmate and 
friend Thomas Jefferson Hogg, the young Shelley writes: 
 I here take God (if a God exists) to witness that I wish torments which 
beggar the futile description of a fancied Hell would fall upon me, 
provided thereby I could attain that happiness for what I love, which I 
fear can never be.—The question is What do I love? it is almost 
unnecessary to answer. Do I love the person, the embodied identity (if I 
may be allowed the ex[pressio]n No! I love what is superior what is 
excellent, or what I conceive to be so, & wish, ardently wish to be 
convinced of the existence of a God that so superior a spirit should 
derive happiness from my exertions—for Love is Heaven, & Heaven is 
Love. Oh! that it were. (Letters, 44)       
 
We find a similar, though more abstract, description of love in Shelley’s 1818 
essay “On Love”: 
  Thou demandest what is Love. It is that powerful attraction 
towards all that we conceive or fear or hope beyond ourselves when we 
find within our own thoughts the chasm of an insufficient void and 
seek to awaken in all things that are a community with what we 
experience within ourselves. . . . We dimly see within our intellectual 
nature a miniature as it were of our entire self, yet deprived of all that 
we condemn or despise, the ideal prototype of every thing excellent or 
lovely that we are capable of conceiving as belonging to the nature of 
man. . . . a mirror whose surface reflects only the forms of purity and 
brightness: a soul within our soul that describes a circle around its 
proper Paradise which pain and sorrow or evil dare not overleap. (SPP, 
503-504)  
 
In both of these instances, there can be no better description of Lacan’s objet 
petit a, or as Shelley would have known it from his translation of Plato’s 
Symposium, the agalma, the secret treasure which the lover sees in his 
beloved but which is merely a fantasy screen for the lover’s desire (as Socrates 
explains to Alcibiades). The lover loves what the beloved does not, in fact, 
possess, which is why the objet petit a is but a semblance of being. So when 
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Prometheus refers to Asia as the “Shadow of beauty unbeheld (III.iii.7), or 
exclaims “Asia! who when my being overflowed / Wert like a golden chalice to 
bright wine / Which else had sunk into the thirsty dust” (I.809-811), Asia 
assumes the impossible role of sustaining the masculine fantasy of a fully 
realized sexual relationship by masquerading herself as the object-cause of his 
desire. Asia is the shadow of a greater good, an ideal beauty beyond herself, 
and a chalice which preserves and gives form to an excess of being that would 
be lost if not for her “transforming presence” (I.832).  
 In either case—whether as screen or form—Asia’s own sense of identity 
intimately depends upon her status as an object of desire, whereas 
Prometheus’s identity depends upon his symbolic status as the “saviour and 
the strength of suffering man” (I.234). Or, as I’ve described by way of Lacan’s 
sexuation formulas elsewhere throughout my study, the masculine subject 
identifies with the object-cause of desire and the feminine subject identifies 
with the phallic object. The difference between this normative heterosexual 
relationship and the perverse structure I’ve discussed above lies in the fact 
that Prometheus disavows the castrating function of Jupiter, despite all 
empirical evidence to the contrary, and positions himself as its exception. 
Jupiter is monarch over all spirits but “One,” and Prometheus identifies 
himself with this “One.” According to Lacan, the two seemingly contradictory 
propositions that define the masculine subject—1) There is at least one X who 
is not submitted to the phallic function; and 2) All X’s are submitted to the 
phallic function—can be understood to mean that this exception to the phallic 
function is a fantasy that the masculine subject presupposes in order to 
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account for the fact that his full emergence into the symbolic evacuates 
jouissance and institutes the metonymic movement of desire. In other words, 
for the masculine subject full jouissance is prohibited. By disavowing this 
prohibition, Prometheus establishes a perverse relation to power, as such. 
And in this perverse relation he is able to exercise a degree of liberatory 
resistance, at least within the context of his fantasy frame. 
 We are now in a position to appreciate Asia’s crucial role in the drama. 
Although she identifies with Prometheus as phallic signifier, as a feminine 
subject she has access to a mode of jouissance that is prohibited for 
Prometheus, although he has attempted to disavow his symbolic castration 
and split subjectivity. Lacan’s formula for female sexuation introduces 
another set of propositions: 1) There is not one X that is not submitted to the 
phallic function; and 2) Not all X is submitted to the phallic function. Unlike 
the masculine sexuation formulas where the masculine subject constructs a 
fantasy of full jouissance that is prohibited, the feminine sexuated subject is 
confronted with the paradox that although this Other jouissance is not 
captured within language, there is no jouissance that is not subject to the 
castrating effects of language. The point being that the symbolic order is 
incomplete, and what escapes the symbolic exposes it as being “not-all.” 
Lacan refers to this “not-all” as the “signifier of the barred Other,” a signifier 
of lack that points to the fact that the “situation,” to use Badiou’s terminology, 
is non-totalizing and can be disrupted by an aleatory event. Shelley’s name for 
this “not-all” that escapes totalization is Demogorgon. As a masculine 
sexuated subject, Prometheus’s psychic economy does not have access to the 
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lack that Demogorgon signifies, but Asia does. Demogorgon signifies the lack 
that Jupiterian ideology, or any structure of power, seeks to conceal in order 
to maintain power.  
 Prometheus does not mention, nor does he interact with Demogorgon. 
In their dialogue in Act I, the Earth mentions Demogorgon (in one of the 
more complicated set of images in the play), but it is unclear if Prometheus 
has any conception of him or it (Demogorgon is, appropriately, not gendered). 
The Earth explains to Prometheus: 
 For know there are two worlds of life and death: 
 One that which thou beholdest, but the other 
 Is underneath the grave, where do inhabit 
 The shadows of all forms that think and live 
 Till death unite them, and they part no more; 
 Dreams and the light imaginings of men 
 And all that faith creates, or love desires, 
 Terrible, strange, sublime and beauteous shapes.   
 There thou art, and dost hang, a writhing shade 
 ‘Mid whirlwind-peopled mountains; all the Gods 
 Are there, and all the Powers of nameless worlds, 
 Vast, sceptered Phantoms; heroes, men, and beasts; 
 And Demogorgon, a tremendous Gloom; 
 And he, the Supreme Tyrant, on his throne 
 Of burning Gold. . . . (I.195-209) 
 
Apart from the metaphysical difficulty of this passage, which scholars have 
interpreted in terms of Platonic, Neo-Platonic, Paracelsian, and Porphyrian 
systems,9 my concern here is Demogorgon’s presence in this mysterious 
shadow-world. I agree with Barbara Gelpi that what Shelley is attempting to 
represent is best described as the realm of the unconscious, or the Lacanian 
“space of the Other.” Gelpi cites Lacan’s observation in The Four 
Fundamental Concepts of Psychoanalysis that “It is in the space of the Other 
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that he [the subject] sees himself and the point from which he looks at himself 
is also in that space” (144). The problem, however, is that this world “beneath 
the grave” contains shadows and mirrors of living beings, so who or what does 
Demogorgon shadow? Does he or it have a counterpart like the others 
mentioned in the passage? Demogorgon is another one of Shelley’s famously 
over-determined images that reflects the theoretical perspective through 
which it is interpreted: from “necessity,” to “potentiality,” to “the One mind,” 
to “effective causality,” to “symbol of proletarian revolution,” to 
“psychoanalyst,” to “pre-Oedipal figure,” to “a symbol of how tyranny breeds 
its own destruction,” to “mystery incarnate,” etc. We know only, however, that 
Demogorgon is a “tremendous Gloom,” that has no counterpart anywhere else 
in the play. He certainly does not mirror Prometheus, who has his own 
shadowy counterpart “underneath the grave” (which also raises difficulties 
since Prometheus is immortal and knows nothing of the world of death). Here 
I agree with John Pierce, who writes: Demogorgon “seems to function outside 
the psychological drama of Prometheus” (125), calling into question Gelpi’s 
reading that “the unconquered “One” is both Prometheus and Demogorgon, 
or Prometheus/Demogorgon” where “Demogorgon is that hidden but still 
vital aspect of Prometheus that holds potential for social change” (145). As I 
have argued, if anything Demogorgon is the sign of an aleatory rupture of the 
fabric of Jupiterian ideology, a shadowy site of potential resistance for Asia 
rather than for Prometheus.   
 But even so, Demogorgon’s status remains ambiguous because 
throughout Asia’s and Panthea’s journey to his realm, what begins as an 
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aleatory rupture develops into a positive representation of being as Asia 
infuses her own desire into Panthea’s second, forgotten dream. Demogorgon 
literally materializes out of the mist, an absence into a presence, a movement 
from the “signifier of the barred Other” to the “other of the barred Other.” In 
other words, Asia identifies with Demogorgon first as lack and then as a 
positive materialization of that lack as her desire (and by extension 
Prometheus’s) begins to give shape to Demogorgon as the “power” that 
manipulates the Other from behind the scenes, so that by the time they reach 
Demogorgon he is a formless presence, though replete with phallic authority. 
Asia’s fascination and sublime respect for the awe that Demogorgon inspires 
is anticipated when she and Panthea arrive at the portal to his lair. Asia 
exclaims:  
 Fit throne for such a Power! Magnificent! 
 How glorious art thou, Earth! and if thou be 
 The shadow of some Spirit lovelier still, 
 Though evil stain its work and it should be 
 Like its creation, weak yet beautiful, 
 I could fall down and worship that and thee.— 
 Even now my heart adoreth.—Wonderful! (II.iii.11-16) 
 
    As Prometheus is tempted to despair by the Furies, Asia is tempted to 
attraction to phallic power. Panthea however, assumes a more skeptical 
approach, noting that the “oracular vapour” hurled up from Demogorgon’s 
portal has been codified throughout history into systems of “truth, virtue, 
love, genius or joy—” by “lonely men wandering in their youth” (II.iii.4-6). As 
such, Panthea provides a warning against attempting to name the aleatory 
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event or to reinscribe it within the context of an existing ideological situation. 
As Demogorgon tells Asia,  
                                         —If the Abysm  
 Could vomit forth its secrets:—but a voice  
 Is wanting, the deep truth is imageless; 
 For what would it avail to bid thee gaze 
 On the revolving world? what to bid speak 
 Fate, Time, Occasion, Chance and Change?—To these 
 All things are subject but eternal Love. (II.iv.114-120) 
 
This passage best exemplifies the distinction I have made between 
Demogorgon as “signifier of the barred Other” and the “other of the big 
Other,” the latter of which Lacan insists does not exist. The transition from a 
signifier of lack to a materialization of lack corresponds to the shift from 
Demogorgon’s claim that the “deep truth is imageless” to an apparent 
formulation of that imageless truth as “All things are subject [to] “Fate, Time, 
Occasion, Chance and Change” except for “eternal Love.” The alterity of 
Demogorgon, and the rupture of indeterminacy he signifies, fuses into Asia’s 
fantasy that “light and love” are the primordial forces of the universe. Asia 
remarks that “So much I asked before, and my heart gave / The response thou 
hast given; and of such truths / Each to itself must be the oracle.—” (II.iv.121-
23). The institution of Promethean law is accomplished the moment Asia 
betrays her fidelity to the “real” of the “truth-event” and invests Demogorgon 
with a fantasmatic agency to enact the change that she and Prometheus 
desire, which, as Prometheus describes it, is the reduction of their subjectivity 
to an instrumentalized passivity: “. . . we will sit and talk of time and change / 
As the world ebbs and flows, ourselves unchanged” (III.iii.23-24) . . . “where 
discord cannot be” (III.iii.39). 
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 Barbara Gelpi wryly comments that Prometheus’s reunion with Asia, 
Panthea, and Ione takes on “some of the characteristics of an infant with 
adoring baby-sitters” (247) and that in the epithalamion of Act IV, “Imagining 
the earth and moon joyously and harmoniously aspin presents nothing like 
the difficulty involved in imagining a world of harmonious, just, and equable 
human beings” (263). While one can agree that the regressive fantasy of 
returning to the dyadic mother-child relationship of a pre-symbolic imaginary 
characteristic of psychosis, I would argue that this fantasy itself is an illusion 
that is demystified throughout the drama as a product of impossibility. 
 Prometheus Unbound stages Shelley’s version of “Twilight of the 
Idols,” where icons like Prometheus and Asia are relegated to the cultural 
memory of history, along with the desire for a social contract without 
antagonism. This may not have been Shelley’s likely intention, of course, but 
the emergent subject of modernity and psychoanalysis—the materiality of 
consciousness itself—conditions the utopian aims of the drama and 
introduces a series of obstacles to Romantic subjectivity. As Neil Fraistat has 
perceptively observed: “. . . over the course of “Prometheus Unbound” 
paradise is regained only to be unmade in “The Sensitive-Plant,” the first 
poem to follow; once lost, this paradise will not appear in the [Prometheus 
Unbound] volume” (169). The “undefiled Paradise” (58) of “The Sensitive-
Plant” is a “garden” whose beauty is a product of sexual difference, 
represented in the poem by flowers that need others to reproduce whereas the 
“sensitive-plant” is hermaphroditic, displaying none of the colors and 
fragrances of attraction: 
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 For each one was interpenetrated 
 With the light and the odour its neighbor shed 
 Like young lovers, whom youth and love make dear, 
 Wrapt and filled by their mutual atmosphere. 
  
 But the Sensitive-plant, which could give small fruit 
 Of the love which it felt from the leaf to the root, 
 Received more than all—it loved more than ever, 
 Where none wanted but it, could belong to the giver. 
  
 For the Sensitive-Plant has no bright flower; 
 Radiance and odour are not its dower— 
 It loves—even like Love—its deep heart is full— 
 It desires what it has not—the beautiful! (66-77)           
 
Although the sensitive-plant yearns for sexual difference, to participate in the 
community of love and beauty, this paradise is made possible only because of 
an Asia-like “Lady” who protects the garden from “killing insects and gnawing 
worms / And all things of obscene and unlovely forms” (41-42). When the 
Lady dies: 
 The garden once fair became cold and foul 
 Like the corpse of her who had been its soul 
 Which at first was lovely as if in sleep, 
 Then slowly changed, till it grew a hep 
 To make men tremble who never weep. (II.16-21) 
 
The garden becomes overrun by “loathliest weeds,” “course leaves,” and “. . . 
thistles, and nettles, and darnels rank, / And the dock, and henbane, and 
hemlock dank” (51-55) and fills “the place with a monstrous undergrowth, / 
Prickly, and pulpous, and blistering, and blue, / Livid and starred with a lurid 
dew” . . . “as if the decaying dead / With a spirit of growth had been 
animated!” (II.59-61). The gothic imagery of these lines mirrors that of the 
Jupiterean age as described by the Earth in Act I of Prometheus Unbound.  
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The difference, however, is that the corruption of the garden in the “Sensitive-
Plant” explicitly points to the fictionality of paradise, that the “garden” is a 
fiction of “nature” itself that exists only because of a benevolent power that 
shields it from equally natural phenomena. In this sense, the Lady in addition 
to her resemblance to Asia, also functions as an “other of the big Other,” in 
much the same way Demogorgon does. The ugliness and destructiveness that 
corrupts the garden are not imperfect forms of nature that can be 
imaginatively transfigured through the performative powers of radical 
transference or metaphorical substitution. These Shelleyesque images of the 
antagonisms of “bare life” must be forcibly expelled to sustain the Shelleyan 
illusion of a harmonic fantasy of subjective plentitude. The poem concludes 
with a lesson drawn from Prometheus Unbound, staging yet another form of 
perverse disavowal: 
 That Garden sweet, that lady fair 
 And all sweet shapes and odours there 
 In truth have never past away— 
 ’Tis we, ’tis ours, are changed—not they. 
 
 For love, and beauty, and delight 
 There is no death nor change: their might 
 Exceeds our organs—which endure 
 No light–being themselves obscure. (III.17-24) 
 
   Rather than accepting that antagonism is not subject to mediation, 
Shelleyan Romanticism again disavows the implications of Shelleyesque 
Gothicism, while the poem itself refuses such as a disavowal. We are once 
again in the perverse subject’s quest to frame his or her desire in such a way 
that falsifies experience. As Feher-Gurewich remarks, the perverse subject 
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strives “to get to the point where the enigma [of the other’s desire] can be 
formulated, yet they do not have the clues, the signifiers, with which to 
produce a theory/fantasy that could make sense of it” (202). Such a fantasy 
“Exceeds our organs–which endure / No light—being themselves obscure.” 
The Shelleyesque appears in all of its traumatic force when fantasy fails, as an 
aesthetic of impossibility. Shelley’s success as a poet is, paradoxically, a 
testament to the failure of imagination to “create from its own wreck the thing 
it contemplates.” For the poet of Adonais, the Romantic ego strives to imagine 
the “white radiance of Eternity” of an undifferentiated “One,” but the gothic 
subject is “borne darkly, fearfully, afar.” Even in a work as optimistic as 
Prometheus Unbound, the Gothic lurks in the mysterious shadows of the 
textual unconscious, an uncanny remainder of the trauma that Prometheus 
and Asia struggle to veil.     
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its earthly “vehicle” which awaits the spirit in the lower world until the 
decease of the earthly body. The “shadows of all forms that think and 
live” are the vehicles prepared for them, having no life of their own 
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